Hezbollah's Entry into the Battle... Escalating Internal and Regional Repercussions

Dr. Osama Abdullah: Iranian axis forces may escalate indirectly to expand the pressure theater without a comprehensive regional war. Nizar Nazzal: Hezbollah's entry was expected given the nature of the ongoing conflict, and what is happening reflects a radical shift in the objectives of the confrontation. Dr. Aql Salah: Hezbollah may seek to drag Israel into a war of attrition that prolongs the confrontation and depletes its capabilities, despite the high cost to Lebanon. Sari Sammour: The actual implementation of the Lebanese government's decision to ban Hezbollah's military activities may open the door to internal conflict. Dr. Reham Odeh: The Israeli escalation may develop into a limited ground incursion into South Lebanon with the aim of creating a buffer zone. Labib Taha: The most likely scenario is unprecedented Israeli destruction of Lebanon in parallel with a sharp escalation in internal polarization. Ramallah – Exclusive to "Al-Quds" – Against the backdrop of the American-Israeli war on Iran and its repercussions, Lebanese Hezbollah joined the war, amidst warnings of a major military escalation against Lebanon, in parallel with internal Lebanese alignments and placing the region before unprecedented escalation possibilities, in which other armed factions may become involved. Writers, political analysts, specialists, and university professors, in separate interviews with "Al-Quds", believe that any expansion of the scope of military operations between Israel and Hezbollah will increase internal divisions and deepen the fragility of the Lebanese state, given the difficulty of controlling the pace in the face of escalating regional tensions. They point out that the party's intervention opens the door to potential Israeli responses, including intensive shelling of party and civilian sites, with the possibility of a limited ground incursion into South Lebanon, with the aim of establishing buffer zones, which places Lebanon before a direct cost in terms of infrastructure and human losses, and the erosion of trust in the state, making the country face an unprecedented critical stage in its modern history. Regionally, writers, analysts, specialists, and university professors expect Hezbollah's involvement to lead to an expansion of the indirect engagement, including targeting American and Israeli interests in multiple arenas, from Iraq to the Red Sea. Reshaping the Internal Lebanese Equation The political researcher and academic presents three main scenarios after Hezbollah's involvement in the confrontation within the context of the American-Israeli war with Iran, warning that any military expansion will not be limited to the field, but will extend to reshaping the Lebanese equation internally. Limited Involvement Abdullah explains that the first scenario is "limited involvement" or within controlled fiery messages, where the party may be content with expanding the margin of calculated engagement on the borders with the aim of relieving pressure on Iran, without going to a comprehensive war. Abdullah clarifies that this path keeps the escalation below a calculated ceiling, but it places Lebanon in a state of continuous security and economic attrition, and deepens the fragility of the state, especially in light of an official Lebanese position expressed by the Lebanese government, leading to the banning of Hezbollah's military activities. The Scene of the 2006 War As for the second scenario, according to Abdullah, it is "comprehensive war," if mutual strikes expand significantly, which may bring back the scene of the 2006 war but with much greater destructive capabilities. Abdullah points out that Lebanese infrastructure will be a direct target in this path, which will push the already exhausted economy towards a deeper collapse, with possibilities of widespread internal displacement and increasing institutional disintegration, considering that this scenario is consistent with what the occupation government and its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, specifically want. Mutual Deterrence Abdullah indicates that the third scenario is "mutual deterrence," where the threat of intervention is used as a political pressure card to enhance regional negotiation terms without extensive military implementation, and in this case, Lebanon remains hostage to a sustained state of tension, without a comprehensive explosion, but with continued risks. Sharper Internal Political Division Internally, Abdullah warns that any military expansion will lead to a sharper political division over the decision of war and peace, immense pressure on the lira and the banking sector, and increased probabilities of social tension, in addition to the erosion of what remains of trust in the central state. Abdullah believes that widespread intervention does not mean merely a military confrontation, but rather plunging the country into a phase of long-term instability. Indirect Involvement of Iranian Axis Factions Regionally, Abdullah links the scene to what is known as the Iranian influence axis, which includes armed actors in Yemen through Ansar Allah, and in Iraq through factions affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces. Abdullah believes that the likely scenario for the intervention of armed forces from the Iranian axis is indirect escalation, through missile or drone attacks targeting American interests or Israeli-linked targets, with the aim of expanding the pressure theater without providing a justification for a comprehensive regional war. Abdullah points out that the widespread intervention of Iranian axis forces remains dependent on two main factors: the extent of direct targeting of Iran, and Tehran's decision to turn the confrontation into a multi-front war. Abdullah emphasizes that Iranian strategy historically tends towards "managing escalation" rather than "comprehensive explosion," but the region is entering a phase of "dangerous strategic fluidity," where a small tactical error could lead to a wide regional transformation that transcends current rules of engagement. A Network of Iranian Proxies in Anticipation of an Existential War Nizar Nazzal, a researcher specializing in Israeli affairs and conflict issues, believes that Hezbollah's entry into the confrontation was expected given the nature of the ongoing conflict, emphasizing that what is happening is not related to a limited security operation or the assassination of a specific person, but rather reflects a radical shift in the objectives of the confrontation. Nazzal explains that the current escalation is related to targeting the Shiite community more broadly, within the framework of American strategic objectives with which Israel is fully aligned. Nazzal points out that the past period witnessed investment in the state of tension with Iran with the aim of reaching a settlement with Washington regarding its nuclear file, including zeroing enrichment and handing over quantities of enriched uranium, noting that things were moving towards a possible understanding before US President Donald Trump was convinced by the viewpoint of the Israeli Prime Minister, which led to a shift towards the option of war, with the central goal shifting to overthrowing the Iranian regime. Nazzal believes that Iran has worked throughout the past years to build a network of arms and proxies in anticipation of an existential war. The High Cost to Lebanon Nazzal emphasizes that Hezbollah's entry will cost Lebanon dearly, especially given the Israeli army's move to enter the entire South Lebanon and regain control of the areas from which it withdrew in September 2000, as Israel is waiting for the right moment or justification to reoccupy every inch it withdrew from. Regarding the Lebanese government's decision to outlaw Hezbollah, Nazzal questions the effectiveness of these measures, emphasizing that Israel now has the pretext to act, at a time when the party realizes that the Lebanese state is unable to stop the coming "storm." Potential Qualitative Entry of the Houthis Nazzal speaks of the expansion of the confrontation regionally, noting that Iraqi factions targeted American bases with drones, with expectations of continued targeting in Erbil and Syria. He points to a decision issued by Tehran calling on all its allies to engage in the battle. Nazzal believes that the potential entry of the Houthis could be qualitative and surprising, whether through targeting American naval vessels or carrying out large operations. Nazzal believes that the region is heading towards a regional war of an existential nature, transcending the logic of military pressure towards negotiation to an attempt to overthrow the state entirely. Hezbollah's Entry After Thousands of Breaches Aql Salah, a writer, political analyst, and professor of comparative political systems, believes that Hezbollah's entry into the war after the escalation with Iran came in the context of a long process of attrition, explaining that for about 15 months since the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, the Lebanese arena witnessed thousands of Israeli violations, including assassinations, shelling, and arrests within Lebanese territory, resulting in hundreds of casualties and widespread destruction. Preemptive Israeli Strike Salah indicates that the party had been warning and demanding the Lebanese government to pressure for an end to these violations, without success, which reinforced its conviction that its turn would come after Iran, but the Lebanese government's announcement of banning the party's military activities may exacerbate the internal crisis. Salah points out that repeated Israeli statements preceding the war on Iran confirmed the intention to carry out a wide operation to disarm the party by force, explaining that Tel Aviv's policy in recent months was based on exhausting and besieging the party in preparation for settling accounts with it. Crossing Red Lines Salah believes that targeting Iran, as the central supporter of the party, constituted a qualitative shift, especially with Israel and the United States going too far in killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which the party considered a crossing of red lines and an assault on its religious and ideological authority, thus imposing on it the duty of support and defense. Salah explains that not participating in an ongoing war against the party for more than a year would have been a blow to its ideological connection, which made it face the option of engaging in combat to impose the "non-aggression" equation that existed before October 7, 2023, and which is based on returning a blow with a blow. Opportunity to Rebuild Internal and External Understandings Salah points out that internal Lebanese governmental pressures, towards adopting American-Israeli policies to besiege and disarm the party, pushed the party to consider the confrontation an opportunity to rebuild internal and external understandings. Regarding the expected scenarios for Lebanon, Salah predicts a long war interspersed with mutual military operations, including Israeli shelling of party and other Lebanese civilian and military sites, in exchange for missile responses from the party, with the possibility of an Israeli incursion from several axes in the south. Salah believes that the party may seek to drag Israel into a war of attrition that prolongs the confrontation and depletes its capabilities, despite the high cost to Lebanon as well. Salah believes that Netanyahu is treating the battle as decisive for redrawing the Middle East under American cover, thus cementing Israel's regional superiority. Salah explains that the outcomes of the conflict are linked to the resilience of Iran and Lebanon; if Washington and Tel Aviv fail to change the regime in Tehran, they may be pushed towards a major settlement. Salah rules out the chances of a diplomatic settlement given the "Trumpian" mentality supporting Israel, pointing to Netanyahu's internal calculations and his political ambitions until 2030, and his endeavor to exploit the atmosphere of war to overcome his judicial crises. Salah warns of severe humanitarian and economic repercussions for Lebanon, including the destruction of villages and the southern suburbs, widespread displacement, and the exacerbation of internal division, in light of a fragile economy. Ideological Ties and Not Standing By Regionally, Salah expects the Houthis to announce their strong entry into the war in support of Iran and Hezbollah, considering that ideological ties make them uninterested in standing by. Salah points out that the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq have been involved since the announcement of the assassination of the Supreme Leader of the Iranian Revolution, Ali Khamenei, predicting an expansion of targeting American interests in Iraq and the region. Salah confirms that the scene is heading towards an open "bone-breaking" conflict with wide regional possibilities. Fears of Internal Lebanese Collision Sari Sammour, a writer and political analyst, explains that Hezbollah's intervention in the ongoing confrontation after the war on Iran "was expected and unexpected at the same time," noting that the sensitivity of the internal situation in Lebanon makes any military involvement of the party a highly influential factor on political and sectarian balances. Sammour points out that the Lebanese government quickly banned the party's military activities, considering that if this decision is actually implemented and does not remain within the framework of a media announcement, it may open the door to an internal conflict that may take on a sectarian or political dimension, especially since the party represents a fundamental segment of the Shiite community in the country. Sammour believes that Israel "will not pay attention to internal Lebanese considerations" and will continue its military operations, which reinforces the action-reaction equation, and leaves the door open to the possibility of the confrontation shifting from an exchange of shelling to ground clashes. Internal Lebanese Alignments Sammour points out that the Lebanese arena has been witnessing sharp alignments for some time that may deepen further in light of developments, describing the Lebanese government's decision as hasty, because Israel has not shown willingness to stop its operations, but rather has made a clear decision to "crush the party permanently." Regarding the expansion of regional intervention, Sammour explains that the Houthi group announced that it may intervene at "a certain moment" according to specific data, although Iran is a strong country that does not need immediate assistance, noting that parties in Iraq have already entered the confrontation, expecting this intervention to expand. The Scene Towards an "Oil Slick" Sammour believes that the scene is heading towards something like an "oil slick" spreading from northern Iraq through the Gulf states and Jordan to Palestine, with escalating tension along what is known as the Fertile Crescent region. Sammour believes that the possibility of containing the escalation still exists "with conditions," but things have become more complicated, especially given Iran's adherence to its nuclear program and its rejection of American and Israeli conditions. Sammour stresses that the region has entered a phase of "bone-breaking war and redrawing maps," and that returning to before October 7, 2023, has become unrealistic. Israeli Ground Incursion into South Lebanon Dr. Reham Odeh, a writer and political analyst, explains that Hezbollah's continued involvement in the war, through launching missiles towards Israeli targets, makes the most likely scenario Israel's continued shelling operations against party targets inside Lebanon, in parallel with intensified attempts to assassinate leaders and active members of the party. Odeh indicates that this path, with Hezbollah's entry into the war and the Israeli escalation, may develop into a limited Israeli ground incursion into South Lebanon, with the aim of creating a security buffer zone along the border. The Regional Scene is Prone to Further Expansion Odeh believes that the regional scene is prone to further expansion, as Israeli air attacks may extend to include Iranian military sites and Revolutionary Guard headquarters, with the possibility of additional assassinations of Iranian leaders within a period ranging from two weeks to a month. In the event of a failure to reach a ceasefire agreement, Odeh expects Israeli air operations against Iran to continue during 2026, but within combat phases interspersed with short truces. Odeh points out that Iran's continued launching of missiles towards Arab Gulf states, without a prospect for a ceasefire, especially if these missiles hit vital facilities such as oil sites, may push some Gulf states to modify their strategy from merely defending to adopting an offensive option aimed at stopping the pace of Iranian attacks. Odeh notes that the repercussions of these missiles have already affected international air traffic and economic activity in those countries. Iran and the Exclusion of Concessions Regarding the Iranian position, Odeh rules out that the current leadership will make strategic concessions related to the nuclear program or ballistic missiles in exchange for a ceasefire. However, she does not rule out, if the war extends for more than a month, the emergence of a new military leadership within the Iranian army that tends to negotiate on American-Israeli terms, while showing some flexibility with the aim of saving the country from security chaos and protecting state institutions from collapse. At the level of regional actors within the Iranian axis, Odeh explains that a number of Iraqi factions loyal to Iran have already announced their entry into the confrontation in support of Tehran, predicting that this intervention will materialize through the launching of drones targeting American sites in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, such as the American consulate in Erbil or the military base there. Odeh expects the possibility of Houthi intervention in Yemen through launching drones targeting American or Israeli ships in the Red Sea, which expands the scope of maritime tension and deepens the regional nature of the conflict. Fears of Unprecedented Israeli Destruction of Lebanon Labib Taha, a researcher and political analyst, believes that Hezbollah's intervention in the ongoing confrontation opens the door to extremely harsh scenarios for Lebanon, considering that Israel will deal with developments as an "opportunity" to launch widespread strikes, using the maximum firepower it possesses. Taha explains that Israel only deals with the language of shelling and destruction, without any regard for the human cost, as it sees no problem in comprehensive destruction leading to dozens or hundreds of casualties. Taha indicates that the most likely scenario after Hezbollah's intervention is unprecedented Israeli destruction of Lebanon, in parallel with a sharp escalation in internal polarization. The Party Facing Complex Pressures Taha points out that the Lebanese scene after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel showed the party in a state of semi-internal isolation, with governmental and presidential positions taking an anti-resistance path, which places the party in the face of complex pressures from within and without. Taha believes that Hezbollah is relatively weaker compared to previous stages, which makes it vulnerable to multilateral pressures, both on the Lebanese arena and at the level of the Arab region, where pro-Israel and US forces will stand against it. Nevertheless, Taha believes that the party will head towards confrontation, not out of "heroism or showmanship," but because the nature of the threat makes it face a battle it considers existential, and in which it sees no wide margin for choice or retreat. Entry of Iraqi Factions Regarding the expansion of the conflict, Taha explains that some forces and parties in Iraq have already entered the confrontation, pointing to the emergence of names of factions that were not widely known previously, while the Popular Mobilization Forces' situation is more complex by virtue of being part of the official Iraqi institution, which may push it - if intervention occurs - to follow indirect methods, such as logistical or armament support, instead of overt involvement. Regarding Yemen, Taha indicates that the intervention of parties there remains a possibility within a broader regional context. The Region is Heading Towards a "Dark Tunnel" Taha believes that the entire region is heading towards a highly ambiguous phase, which can be likened to a "dark tunnel," where it is difficult to accurately predict its outcomes, despite the possibility of anticipating some scenarios, emphasizing that future developments may exceed all traditional calculations.