Has the 'birth pangs' of a new Middle East finally begun?

The war on Iran represents a pivotal moment, and it may indeed prove to be a harbinger of a version of the Middle East that neither the United States nor Israel desires. On September 27, 2024, Israel assassinated Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah. The strike that ended his life came after a series of other operations, the most diabolical of which were the pager attacks that disfigured thousands of the party's civilian and military cadres, in addition to dozens of passersby. I was stuck in Dubai at the time, waiting for a seat on a flight back to Beirut. Three days after the assassination, I was having lunch with two close friends, both keen political observers like myself. The three of us were perplexed because Tehran, even after the assassination of Nasrallah, a man whose stature in Iran was no less than in Lebanon, responded with an inexplicable inertia. Hezbollah, before everyone, and most importantly before its hunted and besieged public, was left to face a fierce attack alone. This abandonment was puzzling in its implications. My friends went so far as to speculate that Iran might have sold Hezbollah in a secret deal with the Americans. But I disagreed with them, saying that the Islamic Republic does not abandon invaluable strategic assets, such as the Lebanese resistance, as part of an understanding with a sworn enemy known for easily reneging on its commitments. Ali Khamenei's hesitation required another explanation. For me, the most logical explanation was the Supreme Leader's extreme reluctance to enter a war that would invite American intervention. Over the past three months, as I watched the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps endure and transform the overwhelming Israeli-American offensive into bold and economically and militarily costly counter-strikes at the regional level, I remembered that lunch in Dubai. In the shocking contrast between the Republic's reservation then and its audacity today, the first features of a new Middle East began to unfold. These features appear in the fourteen points of the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States, which collectively signify an American recognition of Iran as a true regional power. They also appear through the active role played by major Gulf states in drafting this memorandum. They also appear in the tangible tensions between the Netanyahu government and the Trump administration, which are in many ways an inevitable result of a catastrophic war crafted by Israel. They are also evident in the significant shift in American attitudes towards Israel, both among the public and policymakers, a profound shift that is increasingly reflected in the superpower's policy towards its once highly privileged ally. For the first time in decades, Israel faces a dangerous and unpredictable geopolitical landscape. It faces it in an uncharacteristic state of decline and isolation, besieged by its genocide in Gaza and by the ongoing ethnic cleansing operations in the West Bank and Lebanon. Perhaps its biggest mistake was the mistaken belief that it could, through military force alone, overthrow an entire regional system and reshape it into a subordinate or fragmented space. And perhaps Washington's deeper mistake was allowing its ally to proceed with its most insane scheme yet, which is to shape a submissive Middle East from the ashes of mass destruction. In 2024, Benjamin Netanyahu declared to the world: "A year ago I said something simple: we will change the face of the Middle East, and we are indeed doing so. Syria is no longer the same Syria. Lebanon is no longer the same Lebanon. Gaza is no longer the same Gaza. And the head of the axis, Iran, is no longer the same Iran." The prime minister was overly modest, and tragically mistaken in his predictions. The truth is that no country in the region is as it was. Not one! But the Middle East he envisioned is now much further from realization than it was when he embarked on his most dangerous and deadly gambles. It is understandable that Netanyahu, known for his excessive arrogance, expected his 2026 blitzkrieg against Iran to achieve the same results as his attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon. But what happened instead was that the highly effective elimination of the first generation of Islamic Revolution leaders accelerated, at an astonishing pace, the rise of a new class of leaders: sophisticated, tough, bold, and ruthless, but less concerned with revolutionary fervor and more interested in managing mundane state affairs. Khamenei's hardened and aging theocracy, which had always been besieged and on the defensive, is finally giving way to the future. As Vali Nasr and Narges Bajoghli wrote in their prominent Foreign Affairs article titled "Iran's New Grand Strategy": "Domestically and externally, the new leadership espouses no revolutionary maximalism or revolutionary activism. They are state institution men: pragmatic, seasoned nationalists, operating on a realistic assessment of Iran's capabilities and vulnerabilities." We will soon know what the priorities of this elite mean for the resilient and vibrant Iranian people. The Islamic Republic has long been on this arduous and bumpy road. It seems to have finally reached its destination, ironically, thanks in large part to the Jewish state and the United States, who have always been our midwives in the birth of our recurring upheavals. In Lebanon, the open theater where geopolitical trends never cease to leave their mark, Iran is already showing its cards. It has made the two countries a single front in the war, and today it is making them a single front in negotiations. The Lebanese government has every right to feel humiliated by the paradox that Hezbollah's patron represents it in negotiations that may determine its fate. But the problem here is not only the small size of the country, but more painfully, the smallness of the ruling class, which of course explains the smallness of the state itself. The only consolation that comes to mind is that Israel, remarkably, has joined Lebanon in sitting on the sidelines. Nevertheless, Tehran's insistence on including the Lebanese file in the settlement also reflects its own weaknesses. The attention it pays to this file is no less indicative of its limitations than it is a translation of its strength. The Lebanese Shiite community has been forced to sacrifice almost everything over the past three years. Towns, villages, homes, livelihoods, and families have been destroyed in vast areas of the South and the southern suburbs. Discontent within the community is clear, and grief is widespread. This human community will no longer be forced to suffer in the service of others. Hezbollah and Iran are well aware that this war was a turning point. A public that has long suffered due to its proximity to a fierce enemy has been exhausted and has had enough. Mass destruction, ethnic cleansing, and the occupation of gas and water-rich areas form the core of Israeli strategy. Iran's challenge lies in denying the Jewish state the spoils of war and granting it absolute freedom in Lebanon. At a minimum, Israel seeks to maintain its hegemony in the Levant. Therefore, the coming months will be the most dangerous in a decade of continuous turmoil. It has been almost twenty years since we were last promised a new Middle East. In July 2006, as the war between Israel and Hezbollah entered its second week, Condoleezza Rice, then US Secretary of State, said that "what we are seeing here are the birth pangs of a new Middle East." In her vision, a major battle was raging between the American axis of virtue and the Iranian axis of evil, across the lands stretching between the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The main battlefields were Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. The grand prize for the winner was the soul of the region itself. In Lebanon, Hezbollah's opponents, perhaps buoyed by the confidence instilled by Rice, were almost ecstatic at the prospect of the party's fall. The mood in those circles was a mixture of elation, euphoric anticipation, and a desire for revenge. Finally, salvation at the hands of Israel. The search for salvation through foreign "saviors," near or far, was an old Lebanese reflection. No force, sectarian or otherwise, was innocent of it in our modern history. Not one! By mid-August, the sandcastles had collapsed, just like the ruins of the southern suburbs. The biggest of those castles was the one built by Rice. Hezbollah withstood a massive aerial assault and repelled the Israeli army. Today, the birth pangs that Rice and Netanyahu spoke of seem to have finally arrived. But the new Middle East emerging from the ashes of a catastrophic war is not the one they so desperately wanted. As for the Lebanese sandcastles built on the expectation of the Islamic Republic's defeat and salvation at the hands of the Jewish state, they too have collapsed. There are many lessons in these recurring illusions that end in disappointment. But, unfortunately, history has never been the strongest subject for our leaders.