The Arab system and political Islam: roles, not positions

Let us begin by envisioning the dramatic transformation of Arab regimes' attitudes toward political Islam, from the middle of the last century to the present. In the beginning, "conservative" Arab regimes supported political Islam, while "progressive" regimes opposed it. This approach was "natural," or perhaps understandable, at least from a social perspective.

At that time, the Arab system was divided along social, intellectual, and political lines: conservative and progressive, moderate and revolutionary, and so on. Now, that system is no longer divided over anything; everyone is now "liberal" (economically and socially), and if there is a difference, it is in the degree of depth and "creativity" in that. Everyone has become "moderate" in terms of nationalism and nationalism, and the difference here, too, lies in the degree of moderation and "creativity" in that. There is no longer anything to divide the Arab system over, but it remains divided.

Completing the scene, this regime, which is no longer divided over anything but remains divided, has reversed its stance on political Islam, which it initially embraced, to the point where it now adamantly rejects it. (This may require a discussion about the uniqueness of the new Syrian regime in this context.) So what prompted the Arab regime to do this?

Some might interpret this "revolution" as the Arab regime shifting from a conservative to a liberal one, and thus it is only natural that it would shift its stance on political Islam and religion in general. However, this view remains weak, as political Islam has demonstrated a remarkable liberal flexibility, particularly in social life, and in some countries in the region, it has even led the liberal transition.

The current scene is of an Arab regime that is neither conservative, nor progressive, nor revolutionary (but divided), united and fiercely hostile to political Islam (with perhaps one exception). This "devotion" and "devotion" of the Arab regime to its fight against political Islam is not only surprising but also intriguing, with hopes of discovering the reason behind this "strange" reversal in its intensity and "perseverance."

For the Arab regime to demonize anything now, it is enough to link it to the Muslim Brotherhood. All of that regime's apparatuses, systems, laws, media, research centers, thinkers, and intellectuals are now mobilized and mobilized to fight its former "lover," the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam in general.

Once again, and lest the point be lost, we do not aim here to evaluate or judge political Islam, neither to demonize it nor to "kingdomize" it (from "king"). What is being observed here is the Arab regime in its fluctuating movement toward political Islam. (I take the opportunity here—even though the situation is unbearable—to begin using the term "kingdomization" as opposed to "demonization." It is not "just" for Satan to be "disposable" while kingship is deprived of it. Maintaining demonization without "kingdomization" means placing it directly opposite the term "deification," which is also unjust. And since language existed before its rules, we have the right to take it outside the bounds of those rules.)

The question now is, why did the Arab regime "adopt" political Islam in the beginning, and why has it now abandoned it to the point of murder, and is it pursuing it across the globe?

The answer, in my view (and it is open to debate, of course), lies in the transition of the Zionist imperialist project in the region from its partial and localized tactical level, aiming to weaken the centers of power there, to its strategic level, aiming to destroy any "resurrection" of it, even in the conscience.

To be more clear, political Islam and Islam in general represent (emotionally) a nation’s project, but at the same time it is susceptible (at least in some of its basic cases) to being used against what it represents, so it practically goes (and has gone repeatedly) in the opposite direction of what it is supposed to represent in the conscience, against the nation and its project.

The Zionist imperialist project is fully aware that it can employ some elements of political Islam in its “movement” in the region against its project that is “absent” in the conscience (Palestine and the nation). When that (Zionist) project rose from its secondary tactical level that strikes specific hotspots, to its comprehensive strategic level of completely destroying Palestine, the nation and its ideology, and perhaps Islam itself as one of its most important links, here it was decided to “dispensing” with tactics and go for strategy, meaning getting rid of the user (political Islam) in order to get rid of the meanings it carries, which have now become the primary target.

The conclusion here is that the Arab regime has no position on political Islam today, nor has it had one in the past. It is merely a role it has been assigned, one it was required to adopt in the past when necessary, just as it is required to fight it now when necessary. The Arab regime has no positions, only roles.

This also adds a "burden" to the intellectual, namely the need to be careful when expressing his opinion in this area (or any other), to ensure that his position does not become a contribution (role) to a counter-project. In this context, the true compass is not the regime, the political party, or the ideology—it is Palestine.