Palestine and Israel: Security that Generates Conflict and Consciousness that Reproduces It

Since the formation of Israel in a turbulent regional context, the region has entered a long series of conflicts, tensions, and recurring wars, in which geography was not merely borders, but permanent lines of contact between opposing political and security projects. Over time, this reality has not only produced military clashes but has also established a mutual political consciousness between the parties, becoming part of the regional thinking structure.

In the Israeli case, the continuation of wars, security threats, and the faltering paths of settlement with Arab and Palestinian neighbors played a crucial role in solidifying a central idea: that security is not a temporary state, but a permanent condition of existence. With the accumulation of this understanding, a political and social consciousness has formed that makes security considerations a primary axis in decision-making, giving the logic of deterrence and constant readiness a priority over other considerations.

This historical trajectory has produced a political mindset that views stability not as a ready-made reality, but as a state that must be continuously produced through changing political and military tools. Therefore, security is no longer an ultimate goal, but an ongoing process within which cycles of tension and de-escalation repeat, without reaching a stable and final settlement.

In contrast, the Arab and Palestinian world was not outside this equation. Within the Palestine Liberation Organization, and in the general Arab framework, political approaches began to gradually move away from the logic of comprehensive confrontation, towards seeking comprehensive settlements that would redefine the relationship with Israel within a new regional framework. This shift was not a concession of the essence of the conflict, but an attempt to redefine its tools.

From this emerged the idea of integrating Israel into a regional system based on mutual security and political arrangements, instead of continuing isolation and open conflict. This vision was embodied in Arab initiatives, most notably the Arab Peace Initiative, which was based on a clear equation: land for peace, and an end to occupation for normalization and normal relations.

However, this vision, despite its political clarity, always clashed with the gap between ambition and reality, and between declared perceptions and the balance of power on the ground, making it a standing political framework without fully transforming into a stable reality.

In this context, political consciousness within Israeli society formed as a direct result of a long and complex security experience, making it more sensitive to the concept of threat, more inclined to the logic of caution and deterrence, and less willing for unconditional openness. In contrast, within the Arab and Palestinian framework, a political consciousness developed that sees settlement as a possible option, but conditional on ending the roots of the conflict and achieving political justice.

If we assume a radical scenario in which Israel controls the entire land between the sea and the river or the absence of the Palestinian actor as a direct party, the question is not about the disappearance of the conflict, but its transformation. Does security consciousness disappear with the absence of a direct threat?

Comparative readings in political science indicate that this consciousness does not easily disappear, but reproduces itself by redefining sources of danger. Instead of a direct threat, the focus may shift to the broader regional environment: political fluctuations, possibilities of hostile regimes rising, or instability in a changing regional periphery. Thus, it transforms from a “direct existential threat” to a “regional strategic threat,” maintaining the logic of caution and readiness but within a broader scope.

In contrast, these transformations may indirectly reshape political mobilization in the region, where Arab and regional interactions can produce new narratives based on an unresolved conflict history. This may contribute to the continuation or reproduction of forms of tension or hostile discourse, even with a change in the original form of the conflict or a decline in its direct presence.

But most importantly, all this does not make the conflict monocausal. Reducing it to Israeli political consciousness alone is an oversimplification, because this consciousness itself is formed within a complex network of regional, historical, and political relations. The conflict here is not a linear confrontation between only two parties, but a dynamic process affected by changing balances of power, paths of settlement or their collapse, and the structure of the regional system as a whole.

Consequently, the absence of one party to the conflict or a change in its role does not necessarily mean its end, but may redistribute tensions to other levels. Ultimately, the future of stability in the region remains open to more than one path, and is governed by a complex interaction between political consciousness, regional structure, and experiences of conflict and settlement, not by a single factor or a clear linear direction.