Both Israelis and Palestinians have lost their future.

American Foreign Policy magazine

By Steven Cook, Foreign Policy staff writer and senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations

This article examines the implications of the war in Gaza for the future of Palestinians and Israelis, explaining how the conflict has complicated the political landscape and deepened the existing stalemate. It discusses the impact of Hamas's attack and the Israeli response on the prospects for a two-state solution or any political settlement. It also highlights the shifts within Israeli society and Israel's growing international isolation. A full translation of the article follows:

When the ceasefire in Gaza went into effect earlier this week, the joy across the conflict lines was palpable even from 6,000 miles away. While the complex, three-phase agreement is unlikely to be fully implemented, it will save lives, return some hostages home, and provide Palestinians in Gaza with much-needed humanitarian aid. The initial release of hostages and prisoners also offers a moment to reflect on the broader consequences of the war, most notably how the conflict has not only altered the trajectories of Israeli and Palestinian societies but has also forced them to regress in significant ways.

There is no doubt that Hamas has achieved a number of notable accomplishments since launching its offensive, dubbed "Operation Protective Edge," on October 7, 2023. It has drawn the Israeli army into a fierce battle in the Gaza Strip, undermining the international legitimacy of Israel's military and the state it defends. The Palestinian issue has not been at the forefront of regional and international politics with such intensity since the announcement of the Clinton Parameters and the attempts to salvage the Oslo process at the Egyptian resort of Taba in early 2001.

But at the same time, when Hamas sent its fighters across the separation wall between Israel and the Gaza Strip, it set the Palestinian issue back decades, perhaps a generation or more. There was a time, not so long ago, when it was possible to imagine a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. With the peace process irretrievably broken, some observers believed that a “one-state reality,” uniting the Palestinian territories with Israel, might lead to a “one-state solution” in which Palestinians and Israelis would live together. Regardless of the viability of either solution, Hamas’s 15-month-old quest to turn its vision into reality—liberating Palestine from Metulla to Eilat and from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea—made both the two-state and one-state solutions impossible.

In addition to the bloodshed perpetrated by Hamas, international outrage over what Israelis view as legitimate self-defense has diminished the number of Israelis who still believe Palestinian nationalism and Zionism can be reconciled. The Palestinians may have the right to a state, but given the power imbalance, the Israelis have the power to prevent them from achieving it. After October 7, this prospect seems closer than ever.

While Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are rejoicing over the ceasefire, they remain politically disoriented and feel that no one truly represents them. Although Hamas's popularity rises during the conflict with Israel, it declines when the harshness of life under its rule becomes clear to those living in Gaza. It is difficult not to conclude from the past two decades that Hamas's approach to holy resistance has brought Palestinians nothing but more pain and suffering. Yes, there is renewed international sympathy for the Palestinian cause, but the world has long recognized the importance of achieving justice for Palestinians, without this translating into tangible achievements.

There may be other, better options for Palestinians. A vibrant Palestinian grassroots movement is seeking new means of political representation, exploiting the past fifteen months of violence to strengthen ties between the Palestinian cause and international networks of progressives, NGOs, humanitarians, and academics. This is an interesting development, but much of the energy of these movements appears to be directed more toward delegitimizing Israel than toward building a new Palestinian political reality. Given the devastation in Gaza and the existential nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict highlighted by the Hamas attack and the Israeli response, the most lasting achievement of this attack may be the perpetuation of statelessness for Palestinians.

For Israelis, the era of “bourgeois Israel” is over. The Israel of Nike stores, luxury bicycle studios, Maseratis cruising the Ayalon Highway, and glass towers built thanks to the successes of Silicon Valley will remain, but there is a shift in the general mood among Israel’s Jewish citizens. The terror attack that targeted kibbutzim and southern towns 15 months ago has swept Israel back into a different era, one of vulnerability and uncertainty. The collective trauma has been compounded by the incomprehensible hostility Israelis have faced from governments and public opinion in the West.

Israelis have long believed they have overcome their historical isolation, but the intensity of the negative sentiments displayed by the international community toward wounded Israel has been shocking, as if UN Resolution 3379, which defined Zionism as a form of racism, had never been repealed. In the coming years, Israel will face increasing hostility from influential, though not necessarily powerful, elements within the UN system and the NGO world, who have proven their allegiance to a broad anti-Zionist front. Although Israel enjoys diplomatic relations with most countries in the world, the war in Gaza has reopened the question of its international acceptance and legitimacy.

But the consequences of the war extend beyond the hostility of bureaucrats at the UN, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and governments such as Ireland and Spain. Calls for boycott, divestment, and sanctions seem unlikely to achieve real success, given that Israel is so deeply embedded in the global economy, particularly in the high-tech and healthcare sectors. But Israelis, whose security has been strengthened and whose economy has been helped by the United States, will have to contend with higher defense budgets and increased hostility from some members of the US Democratic Party, who will be required to continue supporting security assistance to Israel. This may not have much effect while the Republican Party controls the executive branch and Congress, but Democrats will not remain out of power forever, and the Israeli military's operations in Gaza, which have killed more than 47,000 Palestinians (according to the Gaza Ministry of Health), have had a profound impact on the US Congress. The bipartisan consensus on support for Israel's security was already fraying before the Hamas attack, and the violent Israeli response on October 7 may have shattered it completely.

But what does this mean for the future of Israelis and Palestinians? It means almost nothing. Many analysts said at the outset of the war, “Out of crisis comes opportunity.” This sounds good, but it’s just words. The most likely scenario has always been a return to the status quo ante of October 6, 2023, rather than any positive shift that would enhance the chances of peace. As the release of Gonen, Damari, and Steinbrecher has made clear, Hamas still maintains its grip on Gaza, foreshadowing further Israeli blockades and periodic periods of intense violence. Meanwhile, Palestinians and Israelis are further away from achieving their national goals than ever before.