The announcement of the formation of the "Executive Committee for the Administration of Gaza" and the International Peace Council, under the direct patronage of the American administration and with personal impetus from President Donald Trump, initially appeared as a qualitative shift in the post-war approach: a transition from the logic of ceasefire to the logic of administration, and from relief to reconstruction. However, the speed of the Israeli reaction, the unity of internal division in Tel Aviv, and the complexities of the regional scene raise a central question: Are we facing the beginning of a new path, or merely a re-production of the crisis with different tools?.
It is noteworthy that the American announcement did not come in a vacuum, but at a highly sensitive political moment: a second phase of the ceasefire agreement, Israeli military and political exhaustion, unprecedented international humanitarian pressures, and a clear American desire to impose a new "political engineering" for Gaza, even if it clashed with the Israeli ally itself.
It seemed there was an early clash between Trump and Netanyahu on the path. The statement from the Israeli Prime Minister's office, which denied any prior coordination with Tel Aviv regarding the formation of the executive committee, was not merely a procedural objection, but a clear political declaration of Israel's practical rejection of the new path. More importantly, this rejection came publicly, indicating the first clear confrontation of this level between Netanyahu and Trump since the latter's return to the decision-making center.
The Israeli objection is inseparable from the composition of the council, especially the inclusion of Turkey and Qatar, two countries that the Israeli security establishment views as political adversaries in the Gaza file. Therefore, it was not surprising that Netanyahu's discourse intersected with the positions of Ben Gvir, Smotrich, and Bennett, despite their internal differences, in rejecting any civilian or international administration of Gaza outside direct Israeli control.
Here lies the essence of the crisis: Israel, or at least its ruling right, does not want an alternative administration for Gaza, but rather wants either a permanent vacuum or long-term military rule, with encouragement of emigration and societal dismantling, while Washington, with Trump's pragmatism, moves towards a functional administration model that prevents explosion without entering the quagmire of direct occupation.
The composition of the "Founding Executive Council" clearly reveals the nature of the American vision, a political-financial-investment administration, rather than a traditional peace initiative. The presence of figures such as Jared Kushner, Marc Rowan, Ajay Banga, and Tony Blair, indicates a shift in thinking from the logic of "conflict resolution" to the logic of "post-conflict management" through financing, investment structures, and linking stability to money, jobs, and infrastructure.
As for the "Gaza Executive Council," it is the field arm that combines security, mediation, influence over factions (Egypt, Turkey, Qatar), humanitarian work (United Nations), and funding and implementation (UAE and private sector). This formula, despite its coherence on paper, carries deep contradictions within it, most notably the absence of Israeli acceptance, and the lack of clarity regarding the actual scope of powers on the ground. As for the European Union, it represents the absent presence and suffers from a silent dilemma, and this needs explanation.
From "Al-Masry Al-Youm"
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Gaza Between International Administration and Political Stalemate