Washington repositions itself: Acknowledgment of the difficulty in disarming Hamas and adopting a tougher equation towards Lebanon.

In recent weeks, a new political conviction has taken root in Washington, namely that the old Israeli goal of "completely disarming Hamas" is no longer achievable in the foreseeable future. After more than two years of war in Gaza, and despite the immense destruction and ongoing military operations, the U.S. administration is discovering that Hamas's ability to endure, rebuild, and reposition itself under harsh conditions makes discussions about "militarily dismantling it" closer to political wishes than to a viable strategy. This shift in perspective does not reflect a change in Washington's stance towards the movement as much as it reflects a deeper understanding of the nature of the military and political environment in the sector, and of the equations that arise in prolonged wars when excessive force fails to achieve definitive and conclusive results.

The American statements issued in recent months carry increasing signals of this new approach, as officials in the Trump administration have begun to speak about "moving to the next phase" as the most realistic option, and about "managing the risks" of Hamas's capabilities, rather than eradicating it. This language represents a gradual departure from the rhetoric of the early months of the war, when Washington fully adopted the Israeli narrative about the necessity of "destroying the movement." With the accumulation of data on the ground, it has become clear that Hamas's military capability, despite the strikes, has not been erased, and that its organizational and political structure remains capable of adapting to enormous and unprecedented blows. This realization drives Washington to focus on a transitional Gaza agreement, which it has been trying for months to make a permanent path based on a sustainable ceasefire, multi-party security arrangements, and conditional reconstruction processes, leading to the establishment of a new governance structure that enjoys regional and international support.

This shift in Gaza parallels another equally serious development in the U.S. administration's approach to the Lebanese front. The information circulating in Washington, and what appears in diplomatic and military statements, indicates an increasing American acceptance of the idea of the Israeli army conducting a wide operation or a "major strike" in Lebanon, whether limited in scope or broader in nature aimed at altering the rules of engagement with Hezbollah. It seems that Washington, despite its repeated assertions that it does not want a regional war, has become more willing to overlook a "calculated" wide operation, as long as it does not directly involve the United States in a confrontation with Iran and does not explode the northern front to an uncontainable extent. This acceptance is linked, in part, to both internal and external American calculations, as Washington sees that the increasing pressure on Israel in Gaza may require, from the perspective of the Israeli military establishment, a balance through the north, and it views the Lebanese file as a means of indirect pressure on Tehran and its affiliated parties when it comes to the Gaza issue.

However, this direction is not without contradictions. Trump, who fears the repercussions of the war on his domestic political situation and in the swing states, does not want a regional explosion, while at the same time does not want a confrontation with the Israeli security establishment that has been pressing for months towards a "resolution" on the northern front. Thus, Washington finds itself in a gray area, trying to prevent the regional expansion of the war on one hand, while on the other hand allowing Israel to operate militarily within certain limits, in a fragile balance that makes the American decision appear scattered between internal considerations, strategic commitments to Israel, and a desire to avoid the region slipping into a wide confrontation that is difficult to control.

The current American position reflects a clear duality: an acknowledgment of the failure of the bet on military force in Gaza, and a desire to expedite a political transition that limits Hamas's influence without attempting to erase it by force, while at the same time being prepared to give Israel greater maneuvering space in Lebanon with the aim of changing the strategic landscape on its northern borders. Between this and that, Washington appears to be moving in a narrow space between calming the south and the possibility of escalation in the north, at a time when the balance of power remains fragile, regional calculations are intertwined, and the consequences of any miscalculation could lead to an explosion that none of the parties can fully contain.