The Post-War Has Not Yet Come: Blood Under the Auspices of the Peace Council

 
In Gaza, the truce is no longer a separator between war and peace, but rather another form of war and killing. What has been happening since what was called a ceasefire last October cannot be read as accidental breaches or field chaos, but rather as an organized pattern of killing, taking place under international cover. The bloodshed has not stopped, but has been redistributed over time. A single massacre has been replaced by daily attrition, which does not necessitate declaring a new war, nor does it embarrass anyone.
Away from the details of the truce provisions, it has become clear that the occupation is systematically seeking to empty what is called the second phase of its essence, preventing a deeper de-escalation, but rather maintaining a political vacuum that allows it to continue killing and besieging without new or serious commitments. This behavior is directly linked to the internal context: a fragile government, a fractured coalition, and upcoming elections that make Gaza an internal card. Therefore, the second phase is being transformed into a title without any content.
To justify this course, the occupation uses alleged Palestinian breaches, real or imagined, to redefine the truce as a privilege conditional on Palestinian behavior, or as the occupation alone sees it, despite more than thirteen hundred Israeli breaches and more than five hundred martyrs during this period, which the world did not witness or witness breaches in. Thus, the truce transforms from a mutual commitment into a tool of punishment. The shelling targeting residential neighborhoods and displaced persons' tents confirms this, as there is no engagement or imminent danger, but rather a message that the decision of life and death remains in the hands of the occupation, even in times of de-escalation.
In the face of this scene, the Peace Council, and before it the Security Council, appear as a system of political painkillers. They are no longer tools of obligation or deterrence, but rather media facades for managing international impotence: statements, sessions, and calls for the victim to exercise self-restraint, without any actual effect on the ground. It is as if their function is no longer to stop the massacre, but to reproduce the illusion of international oversight while the killing continues.
Within this vacuum, the concept of a so-called stability force is put forward, which is supposed to separate two parties, protect and monitor the agreement. However, the occupation clearly seeks to turn this role upside down. What is required is a force that operates according to its concept of stability, i.e., controlling Gaza, not protecting its people, and preventing any political or administrative action outside its conditions. If this force does not conform to this measure, then preventing its formation is the solution, because a force without real mandate and deterrent capability will not be a stability force, but an additional cover for the continuation of the war.
Here also emerges the role of the Gaza administration committee, which builds its discourse on the promises of the Peace Council. Reliance on it is great, but the risks are greater. Palestinian experience shows that any administrative entity operating under the ceiling of the occupation gradually turns into an authority of statements, not action. The continuous shelling can be read as a tool to draw margins for the committee, and disable it before it actually begins its tasks. The message is clear: administration is allowed as long as it does not exceed the ceiling of managing destruction.
The health sector, the prevention of transferring thousands of patients, the shortage of medicines, the crossings, and the file of displaced persons constitute the real test for the committee, because the death of children from cold is not natural disasters, just as the disruption of daily life is another form of killing. Nevertheless, all of this is re-described as a humanitarian crisis, not a war crime.
What is happening in Gaza today is a transition from noisy war to organized war, and from rapid extermination to slow attrition. The truce, the second phase, the Gaza administration committee, and the stability force are all exposed to becoming tools within this system. The real question is no longer about the details of the agreement, but about its purpose: protecting civilians or protecting the occupation. Without a clear answer, Gaza will continue to die in installments, and "peace" will remain a pseudonym for continuous terror.