Between economic pressures and security stakes... Will Turkey finalize its full return to the Western camp?

Turkish foreign policy has recently witnessed a gradual shift, re-emphasizing the importance of its historical partnership with the Western camp, after years of attempting to balance between Moscow and Washington. Researcher Gönül Tol, in an analysis published by 'Foreign Affairs' magazine, believes that this new direction is not merely a political maneuver, but rather a result of economic, security, and geopolitical pressures that have forced Ankara to re-evaluate its strategic positioning.

Historically, Turkey's position within the Western system was solidified since the mid-20th century through its membership in the Council of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) rise to power in 2002 initiated a new phase of pursuing 'strategic independence,' which manifested in expanding ties with Russia in the energy and defense sectors, raising the ire of traditional Western allies.

The major paradox in Turkish-Russian relations began with the crisis of the downed Russian jet in 2015, when Ankara felt disappointed by NATO's response and the withdrawal of 'Patriot' batteries. This feeling of uncertainty towards allies pushed President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan towards mending relations with Vladimir Putin, leading to the controversial 'S-400' missile system deal, which resulted in Turkey's exclusion from the 'F-35' fighter jet program.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 revealed the complexities of this path, as Ankara attempted to play a mediating role while supplying Kyiv with drones and closing the straits. At the same time, Turkey became an economic lifeline for Moscow by refusing to join Western sanctions, which raised the volume of trade between the two countries to record levels exceeding $60 billion.

The energy sector is one of Russia's most prominent tools of influence in Turkey, especially with the 'Akkuyu' nuclear power plant project managed by 'Rosatom'. This energy dependence granted Moscow long-term influence within a vital infrastructure of a NATO member state, which has been a constant source of concern for Western capitals that have cautiously observed the Turkish-Russian rapprochement.

The shift towards the West began to crystallize clearly with the exacerbation of internal economic crises in Turkey before the 2023 elections, as the country suffered from hyperinflation and a collapse in currency value. The February 2023 earthquake disaster further increased financial burdens, making continued tension with Western trading partners, especially the European Union, a costly and unsustainable option.

In the context of economic repositioning, Ankara took practical steps to restore international investor confidence by appointing economic experts known for their traditional orientations. This coincided with a serious move to reduce reliance on Russian gas, by diversifying sources and moving towards importing liquefied natural gas from the United States through long-term contracts.

Geopolitically, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in late 2024 contributed to reducing Turkey's need for Russian mediation, which was essential for managing the Syrian file. This field change, along with the withdrawal of American forces from northern Syria, removed major obstacles that had poisoned relations between Ankara and Washington for many years.

Military developments in the region, especially missile confrontations related to Iran, have highlighted the importance of NATO's defensive umbrella for Turkey. The alliance's systems have proven effective in protecting Turkish airspace, while the Russian 'S-400' system remained inactive, raising internal questions about the strategic viability of relying on Russian weaponry.

Sources indicate that military cooperation with NATO has regained significant momentum, with negotiations resuming on advanced European air defense systems. Germany has also begun to strengthen its military presence in Turkey by deploying additional Patriot batteries, a clear indication of the thawing of defense relations between Ankara and Berlin.

Turkey is currently planning to deepen its military integration into the alliance by establishing a multinational corps by 2028 and actively participating in Black Sea security. These moves reflect Ankara's desire to restore its role as a key pillar on NATO's eastern flank, away from the axis policy it pursued in the past decade.

In contrast, Moscow views this Turkish shift towards the West with increasing concern, which explains the absence of high-level visits by Putin to Ankara for years. Turkish officials have become more explicit in criticizing Russian policies, with public support for Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO.

Despite this rapprochement with the West, Turkey does not appear to be entirely abandoning its ambition to pursue an independent foreign policy, but it has become aware of the limits of maneuver. Economic interests linked to Western markets, and the need for advanced defense technology, compel Turkish decision-makers to remain within the Western orbit to ensure the stability of the state.

The analysis concluded that the experience of recent years has proven that building a complete strategic alternative through Russia was fraught with risks and insufficient to meet Turkey's major needs. Consequently, Ankara finds itself today returning to 'square one' in its relationship with the West, driven by political pragmatism that places national security and economic prosperity above ideological slogans.

President Erdoğan's attempts to build an independent balance between East and West ultimately clashed with the realities of economics and security, pushing Ankara to approach the NATO alliance once again.