The Gaza Peace Council: Between the Logic of Reconstruction and Unilateral Decision-Making...!

Amidst the rapid transformations witnessed in the international arena, the initiative known as the “Gaza Peace Council” has emerged as a proposed framework for addressing the situation in the Strip after the war.

However, any serious approach to Gaza's future cannot be separated from a fundamental question: Can lasting stability be built without involving the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people? And will reconstruction become an entry point for monopolizing Palestinian political decision-making?

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) constitutes the politically recognized framework, Arab and internationally, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, while the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) undertakes executive responsibilities stemming from existing agreements. Furthermore, the State of Palestine enjoys recognition from more than 160 UN member states.

Therefore, any initiative that does not stem from this legal and political basis raises issues related to legitimacy and representation, and may be understood as an تجاوز (overstepping) of the comprehensive national framework.

From a procedural perspective, the establishment of an international council to manage a transitional phase in Gaza might appear to be an organizational step aimed at mobilizing resources and coordinating reconstruction efforts.

However, the true measure of success is not determined by the number of participants or the volume of financial pledges, but by the extent to which the initiative aligns with the rules of international law and the principle of peoples' right to self-determination.

Reports circulating about the composition of the council and the powers of its presidency—if accurate—indicate a clear centralization of decision-making and a direct link to the US administration under Donald Trump.

Such a structure, if not regulated by a multilateral collective governance framework, could be understood as a political mechanism of a unilateral nature, rather than a balanced international body, which deepens concerns about the monopolization of decisions related to the future of the Gaza Strip.

The reconstruction of Gaza is an urgent humanitarian necessity that cannot be postponed.

However, transforming reconstruction into an entry point for reshaping the political or security structure of the Strip without comprehensive Palestinian national consensus could lead to counterproductive results. Comparative experiences in multiple conflict zones confirm that reconstruction separated from a political solution turns into temporary crisis management, not a radical solution to it.

The issue of the unity of Palestinian land arises here; any administrative formula for Gaza must be part of a broader vision that ensures the unity of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem within the framework of an independent Palestinian state on the June 4, 1967 borders.

Devoting separate or long-term arrangements for the Gaza Strip outside this context could be interpreted as solidifying division instead of overcoming it.

Furthermore, concerns associated with the “voluntary migration” theses issued by some Israeli officials, including Bezalel Smotrich, add a sensitive dimension to any international initiative that does not include an explicit text rejecting forced displacement and protecting the Palestinian population's presence on their land.

Ensuring the survival of the population and safeguarding their rights is not merely a political matter, but a legal obligation under the rules of international humanitarian law.

Any international framework aiming to achieve peace and stability in Gaza should be based on three fundamental pillars:

Respect for the Palestinian national authority and not bypassing or circumventing it.

Linking reconstruction to a clear political horizon that ends the occupation and embodies the two-state solution.

Ensuring that any transitional administration is temporary, supportive of Palestinian legitimacy, and not a substitute for it.

In conclusion:

Just peace is not built on top-down arrangements, nor on excluding the rightful owner, nor on unilateral management that uses reconstruction as an entry point for monopolizing national decision-making.

Gaza is not a pending administrative file, nor a geographical area amenable to political reshaping according to external calculations, but an integral part of the cause of a people seeking to exercise their legitimate right to self-determination and establish their independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

The future of Gaza cannot be drawn outside the framework of Palestinian national legitimacy, nor in isolation from the unity of the land and the people, and any path that bypasses these constants will not produce sustainable peace, but will perpetuate long-term crisis management under new names.