Hell's Truce: Trump's Bridge to Salvation from the Quagmire of Miscalculations

Dr. Hassan Ayoub: The path to a final agreement is still early, and Iran will not accept turning the ceasefire into an extended state of fragile calm or Israel resuming attacks. Dr. Osama Abdullah: The decision to respond to Pakistani mediation did not stem from a genuine desire for understanding, but from an attempt to escape a "strategic impasse" without admitting defeat. Noman Tawfiq Al-Abed: Israel is the biggest loser so far, as Netanyahu was counting on overthrowing the Iranian regime or striking its regional influence, but what happened constituted a "slap" to him. Dr. Tamara Haddad: The biggest losers in this confrontation are the Arab Gulf states, which will find themselves under the influence of Iranian power, especially concerning the movement in the Strait of Hormuz. Dr. Amjad Bashkar: The current truce is a mutual cessation of attacks, and the United States' acceptance of negotiations based on ten Iranian demands reflects a fundamental shift. Suleiman Basharat: Iran's ability to maintain its network of allies in the region and solidify their role within power equations may give it greater momentum in regional issues. Ramallah - Exclusive to "Al-Quds" - In an unexpected context and at crucial moments, the truce imposed on Wednesday dawn, through Pakistani mediation, brings the war between the United States and Iran into a delicate transitional phase, after the confrontation reached a major escalation that almost dragged the region and the world into an undesirable war. Writers, political analysts, specialists, and university professors, in separate interviews with "Al-Quds," believe that the escalation, which began with a high-threatening tone, ended with an American acceptance of a temporary ceasefire and the imposition of opening the Strait of Hormuz, which was originally open before the confrontation, a clear indication that the declared goals of the war were not achieved, and that continuing would have led to a cost greater than the American administration's ability to bear. They point out that Iran, in turn, managed to turn the time of confrontation into an opportunity to strengthen its regional influence and prove its resilience, making its negotiating card a relied-upon basis for future talks, and that this shift reflects an implicit acknowledgment of the limits of American power, and that Tehran has become a player whose conditions are difficult to bypass. They believe that despite the cessation of attacks, the truce remains surrounded by factors of fragility, amidst Israeli opposition to the path of understanding, and Iranian insistence on rejecting any long-term calm without guarantees, which makes the next phase a test of the mediators' ability to prevent a return to escalation and keep negotiation channels open. American-Israeli Recognition of the Limits of Power Political science professor and American affairs specialist Dr. Hassan Ayoub believes that the transformation of the issue of opening the Strait of Hormuz — an emergency matter during the war — into the primary American condition for stopping the American-Israeli war on Iran, clearly reveals that the declared goals of US President Donald Trump were not achieved. Ayoub believes that Washington's agreement to adopt the ten-point Iranian paper as a basis for future negotiations represents an American and Israeli recognition of the limits of power, after weeks of military escalation and widespread threats that did not translate into strategic achievements. According to Ayoub, Iran dealt with the war as an opportunity to establish a new deterrent equation at the regional level, and not just within the framework of confrontation with Israel. Despite the heavy price Tehran paid, it succeeded — according to Ayoub — in imposing a pattern of "response in kind" throughout the confrontation, which enhanced the credibility of its field threats. Ayoub points out that this pattern is what made Trump's recent threats to "wipe out Iranian civilization" unenforceable, especially after Iran responded by declaring its readiness to respond at the same level. American Political Retreat Ayoub confirms that Trump's acceptance of stopping the aggression can only be interpreted as a political retreat, especially after the widespread criticism of his statements domestically and internationally, and Washington and Tel Aviv's inability to achieve the declared war goals. The Path to a Final Agreement is Still Early However, Ayoub believes that the path to a final agreement is still early, as Iran will not accept turning the ceasefire into an extended state of fragile calm, while Israel and its allies within the Trump administration and decision-making institutions in Washington will push for a resumption of attacks. Ayoub believes that several field and political factors may open the door to a final agreement that meets a significant part of Iranian demands, including: Washington's recognition of the Iranian paper as a reference for negotiation, Iran's ability to continue the confrontation for a long time without collapse, Tehran's understandings with influential regional and international parties regarding the operation of the Strait of Hormuz, which gave it an additional strong card simultaneously with its acceptance of its re-operation, in addition to regional and international fears of a return to a widespread war, and the United States' failure to obtain international legitimacy for its military operations, alongside the noticeable decline in the legitimacy of the war within American society. Netanyahu Tries to Circumvent the Agreement As for Israel, Ayoub confirms that it played a fundamental role in pushing Washington towards the war, which he describes as "Israeli par excellence," but Trump was the party who forced Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept its temporary cessation. Ayoub believes that the language of Netanyahu's statement reflects an attempt to circumvent the agreement, especially with Israel's refusal to apply it to Lebanon despite Pakistan's announcement that its provisions include the Lebanese arena. Ayoub points out that Israel is not satisfied with the current path and will work to obstruct the transition towards a final agreement that ends the war and lifts sanctions on Iran, leading to new understandings regarding its nuclear file without dismantling it, which are fundamental demands Tehran adheres to. A Forced Shift Imposed by Field Realities Political researcher and academic Dr. Osama Abdullah believes that the United States' acceptance of the Pakistani initiative regarding stopping the war on Iran cannot be described as a limited tactical retreat, but rather a forced shift imposed by field realities and the confusion of American policy during the recent confrontation. Abdullah explains that the Trump administration started with a high escalatory rhetoric based on the assumption of a quick decisive victory and achieving clear deterrent superiority, but the war, which lasted for more than a month, revealed a much higher cost than Washington expected, whether militarily, economically, or in terms of the stability of allies in the region. Attempt to Escape a "Strategic Impasse" Abdullah points out that the decision to respond to Pakistani mediation did not stem from a genuine desire for understanding, but from an attempt to escape a "strategic impasse" without admitting defeat, after the continuation of escalation threatened to expand the confrontation into a comprehensive regional conflict whose repercussions would be difficult to control. Abdullah believes that Tehran achieved three main gains by accepting the Pakistani initiative: resilience under pressure without internal tremor, imposing a mutual deterrence equation that ends American unilateral superiority, and shifting the confrontation to an intertwined regional level that limits Washington's ability to achieve a decisive victory. Abdullah explains that Iran's non-defeat constitutes an achievement in the current balance of power, in contrast to an American realization that the ceiling of its ability to impose its will has become limited. Phase of Testing Intentions Regarding the nature of the current phase, Abdullah stresses that the scene does not show signs of a comprehensive strategic settlement, but rather suggests a temporary tactical truce, as the fundamental issues that ignited the confrontation—from regional influence to the nuclear file and Israel's security—remain unresolved. Abdullah points out that talking about two weeks as a timeframe for de-escalation reflects that the parties are still testing intentions and rearranging their positions, not building a final agreement. Abdullah believes that the way out of the war will not be military, but political, through three parallel paths: controlling escalation through undeclared understandings, reactivating the negotiation process through regional and international mediators, and then reaching understandings on spheres of influence as the core and primary driver of the conflict. As for the future of the confrontation with Israel and Iran's allies, Abdullah expects the continuation of a low-intensity war pattern instead of a full-blown explosion, as Israel will continue its operations within limits that do not open a wide regional confrontation, while Iran's allies will continue calculated pressure, and Tehran will adopt a strategy of "managing engagement" to control the pace without going towards a costly open war for all parties. Abdullah points out that the regional scene is still in a fragile phase, whose main title is: conditional de-escalation, open conflict, and complex calculations governing what will happen next. The Rise of Pakistan's Role in International Balances Writer, political analyst, and international relations specialist Noman Tawfiq Al-Abed confirms that the role played by Pakistani Army Chief Marshal Asim Munir was a fundamental factor in pushing for the current truce between the United States and Iran, noting that Munir, by virtue of his previous security and military influence in the Pakistani intelligence administration, has become a regional player capable of influencing Middle East issues. Al-Abed believes that this mediation reflects the rise of Pakistan's role in international balances, and that its success opens the door for influential future interventions. Al-Abed explains that US President Donald Trump found himself involved in a war he was not prepared for, after being misled by the Israeli occupation state and some of his close advisors who supported Netanyahu. The Cohesion of the Iranian Regime Surprised Trump Al-Abed points out that Trump had been waiting for the collapse of the Iranian regime throughout the past period, before being surprised by its cohesion and its ability to absorb blows and its possession of pre-planned strategies for managing the confrontation. Al-Abed explains that Trump's mentality, based on the idea of a "deal," led him to believe that mere threats would force Iran to accept his terms, but he clashed with Tehran's refusal and discipline in managing the battle, which dealt a blow to his political thought and his illusions about the possibility of imposing dictates by force. Political Defeat for America Al-Abed believes that Trump's acceptance of the current truce, although temporary and lasting only two weeks, constitutes a political defeat in itself; the Iranian regime remained in place, enriched uranium remained under its control, and the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab remained in Iranian hands, in addition to Tehran's continued influence through its regional proxies, which Washington had sought to curb without clear success. Al-Abed points out that the Iranian paper, which included conditions that were accepted as a basis for negotiation, represents a turning point in Trump's position, who realized, under the direct influence of the Pakistani mediator, that Iran is not a country that can be easily subdued. Israel the Biggest Loser Al-Abed confirms that Israel is the biggest loser so far, as Netanyahu was counting on overthrowing the Iranian regime or at least striking its regional influence, but what happened constituted a "slap" to him, especially after it became clear that Pakistan, which Israel had viewed as a potential target for negative influence, became the mediator that produced the truce. Al-Abed points out that the American administration's displeasure with Netanyahu has become clear, whether through marginalizing him in the negotiation process or through the statements of the US Vice President, who expressed his dissatisfaction with Tel Aviv misleading Washington. Tactical Repositioning Political writer and researcher Dr. Tamara Haddad confirms that the agreement between Iran and the United States came after US President Donald Trump responded to the Pakistani initiative, and it is not a complete strategic shift, but a tactical repositioning imposed by field results and the high cost of the war. Haddad believes that Iran's insistence on closing the Strait of Hormuz led to a global rise in oil and gas prices, which negatively affected the international economy and specifically the American domestic situation, which constituted a pressure factor on Trump and pushed him to back down from direct military threats. Haddad points out that Trump began to face escalating anxiety within the United States, manifested in the collection of signatures demanding his resignation, in addition to his fears of losing the midterm elections, which made him seek a way out that would reduce the cost of escalation without direct political loss. Haddad confirms that Trump, through his recent escalatory rhetoric, aimed to exert "rapid maximum pressure" to push Iran towards accepting urgent negotiating terms, without being drawn into a long or open war that the American administration does not desire. Washington – according to Haddad – is not concerned with overthrowing the Iranian regime, but with controlling its behavior and containing its influence, a policy closer to "managing the conflict" than ending it. Washington Reaches Deterrence Ceiling Without Sliding into War Haddad points out that Trump's response to Pakistani mediation reflects Washington reaching the ceiling of deterrence it can achieve without sliding into a wide regional war, especially with its fear of losing control over the Strait of Hormuz and global energy markets during an electorally sensitive period. Haddad explains that the mediation provided a way out that saved face for both parties, while Iran was neither defeated nor fully victorious, but it succeeded in avoiding a comprehensive strike that threatened its strategic structure, maintained its political survival, and imposed the principle of indirect negotiation through conditions it presented and Washington agreed to. Despite this, Haddad points out that Iran is still under significant military and economic pressure, which pushed it to accept a temporary truce, but it prefers a comprehensive de-escalation that prevents preemptive strikes, especially from the Israeli side, which does not show satisfaction with the American-Iranian understanding path. Short and Worrying Test Truce Haddad believes that what happened does not constitute a permanent settlement but a "short and worrying test truce," because fundamental issues such as the nuclear project, the level of enrichment, the mechanism for dealing with uranium stockpiles, in addition to sanctions, the missile project, and Iran's regional influence, have not yet been resolved. Haddad explains that exiting the cycle of war requires de-escalation, cessation of strikes, and limited security understandings in the Strait of Hormuz, followed by phased negotiations and a partial agreement in exchange for a gradual easing of sanctions, which is the approach the United States relies on in managing long-term conflicts. As for the Israeli position, Haddad believes that Tel Aviv does not consider de-escalation the end of the conflict and is preparing to continue preemptive strikes against Iran's proxies if it feels threats returning. Resetting the Conflict, Not Ending It Haddad expects the region to remain in a low-intensity friction, with the possibility of the return of a "shadow war" between different parties. Haddad stresses that what is happening is a resetting of the conflict, not its ending, as Trump did not retreat but moved from threats to forced negotiation, while Iran remained steadfast without achieving a complete victory. Haddad believes that the biggest loser in this confrontation is the Arab Gulf states, which will find themselves under the influence of Iranian power, especially with Tehran's ability to influence the movement of the Strait of Hormuz and impose fees on ships in partnership with the Sultanate of Oman, which makes the Gulf states "at the mercy of Iran" in the medium term. Haddad points out that the United States has practically abandoned its traditional reliance on Gulf states in favor of containing Iran. As for the Palestinian issue, Haddad believes that its absence from the agreements confirms that Iran acts according to its own interests, and that "only the Palestinian protects his cause." Iran Remained a True Rival Political science professor Dr. Amjad Bashkar believes that US President Donald Trump's acceptance of the Pakistani initiative regarding the truce and stopping the war on Iran represents a "significant retreat" from his previous threats, especially since Washington and Tel Aviv had aspired from the beginning of the war to overthrow the Iranian regime and replace it with opposition figures, in addition to forcibly controlling uranium enrichment materials. Bashkar points out that Trump was surprised by Iran's resilience, despite the significant difference in military power, as Tehran confronted "the strongest army in the world" and "the strongest army in the Middle East" combined, but it remained a true rival and did not break, which hindered a Western project that aimed to reshape the region. Bashkar explains that Iran suffered severe blows that affected infrastructure, bridges, petrochemical plants, and railway networks, but in return, it succeeded in preventing collapse and surrender, and became a dominant regional power militarily over the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Bashkar points out that the effectiveness of the Arab Gulf states declined during the war and they did not provide real deterrence, while attacks involving parties allied with Iran from Yemen and Iraq contributed to exposing American bases and rendering them useless, which represents the beginning of a significant decline in American influence in the Middle East. Bashkar believes that Israel failed to achieve its goals in Lebanon, and that talk of disarming "Hezbollah" has become unrealistic, which puts the future of Benjamin Netanyahu's government "on the line" after this war. Trump Abandons His Fiery Statements Bashkar points out that Trump was forced to abandon his fiery statements, and that the only clause in which Iran can be considered to have made a concession relates to opening the Strait of Hormuz, although it was originally open, and that the opening is now conditional on coordination with Iranian forces, which gives Tehran an additional advantage. Bashkar confirms that the current truce is a mutual cessation of attacks, and that the United States has accepted negotiations based on ten Iranian demands, which reflects a fundamental shift in the American position. Two Crucial Weeks Bashkar believes that the next two weeks will be crucial: either reaching an agreement that ends the war completely, or returning to square one, although he believes that a renewed confrontation is difficult. Bashkar stresses that the Iranian regime has not changed, and the missile program is still in place and moving towards development, and Washington failed to obtain the uranium it sought. As for the American and Israeli bet on an internal explosion in Iran, Bashkar explains that its result was the opposite, as the national opposition rallied around the regime instead of overthrowing it. Bashkar confirms that Iran did not submit, and its military industries remained effective, while American military industries appeared exposed, noting that Tehran's allies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen will grow stronger and more influential, as they are the front line in confronting American and Israeli influence in the region. Bashkar believes that the United States' agreement to negotiate according to the ten Iranian clauses, including compensating losses through unfreezing Iranian assets or fees on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, means that Iran is the "real victor," confirming that these revenues could make it a major financial power within years. A Ladder for Trump to Climb Down From the Tree Political writer and analyst Suleiman Basharat believes that the Pakistani initiative constituted a "ladder" for what he considers US President Donald Trump climbing down from the "tree," given the level of extreme threats he escalated to during the war, after the region was on the verge of sliding into a confrontation that could spiral into unpredictable dangerous outcomes. He explains that the Pakistani initiative provided a last chance to reintroduce rationality into political discourse and move from brandishing force to diplomatic realism, without this meaning a definitive retreat by Washington, but rather a rearrangement of the tools used in managing the conflict. Basharat points out that the war caused widespread confusion in regional and international calculations, putting the United States on the verge of a clear strategic loss, which prompted it to try to stop the decline by opening the door to a temporary negotiation path. A Fragile Path Whose Outcomes Cannot Be Predicted Basharat stresses that this path is still fragile and its outcomes cannot be definitively predicted, but it gives the parties an opportunity to re-read the scene and reshape the paths in a way that serves the interests of the region and the world. In response to a question about whether Iran had won, Basharat confirms that Tehran succeeded in establishing a new strategic equation despite the losses it incurred, as it proved that military force cannot destroy its regional project or exclude its central role in the Middle East. Tehran, according to Basharat, also strengthened its political legitimacy and became a recognized partner in managing the Strait of Hormuz after reaching a clear mechanism for managing the maritime passage, which represents an implicit acknowledgment of its sovereignty and vital role. A Test for Iran to Maintain Its Allies Basharat points out that Iran's ability to maintain its network of allies in the region and solidify their role within the power equations in the region may give it greater momentum in regional issues, especially the Palestinian and Lebanese issues, in addition to a potential impact on other paths being formed in the region. Regarding the prospects for solidifying the temporary de-escalation, Basharat believes that the region is still at a delicate balance point between the impetus for a truce and factors of escalation, and that the negotiation path will remain hostage to the ability to narrow the gaps between Iranian and American demands, and to overcome the "detonators" that Israel might push to disrupt the agreement, foremost among them the attempt to separate the Lebanese front from the de-escalation path. Basharat believes that the ability of regional mediators — Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey — to control the pace will determine the future of de-escalation in the coming weeks. Basharat confirms that the region is still on a "powder keg," and that the test of strength has shown everyone the price paid, especially by the Gulf states, which almost bore the cost of a war "that was not theirs," which confirms the need to build actual confidence-building steps to prevent a return to the cycle of escalation.