War on Iran: A Tactical Gain or Strategic Loss for Arabs?

Arabs rarely view any war fought by the United States in the Middle East as one that might bring them direct strategic benefit. Historical experience since the end of World War II mostly indicates the opposite: military interventions reshape balances, but often leave the region more turbulent and complex.

It becomes even rarer when it involves military action in which the United States and Israel participate together. In the Arab political consciousness, it is difficult to find a clear precedent where a joint decision between Washington and Tel Aviv directly served Arab interests.

However, the ongoing war today between Iran on one hand, and the United States and Israel on the other, raises an unusual question: Could this be one of those rare moments where American and Israeli interests intersect with a clear Arab interest?

To understand this possibility, one must go back to a pivotal moment in the region's history: the Iranian Revolution. Since then, Iran has no longer been merely a regional state with traditional policies, but has gradually transformed into a political and strategic project seeking to expand influence beyond its national borders.

Over more than four decades, this influence has spread through multiple tools: political alliances, armed groups, and indirect military presence in a number of Arab arenas, from Iraq to Syria and Lebanon, all the way to Yemen. For many Arab countries, this was not merely a natural competition between neighboring states, but evolved into a long-term strategic challenge that altered the balance of power in the Middle East and opened the doors to complex conflicts.

In this context, the current war seems to strike at the heart of that equation. If it ends with the weakening of Iranian military capabilities or the reduction of its regional project, it could remove one of the most prominent sources of strategic tension that has pressured the region since the late 1970s.

However, reading the scene so simply might be misleading. The United States, as international relations literature confirms, does not act out of a motive to serve others, but according to precise calculations related to its strategic interests: maintaining the balance of power, preventing adversaries from threatening its influence, and ensuring the continuation of its leading position in the international system.

Here another, more complex paradox emerges. Israel alone may not be the ultimate beneficiary of this war; Arabs may ultimately find themselves facing a greater strategic cost than initially appears.

Major geopolitical shifts in the world today are not only about the Middle East, but about the escalating competition between the United States and China for leadership of the international system. In this context, the outcomes of the war in the Middle East could become part of broader arrangements aimed at reorganizing global alliances.

In one possible scenario, after weakening Iran, the United States might seek to establish a new regional order that links Arab countries more closely to American strategy in confronting China's rise. This could manifest in political, economic, or security pressures that limit the ability of Arab countries to expand their cooperation with Beijing.

Here a new equation might emerge: weakening a regional adversary like Iran, in exchange for restricting the strategic maneuvering room of Arab countries in their relationship with the rising power in the world.

Many Arab countries today have growing economic ties with China, whether in energy, infrastructure, or technology. If the region becomes part of the front line in the US-China competition, these countries may find themselves forced to choose between their economic partnerships and their position in the US-led security system.

In this case, the problem may not be the war itself, but the arrangements that may follow it.

The worst-case scenario for Arabs lies in the possibility that the war leads to a dual outcome: a decline in Iranian influence on one hand, and the region being drawn into a larger global conflict equation between major powers on the other. In such a situation, Arabs might become a party to a strategic confrontation that does not necessarily concern them, but for which they bear the consequences.

For this reason, the real question is not only about the outcome of the war, but about the phase that will follow it. If Arab countries can deal with the coming transformations with greater coordination and strategic vision, this moment could turn into an opportunity to rebuild a more stable regional balance.

However, if post-war arrangements are left to be entirely shaped from outside the region, Arabs may once again find themselves facing a new regional order whose rules are determined by other powers.

In the Middle East, major transformations often begin with war, but their true effects appear in the order that emerges afterward.