How Trump Decided to Wage War on Iran

Washington – Said Arikat – 3/3/2026

According to a report in The New York Times published on Monday, President Donald Trump's decision to wage war against Iran was not a sudden move, but rather the result of a long process of secret consultations, military planning, and political pressure, especially from the Israeli leadership, coupled with a decline in confidence within the American administration regarding the possibility of reaching a diplomatic solution with Tehran.

The report indicates that the key turning point came during a lengthy meeting at the White House on February 11, where Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussed the prospects of war and the potential timing of any attack. At that time, the United States was engaged in indirect negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program, but Israel feared that these diplomatic efforts would disrupt the military plans secretly discussed between the two sides.

Days after the meeting, Trump began to openly express his skepticism about the usefulness of negotiating with Iran, considering that years of previous dialogue had not yielded results. He also hinted that regime change in Iran might be the best option. Just about two weeks later, he authorized a large-scale military operation in coordination with Israel, which included intensive strikes targeting military and nuclear sites and centers within the country, resulting in the death of the Iranian Supreme Leader and the country descending into chaos, in addition to the outbreak of a wave of regional violence that led to American and Iranian casualties.

Although the American president's public rhetoric seemed hesitant between seeking a diplomatic agreement and brandishing military force, the report confirms that the move towards war was steadily progressing behind the scenes. Israel played a pivotal role in pushing Washington towards a decisive strike, based on an assessment that the Iranian regime was in a weakened position. Trump was also influenced by his growing confidence after a successful American operation that overthrew the leadership in Venezuela weeks earlier.

The report indicates that opposition within the president's inner circle was very limited. Even figures previously known for their reservations about military interventions supported the idea of a broad and swift strike if an attack was decided upon. In contrast, military leaders warned of significant risks, including the potential for heavy American casualties, regional destabilization, and the depletion of American military stockpiles. However, these warnings were not fully reflected in public statements, as the operation was portrayed as easily decisive.

The report also clarifies that American officials did not fully disclose to members of Congress that the option of regime change was among the military plans, despite holding security briefings to discuss Iranian threats and the timing of potential strikes.

At the same time, nuclear negotiations with Iran continued, but the report suggests that they practically provided a temporal cover for strengthening the American military presence in the Middle East. At the beginning of the year, American forces were not ready for a long war, as no aircraft carriers were in the region and air defenses were limited. Over the weeks, two aircraft carriers and a large number of fighter jets, bombers, and defense systems were sent, allowing for an extended military campaign.

During the negotiations, Washington insisted on the demand for “zero enrichment,” meaning the complete cessation of Iran's ability to produce nuclear fuel, a condition that Tehran consistently rejected. With growing doubts within the American administration, official statements began to reflect a growing conviction that reaching an agreement was almost impossible due to the ideological nature of the Iranian regime.

Within National Security Council meetings, the discussion focused on the scale of the military operation rather than the principle of its execution. Multiple options were presented, ranging from limited strikes aimed at negotiating pressure, to a broad campaign aimed at overthrowing the Iranian leadership. Intelligence agencies presented various scenarios for what might happen in the event of the Supreme Leader's death, including the possibility of a more hardline leadership emerging, internal unrest, or a more pragmatic wing of the Revolutionary Guard coming to power.

Some officials adopted the latter scenario, believing that a pragmatic military leadership might be more willing to reach an understanding with the United States and abandon the nuclear program or reduce regional confrontation, although these expectations remained unconfirmed.

Almost the only prominent opposition came from conservative media personality Tucker Carlson, who warned of the risks of war to American forces, energy prices, and relations with Arab allies, considering that Washington might be drawn into the conflict due to Israel's security priorities. However, Trump informed him that he believed the United States would be involved in the fighting anyway if Israel initiated the attack alone.

On the domestic political front, the administration did not seek clear authorization from Congress before commencing operations, which drew criticism from some lawmakers who saw the logic used to justify the war as circular, as it was considered that the military buildup itself might provoke Iran to respond, thus making an American attack inevitable.

A final round of negotiations was held in Geneva days before the strike, where Iran presented a proposal allowing for certain levels of enrichment to continue, which American negotiators rejected. After the talks concluded, the negotiating team informed the President that the chances of reaching an agreement were very slim. Meanwhile, the United States and Israel were already discussing the timing of the attack, until an intelligence breakthrough led to the identification of a meeting of senior Iranian leadership in Tehran, and the decision was made to carry out a strike directly targeting the leadership, effectively starting the war.

The course of events, as presented in the report, suggests that the diplomatic path was not necessarily a genuine attempt to avoid war, but perhaps served as a political tool to manage military timing. The continuation of negotiations coincided with the largest American military buildup in the region in years, reinforcing the impression that dialogue provided temporal cover to complete operational preparations rather than being a viable path to success. American demands, especially the “zero enrichment” condition, were known beforehand to be unacceptable to Iran, which made reaching an agreement almost impossible from the outset.

In the same context, the announcement of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's visit, scheduled for Monday, March 3, takes on additional political significance. The announcement of the visit appeared to be a continuation of the diplomatic facade and a sign of normal political engagement, at a time when military decisions had practically been made. From this perspective, the late diplomatic moves can be understood as part of managing the international scene and preparing public opinion, rather than a realistic last-ditch effort to prevent escalation, which reflects a recurring pattern in international crises where negotiating channels are sometimes used to secure political legitimacy before proceeding to wage war.