Every time the confrontation between Israel and Iran escalates, an old political and media discourse resurfaces: if Iran falls or its power declines, Israel will become the dominant power in the Middle East. This idea seems logical at first glance, given Israel's military and technological superiority, and the strategic support it receives from the United States. However, a closer look at the structure of the regional system reveals that this narrative is closer to a political illusion than a realistic reading of the balance of power.
Historically, the Middle East has not been a region that allows a single power to dominate for a long time. Since the end of the Cold War, the region has been shaped by shifting balances between several regional powers, most notably Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. These powers differ in their tools: some rely on economic and religious weight, others on military power or geopolitical influence, but none has been able to impose comprehensive hegemony over the region.
In this context, Iran represents a special case. Iranian power is not based solely on traditional military capabilities or its missile and nuclear program, but also on a regional network of influence extending through local allies in several arenas. Therefore, talking about the "fall of Iran" as a rapid military event ignores the nature of Iranian power itself, which has been built over decades through a mix of politics, alliances, and the ability to operate in turbulent regional environments.
In contrast, there is no doubt that Israel possesses a qualitative superiority in military technology, intelligence, and air force, in addition to its deep alliance with the United States. The diplomatic shifts witnessed in the region in recent years, especially after the normalization agreements with some Arab countries, have also strengthened Israel's political and economic presence in the Middle East. However, this relative rise does not necessarily mean the region's transition to an Israeli-led regional system.
There are structural constraints that prevent this. First, Israel, despite its military strength, remains a relatively small country in terms of area and population compared to the countries of the region. Second, the political environment in the Middle East remains highly sensitive to the idea of external hegemony, making any project for regional control fraught with political and popular resistance. Third, other regional powers, especially Turkey and Saudi Arabia, will not easily accept a strategic vacuum that allows a single power to control regional balances.
Even in the hypothetical scenario where Iran loses the war and exits its position as a regional pole, the legacy of its influence will not automatically transfer to a single party. On the contrary, this legacy is likely to become an arena of competition among several regional powers. Countries that have built their security policies over the past decades on confronting Iran's rise – such as Israel, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia – will find themselves with a wider space for strategic repositioning and strengthening their presence in arenas where Tehran was a key player.
This is because a large part of these countries' focus and resources were directed towards containing or balancing Iranian influence. If this balance is disrupted by Iran's exit or decline, all these powers will reap a kind of strategic credit: military and political resources that were allocated for confrontation may be redirected to enhance regional standing, and relatively closed spheres of influence may turn into new arenas of competition among them.
However, the most important factor in this landscape may not be only regional, but also international. Despite repeated talk in recent years about the possibility of a gradual US withdrawal from the Middle East, broader strategic data indicate that Washington may not easily leave the region. The challenge facing the United States is no longer limited to Iran or to managing traditional conflicts in the Middle East, but is also linked to the rapid rise of China as a competing global power.
From this perspective, the region may once again become an important arena in the competition between major powers. The presence of huge energy resources, strategic maritime passages, and massive financial and investment markets makes the Middle East an important part of the geopolitical calculations associated with China's rise.
Therefore, the United States is likely to seek to reshape its presence in the region not through withdrawal, but by building a wider network of regional alliances. This alliance framework may be mostly Arab, and perhaps Sunni in its political structure, relying on the significant economic weight of the Gulf states and major Arab countries to balance growing Chinese influence.
In this context, the Middle East may become a stage for the intersection of several levels of competition: regional competition among the major powers in the region, and international competition between the United States and China, with a Russian presence that also seeks to consolidate its position in the equation.
Hence, portraying any potential war against Iran as the path to an "Israeli-led Middle East" reflects in part a political or propaganda discourse more than it reflects a strategic reality. Even if Iran suffers severe blows or its military capability declines, this will most likely lead to a redistribution of influence among several parties, rather than the emergence of a single dominant power.
The Middle East, by virtue of its history and its political and demographic composition, always tends towards complex balances rather than absolute hegemony. Therefore, talking about the fall of Iran and the rise of Israel as a dominant power in the region may seem attractive in media headlines, but it remains closer to a political illusion than to a realistic analysis of the region's future.
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The Illusion of Iran's Fall and Israel's Rise: A Reading of the Hegemony Narrative in the Middle East