Political Analysis: A Reading of Israel’s Strategy for the Future of the Gaza Strip

The Israeli strategy toward the Gaza Strip (GS) operates across three tiers—high, medium, and low—based on the level of feasibility. Despite the variation in goals at each level, one common objective seems to underlie all three: a Gaza without weapons and without Hamas!!

The highest tier envisions occupying GS, displacing its population, annexing it wholly or in part, reactivating settlement plans, and establishing direct or indirect control over it. This implicitly entails the elimination of Hamas and the disarmament of both its forces and other resistance groups. This vision is actively discussed in far-right and Religious Zionist circles and is supported by the US, with Trump having repeatedly called for the displacement of Gaza’s population.

The middle tier involves maintaining control points within GS, exercising overt or covert authority over the crossings, and retaining unrestricted access to Gaza’s airspace, with the ability to carry out targeted raids and strikes, as is done in the West Bank (WB). Governance of Gaza would be assigned either to Arab and international forces or to the Palestinian Authority (PA)—but under Israeli-defined terms. This scenario excludes displacement, annexation and settlement, while facilitating the entry of basic necessities and some reconstruction materials. It also includes an intensive program to disarm the resistance and remove Hamas from both the political arena and the administration of the Strip.

Israel will seek to achieve what is attainable within the upper and middle tiers, based on field conditions and on-the-ground developments. At the same time, it will use these tiers as leverage in negotiations, especially if the resistance maintains its operations, aiming to reach its desired minimum objective. Israeli efforts will likely include generating pressure from international, Arab and internal Palestinian fronts—particularly from the PA and its supporters. There may also be attempts to fabricate and expand a protest movement against the resistance within GS. These moves would be reinforced by Arab and international political and media campaigns portraying Hamas as the intransigent party blocking an agreement and causing the Strip’s suffering. In addition, the cessation of the war, Israel’s withdrawal from GS, the halting of the displacement plans, and a partial easing of the blockade—along with the introduction of a Palestinian administration modeled after the PA—will be all framed as major Israeli “concessions.” This would amount to an attempt to make Hamas “swallow the knife” by conditioning the end of the war and a full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip on Hamas and the resistance agreeing to disarm and exit the Palestinian political and institutional arena.

However, the danger of such a strategy lies in its attempt to achieve the war’s primary objective while simultaneously presenting it as an Arab and international demand. It is further framed as a “national” and “pan-Arab” achievement by the normalizing Arab states that reject displacement but align with Israeli and US hostility toward the resistance axis and the “political Islam” current. Furthermore, it portrays the PA as a viable alternative capable of ending Palestinian suffering.

Key Elements of the Israeli Strategy:

An objective and analytical review of Israeli statements and positions—alongside an assessment of the actions taken by Netanyahu, his government and the military on the ground—reveals the following as the key elements of Israel’s strategy toward GS and its future:

1. Attempting to restore the image lost by Israel, on 7/10/2023, following the severe blow to its security theory, the loss of deterrence power, and the erosion of public trust in it.

2. Attempting to rebrand Israel’s functional role as an advanced fortress and a blunt instrument for Western influence in the region, while positioning it as a reliable power for Arab normalization countries, particularly in managing conflicts with their regional competitors.

3. Attempting to sear, in the harshest possible way, a sense of deterrence into the consciousness of the popular base in GS and the resistance—through overwhelming force, brutal civilian massacres, and the total destruction of homes, infrastructure, government institutions, schools, hospitals, mosques, churches, crops, and water wells, among others. This is carried out with complete disregard for legal, ethical or political standards, aiming to instill the “complex” of preventing a repeat of the October 7th attack.

4. Exploiting the wartime context to impose visions of “postwar” governance in GS, shaped by Israeli criteria and standards.

5. Exploiting the wartime environment to advance and accelerate Judaization and displacement projects in WB and GS.

6. Expanding Israel’s security doctrine to include effective deterrence across the strategic surroundings of Israel, with the aim of securing its stability and longevity—even after the Palestinian file is deemed closed. This vision has been repeatedly articulated by Netanyahu.

7. Raising the negotiation ceiling with the resistance to extremely high levels—even if these goals are unattainable—in order to use them as leverage and tools of pressure during the negotiation process.

8. Seeking to minimize the impact of the Israeli captives’ issue on the costs paid to the resistance, whether by attempting to free them, prolonging negotiations, or emphasizing the potential gains of continuing the war—even if it risks the loss of additional captives.

9. Maximizing the use of US influence and backing within the international arena, the UN Security Council and the Arab environment. Also, leveraging the US role as a mediator and its support in political, military, economic and media fields.

10. Maximizing the exploitation of Arab weakness and disillusionment, leveraging the alignment of several Arab states with anti-resistance and anti-“political Islam” agendas, and taking advantage of the ineffectiveness and failure of international institutions, all in order to advance the Israeli agenda.

11. Prolonging the war as much as possible to achieve maximum gains against the resistance, while maintaining the cohesion of the extremist coalition governing Israel, advancing its internal agendas, and evading both collapse and accountability.

12. Deliberately concealing the true losses of the Israeli army, fabricating lies about its achievements, and attempting to obscure widespread desertion within the reserve forces, as well as crises related to recruitment, all in an effort to maintain domestic support for the war.

13. Deliberately violating agreements with the resistance and using that as a means of military, political and economic coercion—exploiting the exhaustion and suffering in GS to tighten the blockade and secure strategic and negotiating gains, particularly at the resistance’s expense.

Disarmament of the Resistance:

Recent discussions have increasingly linked “post-war” arrangements in GS to the disarmament of Hamas and its exclusion from the political arena. European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron—despite his support for the two-state solution and recognition of a Palestinian state—have echoed this stance. Notably, Egypt, in its role as mediator, has added the disarmament issue to the list of negotiation clauses between Hamas and Israel. This has raised concerns among Hamas and other resistance factions, who maintain that resistance weapons are a “red line” and will not be subject to negotiation. Meanwhile, some figures aligned with the PA have sought to exploit the severe humanitarian suffering in GS by redirecting public anger toward Hamas and the resistance, rather than maintaining pressure on the Israeli occupation for its continued aggression and crimes.

The Israeli escalation, following the violation of the ceasefire and the tightening of the blockade on GS—preventing the entry of essential supplies—was characterized by bloody aggression and brutal massacres, with women and children bearing the brunt of the suffering. Israel also reoccupied parts of the Strip, displacing large numbers of its already exhausted people, who had been drained of their blood, resources and homes. This heightened the pressure to unbearable levels, while Israel reiterated its agenda with its most extreme demands. However, the resistance surprised Israel by reactivating its effective military operations and launching a parallel political campaign that reaffirms its steadfastness on fundamentals, while demonstrating maximum flexibility in issues like prisoner exchanges, aiming to save Palestinian lives, end the war and ensure a complete Israeli withdrawal from GS.

Resistance’s Arms are a Red Line:

In response to Netanyahu’s “zero-sum” strategy, driven by his extremist government, there are no clear signs of ending the war, fully withdrawing from GS, lifting the blockade, or even restoring the situation to what it was before October 7—unless the resistance continues to exhaust Israel’s army, economy and security, while intensifying internal pressure and raising the costs of the war to unsustainable levels. The resistance has made significant strides, particularly after resuming its targeted operations, while Israel’s situation becomes increasingly untenable. Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir admitted that the war could last months or possibly even years. Meanwhile, Trump’s volatile and urgent nature limits Netanyahu’s ability to prolong the war, compounded by Trump’s push for breakthroughs in regional normalization and Iran’s nuclear file. This is further complicated by an anxious Arab environment, which holds the potential for change and upheaval, and an international landscape where support for Israel has dwindled, even among its European allies.

The luxury of having options is non-existent for the resistance when it comes to engaging in this “zero-sum” battle aimed at eradicating the Palestinian people and their cause. Therefore, reliance on the resistance and its weapons remains a fundamental condition and a red line in confronting the occupation and thwarting its plans. Historical experience over more than a century bears witness to the Palestinian people’s ability to thwart dozens of plans and projects targeting them, and they are also capable of defeating this strategy and resisting this aggression.