Gaza Administrative Committee: Entrenching Division and Undermining National Representation

Fears of creating a national alternative to the Palestine Liberation Organization are no longer mere hypotheses or theoretical analyses; they have transformed into a political reality imposed on the ground with the announcement of what is called the “Gaza Administrative Committee.” The manner in which the members of this committee were chosen, far from any comprehensive national consensus—whether at the level of the Authority, the PLO, or the factions—and in parallel with clear coordination with external parties and the occupation forces, places us before one of the most dangerous attempts aimed at reshaping the Palestinian political reality since 1948. Suspicious Inputs… and Catastrophic Outputs Scrutiny of the mechanism for forming this committee reveals that the real goal has no connection to the relief or humanitarian dimension being promoted; rather, it goes beyond that towards formulating an updated model of “village leagues,” but this time with regional and international cover. More dangerously, there are explicit demands from the occupation and the United States to hand over all weapons—whether the weapons of the factions, or the weapons of families, or even the personal weapons of Authority members to an international body (i.e., to the occupation). This scenario brings to mind the Sabra and Shatila massacres of 1982, where the same plan was executed: a right-wing government led by Menachem Begin at the time, with the intervention of US envoy Philip, replaced civilian and armed resistance with a “committee” in exchange for handing over weapons, leaving the field to loyal militias such as the South Lebanon Army and the Phalanges. Today, the same scenario is being replayed, but led by Benjamin Netanyahu and coordinated by the current US envoy, Tekoff, in an attempt to reproduce the experience of “administrative committees” in exchange for emptying armed resistance of its capabilities and separating Gaza from its national project. Any handover of weapons in this manner is a painful repetition of history. Therefore, if anyone is to be allowed to possess weapons, it should only be the National Authority and its legitimate apparatuses, in a way that preserves security and political balance and ensures the protection of the Palestinian people and their national project. Targeting Legitimacy… Not Factions It is wrong to reduce the danger of this committee to targeting a specific faction, such as Hamas or others; the issue is deeper and more dangerous. The essence of this project aims to undermine national legitimacy represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the National Authority. Imposing an administrative committee as a fait accompli practically represents the beginning of the “post-PLO” phase, and the gradual stripping of recognition from the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. If this experiment succeeds in Gaza, its generalization in the West Bank will only be a matter of time, which is consistent with the declared proposals of Israeli right-wing currents. Maximum Pressure: Engineering Alternatives Under Blackmail This step comes amidst unprecedented pressures on the Palestinian leadership, whether through financial blockade or field escalation, in an attempt to weaken its ability to manage the scene. This reality is intended to create a state of political and administrative vacuum, to be filled by these “imposed” committees, to appear to the citizen as a salvific solution to daily crises, while in reality they are an entry point for reshaping political awareness and loyalty away from the comprehensive national framework. The Duty of the Moment: Unity or Collapse In the face of this challenge, there is no longer room for gray positions; rather, a set of urgent national imperatives emerges: 1. A decisive stance on the committee: The PLO must lead a broad political and media effort—locally, regionally, and internationally—to delegitimize this committee and demand its members withdraw immediately. 2. Producing a consensual formula: The real response to “external appointment” projects lies in accelerating the achievement of a genuine national partnership that includes all forces, thereby restoring credibility to the unity of political decision-making. 3. Defending national legitimacy: Protecting the PLO today, despite all observations, is protecting the comprehensive framework and the entire Palestinian national project. Conclusion We are at a pivotal moment that does not tolerate hesitation. The “Administrative Committee” project does not target a specific party, but rather affects all Palestinians. Any reliance on achieving narrow gains in this context will only be a direct contribution to undermining the national house. Uniting behind a comprehensive national stance that rejects imposed alternatives and entrenches Palestinian legitimacy is the last available option to preserve what remains of the national project, before it dissipates under the guise of “self-administration” linked to the will of the occupier.