When Change Becomes a Condition for National Salvation: From an Authority Born of the Intifada… to an Intifada Searching for Leadership

The current Palestinian moment is no longer just another round of conflict with the occupation; it has become a moment of existential test where all elements of danger intersect: a devastating war on the Gaza Strip, unprecedented terrorist settlement escalation in the West Bank, and accelerating attempts to impose permanent realities on the ground, amidst a clear collapse of the international justice system and the international community's inability to stop the crime or deter its perpetrators.

The ISIS-like behavior of the settlers, under the protection of the terrorist occupation army, is not engaging in isolated attacks, but rather a declared daily war on Palestinian existence, as if the Tel Aviv government is racing against time to impose a new reality. In contrast, the official Palestinian leadership appears to be trapped in a state of political impotence, possessing nothing but talk of “regional and international contacts” that have not stopped killings, prevented settlement, or protected people.

The problem here is not only the limited tools but also the absence of a vision capable of rebuilding Palestinian elements of strength. The occupation has never sought pretexts, because its project precedes all pretexts. And whoever thought that letting Gaza drown in the blood of its people would protect themselves or what remained of Palestine, discovered that the colonial project does not compartmentalize its goals; what is happening in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, confirms that Jewish terrorism targets the entire Palestinian existence.

Nevertheless, the discourse of “do not give them pretexts” is still repeated, to the point where defending one's home, land, and dignity is portrayed as overstepping political boundaries. Herein lies the tragedy, not only because it is an attempt to restrict the people's right to resist occupation, but also to hold the victim responsible for the crimes of the occupier.

But the deeper question is: How did we reach this moment? Invoking 1948 is not a summoning of the past, but an attempt to understand the mechanisms of defeat when organized national action is absent. Palestinians at that time, amidst deep internal and regional imbalances, relied on promises of protection, while the Zionist project had a clear plan and organized tools to settle facts on the ground.

Today, circumstances are different, but the historical lesson is present. Arab armies no longer speak of confrontation, and the question is no longer how to prevent the occupation from implementing its project, but how to negotiate with it about the limits of its crimes. Here, reliance on external parties has transformed from a political tool into a substitute for building self-strength.

Perhaps the most tangible comparison is not only between 1948 and today, but between the experience of the First Intifada and the current reality. The First Intifada was not just a popular confrontation with the occupation, but a model for building national strength from within society. It stemmed from the concept of comprehensive popular resistance that included civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts, organizing education, social welfare, local production, and all forms of organization that made Palestinian society capable of managing its life and strengthening its steadfastness.

The unified national leadership derived its legitimacy from the people, and its mission was not to manage the population under occupation, but to build society's capacity to resist it. The nuclei of a “people's authority” emerged; the authority of popular committees that met citizens' needs and protected their steadfastness, not an authority that controlled their livelihoods or was unable to provide the minimum necessities of their lives.

But the comparison with the First Intifada is incomplete without pausing at a more pressing question: What happened to Palestinian popular action after the establishment of the Authority?

Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, the spirit of popular resistance has not disappeared, nor has society stopped creating new forms of protest and confrontation. However, it is noteworthy that the most prominent waves of mass action witnessed in recent years did not originate from the centers of the Authority's presence, but often from areas where the Authority has no direct presence or ability to contain, foremost among them occupied Jerusalem.

The Jerusalem uprising in 2017 against the electronic gates, and the successive popular uprisings in defense of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the city, as well as the waves of anger known as the Knife Intifada, all revealed an important political truth: that Palestinian society still possesses the ability to initiate when it feels that its existence and dignity are threatened.

Here the big question arises: Is the problem in the absence of the people's readiness to act, or in the nature of the political structure that emerged after Oslo, which gradually separated society from its national project?

In the First Intifada, the leadership emerged from society and led it. After the establishment of the Authority, a different model emerged; the Authority became the center of decision-making, while society's ability to produce its independent tools declined. Instead of national institutions being an extension of the vitality of the people, part of society felt that what was required of it was to adapt to a limited political reality, not to reshape it.

The issue is not the existence of a national authority in principle, but its function, role, and structure. The question is not only, should the Authority continue or not? But, what kind of authority do we want? And what is its function in a stage where the occupation is still ongoing?

Will it be an authority that manages the population under occupation, adapting to the limits allowed by the occupation? Or a tool to strengthen society's steadfastness and build its political and organizational capacity to end the occupation?

The current Palestinian dilemma is not only the failure of the Authority. The deeper problem is the absence of the ability to acknowledge failure and review the path, and the transformation of impotence into a state that is defended, while the occupation continues to change the reality on the ground. The Authority, which was established as a transitional stage towards freedom and independence, finds itself, after more than three decades, facing fundamental questions: If it has not ended the occupation, not stopped settlement, not protected the land, and not provided citizens with the minimum economic and social security, what gives it the right to continue in its current form as a leadership for the national project?

Here the question becomes legitimate: What concept of leadership is this?

Leadership is not a permanent privilege, nor a monopoly of representation. Its legitimacy is not granted forever, but is earned from its ability to perform its national function. And when this function is lost, changing and renewing the leadership becomes a national necessity, not just a struggle for power.

But exiting the crisis is not by replacing names with names, nor by re-distributing positions, but by rebuilding the concept of leadership itself; a leadership that stems from society, is based on popular participation, and restores credibility to organized popular resistance as a comprehensive political and social project.

The question today is not only: Are we on the verge of a new intifada? Intifadas do not begin with a decision, but explode when society reaches the conviction that silence has become more costly than action. And all indicators suggest that Palestinians are approaching this moment of explosion.

So the real question is: What kind of intifada will it be?

Will it be a return to the 1987 model, where popular anger transforms into an organized national project led by a unified vision? Or will it be scattered explosions consumed by the occupation, and the danger will not be the absence of the ability to resist; for Palestinians have repeatedly proven this ability. The real danger is the absence of vision, unity, and leadership capable of transforming this ability into political power.

Therefore, the great national task today is not to preserve a reality that has exhausted its justifications, but to rebuild a national movement capable of restoring the meaning of leadership, meaning that the authority should be a tool in the service of the people and not the other way around, and that its main priority is to provide the elements of survival, steadfastness, and the ability to confront.