Dr. Refaat Sayed Ahmed: Washington will not enter terrestrially in the traditional sense because it understands the lessons of previous experiences, foremost among them the Afghanistan experience. Dr. Kholoud Al-Obaidi: The war is heading towards decisive options, which necessitates considering ground intervention, even if it seems unrealistic. Dr. Jamal Al-Shalabi: The idea of ground war is merely media rhetoric or a random decision that may not be implemented and perhaps falls within the framework of psychological warfare. Dr. Bilal Al-Shoubaki: The war in its current form can be ended while maintaining a state of tension within Iran without expanding the scope of confrontation outside it. Dr. Amjad Shehab: The scenario of a ground occupation of Iran is extremely difficult given the current data, and there are several factors that make this possibility unlikely. Amir Makhoul: All possibilities are open, and ground entry at this stage is unlikely because the Iranian army is still cohesive, as is the regime. Exclusive to Al-Quds - Amidst the escalating war between America and Israel, on one hand, and Iran, on the other, talk of potential ground intervention emerges after statements by US President Donald Trump in an interview with the "New York Post" on Monday, in which he said he would not rule out "putting boots on the ground," referring to ground forces, adding that "we probably won't need them," which raised questions about the limits of this option and the possibility of its implementation. Analysts and writers for "Al-Quds" suggested that a traditional ground invasion of Iran is unlikely, due to considerations related to the complex geopolitical situation of the region, in addition to the vast areas, rugged terrain, and population density that make ground warfare difficult, exhausting the United States and Israel, and giving Iran wide room for maneuver and a clear defensive advantage. However, at the same time, they warned that this war is heading towards decisive options in an attempt to restore regional balance in favor of Israel, which necessitates taking all scenarios into account. Multiple Scenarios The Egyptian strategic expert, Dr. Refaat Sayed Ahmed, believes that the United States will not enter terrestrially in this war because it understands the lessons of previous experiences, foremost among them the Afghanistan experience, where ground entry often meant a costly and problematic exit. He adds: Washington will not enter terrestrially in the traditional sense, i.e., by sending large forces to invade the country and overthrow the regime, because such an option requires extensive military operations, especially since regimes do not fall by air strikes or missiles alone, which may necessitate a massive ground intervention, something the United States is not believed to be willing to do at this stage. Sayed Ahmed points out that another possible scenario could be a limited ground entry from other directions, such as Azerbaijan, and not from the Gulf, through special forces and extended logistical operations, with the aim of seizing quantities of enriched uranium, estimated at about 460 kilograms, and stored, according to estimates, in areas far from the Gulf. Limited and Focused Operation He explains that this type of intervention, if it occurs, will be a limited and focused operation aimed at controlling nuclear materials rather than destroying them, noting that this quantity could theoretically be sufficient to produce a number of nuclear bombs if enriched to higher levels. Sayed Ahmed estimates that "the United States has been tracking the storage locations of these materials for some time through accurate intelligence efforts," considering this to be the likely scenario for any potential ground movement, rather than a full-scale invasion. In contrast, the Egyptian expert stresses that traditional ground entry remains unlikely, because Iran is a large, sprawling country capable of inflicting significant damage on attacking forces, especially in the medium term, by exhausting them and disrupting their supply lines. Sayed Ahmed adds: A complete or decisive American victory is not easily achieved in such a conflict, explaining that air strikes do not necessarily mean achieving a strategic victory, and ultimately suggests reaching a political deal that keeps the Iranian regime in place, given the difficulty of overthrowing it militarily without a large-scale ground invasion, which does not seem to be an available option. Sayed Ahmed points out that the most dangerous pressure tools Iran might resort to are raising the cost of war for the United States and its allies, such as threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, which could lead in a short period to a sharp rise in global energy prices and inflict economic damage on Gulf countries, with the aim of exerting double pressure on Washington to stop the war. Sayed Ahmed warns of an extremely dangerous scenario involving a missile veering off course towards sensitive targets, such as the Dimona reactor, and considers that such a development could open the door to a wide confrontation with catastrophic dimensions, exceeding traditional war calculations and entering the region into an unprecedented phase of escalation. The War Against Iran is Different Dr. Kholoud Al-Obaidi, a specialist in political science and international law, says: "Israel and the United States have accustomed us to waging wars in the region. It is as if our destiny is to live a new war. The motive for the wars in the region is one: to eliminate any rise or power of the region's countries, so that Israel remains in control of the peoples of this region, and this is an equation that cannot last." She points out that "Israel was established by the great powers to be their tool for imposing their hegemony on the region. So, these wars are exhausting the United States, and indeed, they are among the most important reasons for the deterioration of the United States' position as an international power." Al-Obaidi believes that "America's wars, including the experience of the war against Iraq, were harsh and costly. It was a big mistake that destroyed the United States as much as it destroyed the countries of the region. The current American president was one of the first voices to criticize the war against Iraq and Afghanistan. And here he is waging a new war, this time against Iran." Al-Obaidi adds: Reports initially indicated that the war against Iran would be different. The most important difference was that it would not be a ground war like the Iraqi war and the Afghanistan war because the two previous experiences were costly and ineffective. Al-Obaidi explains that in the American war against Iraq, the United States mobilized more than 30 countries and could not end its military operations until after more than a month. She points out that the United States faced resistance and could not impose its control due to the presence of resistance that continued thereafter and inflicted heavy losses on the Americans. Al-Obaidi clarifies that Iran's area is six times the area of Iraq, Iran's terrain is mountainous and rugged, and Iran's population is more than 80 million, while Iraq's population was twenty million, which indicates that ground warfare is impossible and unfeasible. Last Monday, US President Donald Trump said that "sending ground troops would be unnecessary." Al-Obaidi confirms that since the beginning of the war in the past three days, statements by President Trump and officials in the American administration have begun to talk about a ground war. President Trump reiterates that he may send ground troops to participate in the war. Trump's statements came a few hours after Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that the Trump administration believes its goals against Iran can be achieved without ground forces." Rubio told reporters on Capitol Hill: "Our focus is on destroying Iran's ballistic missile launch platforms, their ballistic missile stockpiles, their ability to manufacture ballistic missiles, as well as their attack drones and their navy." Adjusting War Plans Al-Obaidi says: With the escalation of the situation, we find that there is an adjustment to war plans, as Trump stated to CNN that he does not rule out sending American ground troops to Iran if needed. He said he is not hesitant about sending troops... "We probably won't need them, but if necessary, I won't refuse," he said. Al-Obaidi notes that these statements began to appear with the escalation of the situation during the strikes directed by Iran against the Arab Gulf states. The New York Post also quoted President Trump as saying that he does not rule out sending American ground troops to Iran if necessary. Al-Obaidi points out that the issue of ground presence was also confirmed by US Secretary of War Peter Hegseth, who said, "We have no presence on the ground in Iran, but we are ready to go as far as we need to achieve victory." Al-Obaidi explains that "some have begun to think about a ground invasion, and this is due to the Iranian response targeting military bases and Arab Gulf states." In her opinion, this development is due to Iran's regional expansion in the war due to its attacks on Arab Gulf states and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, noting that "there are also statements about the possibilities of a ground war in which Iran occupies parts such as Kuwait and other Arab emirates. These scenarios, although they seem unrealistic, must be taken seriously." Al-Obaidi says: President Trump expects the war to last from four to five weeks to achieve its goals and affirmed that the United States will continue its attacks on Iran until all forms of threat are eliminated, noting that it may last for more than five weeks if necessary. She adds: The confirmation that has come more than once, therefore, must be taken seriously, and despite the difficulty of imagining its realization, this war is heading towards decisive options. Therefore, we must take ground warfare into account. Analysts ruled out the idea of a comprehensive ground war to occupy Iran, and suggested that ground warfare might mean deploying special forces in specific cases, such as assisting separatist movements or political groups in the event of regime change. Al-Obaidi believes that the current war is a war to restore regional balance in favor of Israel, which does not hide its intentions and projects. The solution is for us to stand united, like many countries in the world now, Spain and Italy, against the war and condemn the Israeli-American aggression. A Hasty and Perhaps Ill-Considered Idea Dr. Jamal Al-Shalabi, Professor of Political Science at Hashemite University in Amman, says that this idea was put forward by US President Donald Trump, amidst a difficult, expanding, and dangerous war for the Middle East as a whole, noting that putting it forward just four days after the start of the confrontation and attack on Iran opens the door to many questions and scenarios. Al-Shalabi explains that the most prominent of these questions are: Does the United States want to wage a long-term war? Is it seeking to recall its experience of intervention and invasion of Afghanistan? Does this proposal reflect an inability to achieve goals through air power alone? He adds: These questions reinforce the impression that the idea is hasty and perhaps ill-considered, and no less dangerous than the decision of war itself, which has not been sufficiently analyzed in light of the nature of the region and its religious, political, military, and economic complexities. The War Will Affect the Pace of the Global Economy Al-Shalabi emphasizes that the region does not only represent its existing political entities, such as the Gulf states, Iran, Israel, and the United States, but also represents the arteries of global trade, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, and others, which means that the course of the war will affect the pace and trends of the global economy. Al-Shalabi suggests that the idea of ground war is merely rhetoric or a random decision that may not be implemented, and perhaps falls within the framework of psychological warfare in which Trump excelled, in an attempt to win the confrontation morally against the Iranians. He wonders about the possible scenarios, including: Can the regime be overthrown after weeks of bombing through an American ground intervention? He expresses his doubts about this. He also points to the possibility of using mercenaries from different countries, but he considered this option complex and difficult to implement, given what it requires in terms of organization, training, and long operational planning. Al-Shalabi puts forward a third possibility, which is to persuade some Arab countries affected by Iranian strikes to participate in the war by sending troops, supported by American forces from behind. However, he believes that this scenario is also not easy to achieve, although it remains a possibility if the war drags on. As for the fourth possibility, Al-Shalabi considers it closer to a political maneuver or media rhetoric from a president who views the world with a deal-making and quick-decision mentality, and points out that losses in this region are not only financial, but also affect values, role, influence, and strategic image. He personally rules out that the United States will implement this idea on the ground or include it in an actual strategy to overthrow the regime, and notes that any ground intervention will give Iran a greater incentive to defend its territory, and will make it more fierce in the confrontation, which means a high human cost for the American side. Al-Shalabi points out that Iran is a large country with an area exceeding two million six hundred thousand square kilometers, which raises practical questions about the paths and limits of ground entry. He adds: Reaching Tehran requires crossing long distances, and overthrowing any central regime is linked to controlling the capital, which is extremely complex given the presence of large military forces including the army, the Revolutionary Guard, and other forces, which makes the idea of ground war incorrect or applicable in reality. Implementation of the Ground Entry Scenario is Still Premature Dr. Bilal Al-Shoubaki, Head of the Political Science Department at Hebron University, confirms that the implementation of a ground entry scenario into Iran is still premature, although it has been raised in the media and by some American officials. Al-Shoubaki points out that this proposal brings us back to a very important question related to the extent to which the entire region, including the Gulf states, is prepared to live in a long state of anticipation and security tension; as talking about the entry of ground forces practically means operations that may extend for months at least. He adds that if this scenario is actually on the table, it is linked to the goal of removing the regime, because overthrowing any political system cannot be achieved through missiles, planes, or assassinations alone, but requires a force on the ground. Al-Shoubaki explains that this force may not necessarily be an external military force, but perhaps an influential internal force that has a popular base capable of leading a comprehensive political change process, which so far seems difficult. He says: If the goal of removing the regime is seriously on the table for American or Israeli decision-makers, then theoretically, ground forces would be required to carry out this mission. However, he points out that there is another different scenario, based on not needing ground intervention, and not insisting on completely changing the regime, but rather keeping it in a state of weakness and fragility, while keeping it under constant internal pressure, and exposed to American and Israeli air superiority. According to this perception, Al-Shoubaki adds that the war in its current form can be ended while maintaining a state of tension within Iran, without expanding the scope of confrontation outside it, with the continued American role in the region as a protective element, under a remaining Iranian regime, but with fewer capabilities and weaker influence. Al-Shoubaki believes that this vision may be the closest to the thinking of a number of decision-makers in the United States, although the issue of regime removal has been publicly raised in Israel and America. He stresses the need to look at the issue from the perspective of calculating gains and losses: What will the United States and Israel gain from the survival of a weak regime? And what will they gain if they engage in a long-term war aimed at overthrowing it? Al-Shoubaki concludes that if regime change is possible at a lower cost and within a short timeframe, it may be an option for some parties. However, if it requires an extended war and a large-scale ground intervention, with the accompanying introduction of the region into a long period of instability, and giving Iran an opportunity to disrupt the region even with limited capabilities, then this option may not be acceptable. Factors Making Ground Entry Unlikely Political analyst Dr. Amjad Shehab confirms that the scenario of a ground occupation of Iran is an extremely difficult option given the current data, pointing to a number of factors that make this possibility unlikely, foremost among them the very high material, political, military, and human costs. Shehab explains that the United States has sought for decades to avoid engaging in a direct ground confrontation with Iran, considering that any move towards a ground occupation would be interpreted as a radical shift in American strategy, which until now has been limited to air strikes, assassinations, precise intelligence operations, and cruise missile attacks. Shehab points out that Washington has harsh experiences in ground interventions, including the Vietnam War, the war in Iraq, and Afghanistan, experiences that left deep military repercussions and human and psychological and political losses. He adds: The current American administration lacks, at this stage, sufficient internal support to adopt an option of this magnitude, and the risk, especially in light of political division and economic challenges. Any Ground Operation is Subject to Long-Term Attrition Shehab explained that Iran's vast area, exceeding 1.65 million square kilometers, along with its population density of nearly 90 million people, as well as its complex terrain, especially mountain ranges, the spread of religious ideology advocating resistance to any occupation, and its defensive capabilities, all make any ground operation subject to long-term attrition. Shehab emphasizes that the Iranian military mindset is skilled at managing wars of attrition, noting that even if the regime is overthrown or the army is dissolved, similar to the Iraqi model, invading forces will face urban warfare, given the difficulty of ground movement and control of major urban centers, making foreign forces visible targets and vulnerable to attacks. Shehab points out that any ground intervention will face complex strategic challenges related to terrain, popular resistance with an ideological dimension, as well as the fragility of supply lines that will remain vulnerable to targeting at any moment, which multiplies the cost of human and material attrition. The Option of a Quick End Remains Possible Amir Makhoul, a specialist in Israeli affairs at the Progress Center for Policies, estimates that all possibilities are actually open, and asks: Does this mean a ground entry, or a quick withdrawal and an urgent end to the war? He believes that the option of a quick end also remains possible due to regional pressures and the effects of the war on global energy markets and others, and emphasizes that the issue goes beyond the direct military dimension. Makhoul points out that the United States' entry at this stage seems unlikely, because the Iranian army is still cohesive, as is the political system, and there are no indications of a real ability to mobilize the Iranian interior in a different direction. Even if there is an attempt to mobilize the Kurds or other ethnic groups to take a separatist stance, this scenario is unlikely, given the existence of regional factors that prevent it, foremost among them Turkey, which does not accept the establishment of a separate Kurdish entity on its borders, or the influx of new waves of refugees into it. Matters Are Too Complex to Be Easily Resolved Makhoul emphasizes that matters are too complex to be easily resolved by Israel or the United States, because any widespread escalation could destabilize the entire region, not just implement a limited military operation. He adds that ground entry does not guarantee decisive results at this stage, as the primary strength of the United States and Israel lies in air, technological, and intelligence superiority, not in ground operations, which represent a major gamble. Also, the US President cannot engage in a widespread war of this type without congressional approval, which makes this option more complex. Makhoul points out that there are Israeli intentions to introduce commando forces or carry out special operations, which may also be a US possibility, but such operations, if they occur, will be limited in nature, such as carrying out a specific mission or kidnapping a specific person, and will not fundamentally change the course of the war. Makhoul warns of another more complex scenario, which is the success of the US President in overcoming the obstacle of Congress or obtaining a majority in favor of the war, even if small, which may push him to expand his goals beyond the nuclear and missile file. He believes that American and Israeli goals are not completely identical, but they are witnessing a kind of synchronization in managing the battle according to the strengths of each party. America Views the Conflict in a Broader Framework Makhoul believes that the United States views the conflict in a broader framework related to international competition for energy and global trade routes, and that weakening Iran may reflect on competing international projects. He says: If successful, a deeper military partnership between Washington and Tel Aviv may be established, going beyond mere traditional support. However, if it fails, it may negatively affect US priorities and Israel's position, and perhaps the US President's political standing domestically. Makhoul points out that Israel itself is not inclined to engage in a widespread ground war, because that would exhaust its army and capabilities, in the absence of full public consensus on this war, despite political agreement between the government and the opposition. Makhoul suggests that if the missile escalation continues, the chances of reaching an end to the war may increase instead of moving towards a ground entry, especially since its cost will be exorbitant and its results are not guaranteed, and that the qualitative American-Israeli superiority may decline if they engage in a long ground confrontation. Makhoul emphasizes that despite all options remaining theoretically on the table, the possibility of a comprehensive ground entry remains weak in the foreseeable future.
