Gaza Strip and the US-Iranian Memorandum of Understanding

Although the Gaza Strip does not appear in any of the texts of the US-Iranian Memorandum of Understanding signed by both sides on Thursday (June 18, 2026), Gaza (and the Palestinian issue in general) remained present in the background, priorities, and future paths of the scene, contrary to the declared American and Israeli goals of overthrowing the Iranian regime, establishing an allied regime on its ruins, eliminating the Iranian nuclear file, subjugating and taming Iran, and moving towards forming a new Middle East and ushering the region into the “Israeli Era.” All of this has not been achieved, and America and “Israel” have become further away and more frustrated with the possibility of achieving their goals. It is true that Iran suffered significant targeting of its political and military leaders and scientists, and many of its nuclear, missile, naval capabilities, and infrastructure were hit. However, the Iranian political system maintained its cohesion and effectiveness, and was able to renew and compensate for many of its military capabilities. It also witnessed greater popular support in the face of external aggression and was able to “cleanse” its internal front of large numbers of “agents” and supporters of the counter-revolution. At the same time, Iran forced the American side to end the war, lift the siege on Iranian ports, and allow for much better Iranian economic conditions (than before the war) through the freedom to export oil, and an American commitment to provide at least 300 billion US dollars for the reconstruction of Iran in cooperation with regional partners, and to lift sanctions and release frozen Iranian funds and assets as part of the final agreement. Iran also succeeded in linking the cessation of war with it to its cessation in Lebanon; the agreement provided practical American recognition of Iran’s regional role. As for Iran’s commitments regarding the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear file, there are no real new commitments, while arrangements and agreements were left for future negotiations. Perhaps this is the reason for the great frustration among the ruling coalition and the opposition in Israel; many saw what happened as a major strategic failure for “Israel”; and that Netanyahu’s “adventure” in aggression against Iran did not bear fruit, with widespread demands for his resignation. Repercussions on the Gaza Strip: There are two scenarios or conflicting views regarding the potential repercussions on the Gaza Strip: The first scenario believes that the repercussions will be negative, as it assumes that the transition of the Iranian situation from confrontation to regional and international settlement and accommodation will push Iran towards a repositioning commensurate with development and reconstruction projects in Iran, which will reduce its involvement in confronting the Zionist project and weaken its preoccupation with regional influence; consequently, the Palestinian issue will decline in Iran’s priorities; especially after the heavy prices Iran has paid, and with the presence of regional countries normalizing with “Israel” and allied with America. This scenario assumes that even if the principled Iranian stance towards the occupation and towards Gaza, Jerusalem, Palestine, and its people continues, it will be more confined to the political and media framework, and will move further away from military and financial support for the resistance. This scenario also assumes stronger opportunities for Israeli-American unilateralism in Gaza and the Palestinian file, and an attempt to erase it, and a greater impetus towards Arab-Islamic normalization with the occupation. This means moving more towards dealing with Gaza as a humanitarian relief issue, not as a political issue or an issue of liberation from occupation. The second scenario states that: • As long as Iran has established itself as an undeniable regional player, • As long as the hypothesis of overthrowing the regime, on which many relied, has fallen, • As long as “Israel’s” dreams of forming a new Middle East have “evaporated,” • As long as “Israel’s” value as a potential strategic ally has greatly diminished in the eyes of Gulf and regional countries, • As long as America, with all its “greatness,” failed to open the Strait of Hormuz and fully protect its allies, • As long as Iran has emerged from its war with a more hardline and resolute leadership, and with a greater desire for revenge for its dignity, its leader, and its leadership, and with a stronger role for the Revolutionary Guard, • As long as it has been able to compensate for many of its weapons and military capabilities, • It has also been able to impose a ceasefire in Lebanon on the Memorandum of Understanding, with readiness to return to war and bomb “Israel” if the Israeli aggression in Lebanon does not stop, • As long as the value of Lebanese and Palestinian resistance has increased in Iranian national security considerations, All of this gives clear indications that the Iranians still give weight to their allies and to regional considerations, and that a state of internal Iranian “retreat” remains unlikely. According to this trend, the Iranians clearly realized, after the fierce aggression that targeted the heart of their political system and killed their leaders, the extent of the Israeli danger to them, and that dealing with them as an “enemy” and entering into a “direct conflict” with them took its actual dimension; therefore, confronting the Zionist project is not a tactical matter, nor a matter that can be postponed; consequently, the importance of Palestinian resistance and its support as a first line of defense against the Zionist project and its extensions in the region is increasing. Also, lifting the siege on Iran and the flow of investments and the improvement of the economic situation will free Iran from external economic pressures; and will increase its financial surplus, putting it in a better position to protect its national security, and to rebuild and support its network of allies. Therefore, perhaps the understanding of Israeli politicians, experts, and military personnel of the implications of the second scenario made them express their anger and frustration; and pushed the Israeli occupation to escalate its aggression against Lebanon in an attempt to thwart the “Memorandum of Understanding,” and also pushed them to further escalation in the Gaza Strip. While Netanyahu will try to race against time to achieve some accomplishment before the upcoming Israeli elections, the opinion polls themselves indicate that time will pass Netanyahu by, with a tremendous record of destruction and genocide and a strategic failure to achieve the declared goals. This does not mean that the opposition that may win is better than him, but it may be more realistic in dealing with the facts on the ground; while avoiding a clash with Trump, who is trying to make the Memorandum of Understanding a success, as he is trying to make the “Peace Council” in Gaza a success. Therefore, America pressured to prevent an imminent Israeli attack to try to invade what remains of the Gaza Strip; which made the Israeli occupation cancel the attack, albeit temporarily. Also, “Israel’s” attempt to improve its image (in an environment of international isolation and global popular hostility) may force it to ease pressure on the Strip, especially in humanitarian and living aspects. Finally, perhaps the course of events in the short term will tend to favor Iran’s calming stance regarding Gaza and Palestine, in the hope of passing the Memorandum of Understanding and benefiting from its outcomes, especially in the next sixty days, but the second scenario may become more likely in the medium and long term. The state of instability in the region will also continue, as will the state of formation and re-formation, which opens the door for a number of opportunities, the most prominent of which is that the decline in Arab countries’ trust in the benefits of the relationship with “Israel” and the emergence of the danger of expansion and hegemony will create better common ground in the relationship with Palestinian resistance forces and support for Gaza and the Palestinian issue in general, and even with Iran. This is with our deep understanding that many risks remain, and that there are regimes that do not learn from the lessons of history!