Why America Will Lose Its War on Iran

Some believe that achieving victory in war primarily depends on a nation's military strength, meaning that a war between two militarily unequal parties is always expected to be decided in favor of the stronger party. While there is some justification for this belief, as military power can give the superior party an advantage when war breaks out, granting it high destructive capability to inflict damage on the adversary, it is not sufficient to be the sole determining factor for victory. The important thing is not starting the war, or having an advantage at its outset, but rather possessing the ability to steer its course in a way that allows control over its outcomes. In steering the course of wars, another factor alongside military capability, and perhaps the most important in controlling their results, is the varying ability of warring parties to bear their costs, not only material but also moral. Whoever among the warring parties groans first, regardless of the size and extent of their military power, loses, and the loss may befall the stronger party against the weaker in terms of military power. If the belief that military power is a reliable indicator for determining the victorious party in war were true, the outcome of wars would be guaranteed and known in advance, and wars would not have happened in the first place. The militarily weaker party should – according to this assumption – learn the lesson in advance and surrender, to spare itself the destruction that the stronger party would inflict upon it. But this belief fails to explain France's bitter defeat in its war in Indochina, or in its attempt to suppress the Algerian revolution, and why the Soviet Union suffered a painful defeat in Afghanistan. And why the United States, the world's greatest military power, suffered a crushing defeat in its successive wars from Korea to Vietnam and Afghanistan, and even Iraq. The important thing in wars is not a party's ability to use its military superiority to inflict severe damage on the other party (such as destroying its infrastructure and various facilities), but rather to achieve a favorable political outcome when the war ends. In short, in wars, inflicting damage is employed as a means to achieve an end (as happened in the two World Wars between powers of equal military strength), but if it turns into an end in itself aimed at punishment, it may fail miserably (as happened in the case of American wars on Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq between militarily unequal powers). Our reluctance to accept the validity of the belief that military superiority decides wars in favor of stronger parties over militarily weaker ones leads us to propose another type of assumption that may seem strange at first glance and contrary to intuitive expectation: that the ability of internally more prosperous parties (in terms of economic prosperity and open political participation) to bear the costs of war remains less than the ability of parties less endowed with these two characteristics. The intuitive expectation is that economically prosperous and politically democratic countries are more vital and capable than economically weak and politically authoritarian countries of bearing the costs of war. Countries of the first type are supposed to possess the economic capacity and political vitality that enable them to support the war they decide to wage, while countries of the second type do not possess these components. But the question that justifies our differing assumption, and needs investigation and an answer, remains: Why, then, do developed countries, with clear historical evidence of America's and France's failures, fail to achieve victory in their wars when facing parties militarily weaker than them, economically less prosperous, and less vital in their political systems? In an attempt to provide an introduction to an explanation supporting the assumption presented above, it is worth paying attention to the impact of public opinion on the course of political life in democratic countries, such as America and France. The political level in such countries may decide to start a war against a certain party and mobilize public opinion to support the decision. Public opinion responds to the decision, may accept the justification provided by the political level for waging war, and grants its support. But this support is not guaranteed to continue; rather, it is subject to fluctuation and change, based on changing circumstances. Most likely, and given the prevailing general feeling of superiority, especially over a party it considers inferior in terms of progress, public opinion in prosperous countries expects positive results, summarized as waging a winning war against that party, which will be swift, quick, and of limited cost. Public opinion does not care about the hidden cost of war, which the state bears and whose results do not appear quickly, but it is highly sensitive to the visible cost, which directly affects individuals in society, who see and quickly suffer from its negative consequences. This cost is summarized by the level of human losses that must be borne, on the one hand, and the material losses that affect individuals' pockets, on the other. As long as the cost is limited in both directions, public opinion can bear it, but if its pace escalates in one direction, and more dangerously if it does so in both, due to the weaker party in the war managing the war in a way different from the stronger party's expectation, especially by turning it into a costly and long-term war of attrition, then public opinion begins to shift, and may turn against the war, directing criticism at the political level. When the level of criticism reaches a high degree, and may erupt in street protests, as happened in the case of the American war on Vietnam, the political level becomes anxious and fears accountability and loss in the upcoming elections. Therefore, it begins a process of self-review and changing direction, and searches for a way out of the predicament it has put itself in. The situation of the political level in these prosperous countries worsens according to the type of war it wages. Wars are of two types: "war of necessity," which is a war imposed on the state when its existence is threatened, requiring it to defend itself. This type of war always enjoys high public support, with public opinion rallying around the political level and providing all necessary support to achieve victory, no matter the sacrifices. In this type of war, the homeland is exposed to an existential threat, and defending it is a national duty for which all costs are cheap. The second type is "war of choice," which does not result from an existential threat targeting the state, justifying the necessity of waging war to protect its existence, but rather the political level chooses to initiate it for reasons it believes are important. This type of war, being avoidable, is the type that can easily provoke public opinion against it, especially if the reasons provided to justify waging it do not gain acceptance and support, and if its course becomes complicated and it is no longer a "clean and quick" war as expected and hoped. In contrast, the countries targeted by prosperous countries in wars of choice, being weaker, suffer from economic fragility, high levels of poverty, and the absence of political freedoms that turn political participation into a process of mobilizing support for the ruling regime. This reassures the countries waging these wars that they can achieve a quick and low-cost victory over those weak countries with fragile internal structures. But when the inevitable happens, the attacking countries are surprised by the resilience of the resistance they face, despite the destruction they inflict on the targeted country. The reason behind this resilience is multifaceted. On the one hand, regardless of the severity of internal differences, the majority of the people usually unite when their country is subjected to external aggression, so the war becomes for them a "war of necessity," in which defending the homeland dictates the duty of strengthening solidarity and internal cohesion, and rallying behind the political system, even if temporarily. On the other hand, due to the fragility of the economic situation and the dominance of the political and security system, the peoples of the targeted countries have high immunity, having become accustomed to hardship, forced to adapt quickly and manage their lives with minimal costs, and they are not greatly harmed by external harshness added to the harshness of internal life, for life for them is a series of escalating difficulties. Therefore, these peoples, unlike the peoples of prosperous countries, can withstand shocks and suppress the pain caused by being targeted by the weapons of mass destruction directed at them by those countries. The immunity of targeted countries increases when their political system is ideological or doctrinal, as this gives it the advantage of being able to mobilize the masses, and provides it with support based on firm conviction in the hearts of its followers. This gives an additional motivation to these individuals to defend not only the country but also the political system targeted by the attacking countries. This becomes part of the faith formation of individuals belonging to the system, providing them with great moral strength, which often outweighs the material superiority of the attacking military force. *** America and Israel are waging a "war of choice" against Iran. While Netanyahu was able to justify this war to Israelis, the task was more difficult for Trump, who kept trying to find a convincing reason to promote it to Americans. This war was not "clean and quick" as he wished, but rather closer to a quagmire in which he became more entangled each day. In contrast, this war was a "war of necessity" for Iran, fighting to defend its existence and its ideological political system. Therefore, steadfastness in the face of the American-Israeli attack was not an option for the Iranian regime and its supporters, but a fundamental condition for survival. Therefore, Iran chose to turn this war, which Trump wanted to be swift, into a long war of attrition, thereby involving the region in the furnace of battle and plunging the entire world into an escalating economic crisis. From the beginning, American public opinion was not supportive of this war, the reason for which it did not know, and the pace of its criticism began to increase with the fall of American soldiers on the battlefield, on the one hand, and the rise in inflation and the increase in commodity prices in the markets, especially fuel, on the other. Trump began to suffer from a escalating crisis that could destabilize the remainder of his term. His party is at risk of losing the midterm elections next fall, which means losing control of Congress, with the possibility of Democrats then opening the door to constitutional procedures to impeach the president. As in America's previous wars, which inflicted immense destruction on the targeted countries, destruction will befall many structures and facilities in Iran. But just as America lost those wars and did not achieve the desired outcome, America will also lose this war with Iran. The conclusion to be drawn from the lessons of history is: the limited extent of what military power can achieve, even if superior, in the face of the immunity of endurance.