Netanyahu-Trump meeting outlines truce boundaries: temporary pledges and uncertain prospects

Dr. Hussein Al-Deek: The guarantees Hamas is demanding are still virtually absent, except for a personal pledge from Trump, which reinforces the trend toward a temporary truce rather than a permanent agreement.
Awni al-Mashni: This truce may be the best opportunity for Netanyahu to end the war and head toward early elections in which he can market his military and political "achievements."
Dr. Qusay Hamed: Hamas seeks to ensure the Israeli army's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, but it is not yet confident that this goal will be achieved.
Firas Yaghi: Netanyahu does not want to truly end the war, but rather seeks to transform it from one form to another under the banner of "imposing peace by force," in accordance with Trump's vision.
Dr. Tamara Haddad: The recent meeting between Netanyahu and Trump confirms the "day after" scenario for Gaza, granting Israel freedom to strike based on the Lebanese model.
Hani Abu al-Sabaa: This time, the truce has a higher chance of survival than previous times, given the existence of US-Israeli understandings regarding the settlement of the Gaza crisis.


Amid the Israeli escalation in the Gaza Strip, the recent meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump was seen as a key step toward formulating a truce that could last for sixty days. This comes amid fears that a temporary truce would reshuffle the pressure on Hamas and the Palestinian resistance in Gaza.
In separate interviews with "I", writers, political analysts, specialists, and university professors believe that this meeting, which reflected a consensus on the continued Israeli control of the Gaza Strip, has refocused attention on the American role in attempting to establish a temporary truce during which the parties will be given a chance to catch their breath and organize their political and field affairs.
The book indicates that Netanyahu is seeking to capitalize on this truce to strengthen his domestic standing ahead of a potential early election, while Trump is betting on re-presenting himself as a mediator for peace in the Middle East, despite the absence of any real guarantees that the basic Palestinian conditions will be met, most notably the complete withdrawal of the Israeli army and a guarantee that war will not resume after the truce expires.
While negotiations continue in Doha to overcome the final obstacles, writers, analysts, specialists, and university professors point out that many questions remain regarding the seriousness of transforming this truce into a permanent agreement. Scenarios suggest a reimposition of a security model similar to that occurring on the Lebanese border, while the landscape remains open to conflicting possibilities, ranging from a temporary thaw to a return to the language of war.

The current effort does not aim for a permanent ceasefire.

Writer, political analyst, and expert on American affairs and international relations, Dr. Hussein Al-Deek, asserts that all current indicators point toward a temporary truce in the Gaza Strip lasting for 60 days. This is in light of ongoing negotiation meetings in Doha, which focus on overcoming obstacles related to the Palestinian resistance's reservations to ensure this ceasefire is achieved.
Al-Deek explains that the resistance has set three main demands for the success of this agreement: the withdrawal of the Israeli army from the Gaza Strip, a mechanism for distributing humanitarian aid and ensuring its delivery, and real guarantees to prevent a renewed war after the sixty-day period has expired. Al-Deek notes that current discussions are focused on further clarifying these three points so that they are acceptable to all parties.
Al-Deek explained that the current effort does not aim for a permanent ceasefire, but rather a truce with a specific duration. The possibility of converting it to a permanent ceasefire will be explored within the same 60-day period if appropriate political and security conditions are met.
However, Al-Deek stresses that the guarantees Hamas is demanding are still virtually absent, existing only in the form of a personal pledge from US President Donald Trump, which reinforces the belief that the movement is moving toward a temporary truce rather than a permanent agreement.
Al-Deek explains that the lack of other alternatives makes the truce a mutually beneficial option for both sides. He explains that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sees this truce as an opportunity to improve his domestic popularity, particularly after the recent confrontation with Iran, in addition to his desire to advance in the polls through a prisoner and detainee exchange deal from Gaza.
Al-Deek points out that Netanyahu's initiative to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize confirms the two sides' complete agreement to advance matters toward a temporary truce.

The absence of any real political horizon after the ceasefire

Al-Deek explains that recent statements by Trump and Netanyahu have reinforced this assumption about a temporary truce only. Trump spoke clearly about granting Palestinians the freedom to leave or remain in the Gaza Strip, while Netanyahu emphasized that security control would remain in the hands of the Israeli military. When asked about the two-state solution, he offered no definitive answer, indicating the absence of any real political horizon beyond the truce.
Al-Deek points out that one scenario currently being circulated in the Hebrew press involves making the Morag axis the primary dividing line for Gaza, with Israeli forces withdrawing from the Philadelphi corridor and repositioning themselves at the Morag axis. This could lead to the concentration of more than half of Gaza's population in the buffer zone between the two axes, facilitating the movement of a portion of the population toward Egypt and removing the obstacle to movement between Palestinian Rafah and Egyptian Rafah.
Al-Deek asserts that the Lebanese model may be the strongest hypothesis to be applied in Gaza, meaning that Israel will continue its military operations while maintaining its security control.
However, Al-Deek points out at the same time that the possibility of reaching a permanent ceasefire after the end of the sixty-day period remains an uncertain possibility, and may or may not be achieved, depending on the facts on the ground.

The last hours of any war are usually the most violent.

Writer and political analyst Awni Al-Mashni believes that the current proposed truce between Israel and the resistance is no longer solely a Palestinian interest, but has become a clear Israeli interest as well. This is due to the continued depletion of the Israeli army on the Gaza fronts, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's desire to maintain the "image of victory" he presented to Israeli society following the recent confrontation with Iran.
Al-Mashni believes this truce may be the best opportunity for Netanyahu to end the fighting in Gaza and head toward early elections, where he can promote his military and political "achievements," capitalizing on the convergence of interests among all parties, including the United States, which is now pushing for a ceasefire that would end the escalation.
However, Al-Mashni warns that the final hours of any war are often the most violent, as each side seeks to achieve additional gains and translate its military might into political leverage. This explains the current escalation in Gaza despite the approaching truce agreement.

The situation may turn into something resembling the "Lebanese scenario."

He explains that a potential ceasefire does not necessarily mean an end to the crisis, predicting that the situation will evolve into something resembling a "Lebanese scenario," with intermittent strikes and assassinations continuing to keep Gaza "unlivable."
Al-Mashni asserts that the idea of displacing Palestinians has not left the minds of Israeli decision-makers and will remain a fundamental driver of current and future Israeli policies.
He explains that the continued existence of the current "racist" Israeli government makes the chances of achieving a genuine ceasefire or lasting stability virtually nonexistent, emphasizing that the Israeli right considers the failure of displacement a failure of its programs.
Al-Mashni explains that Israel will continue its policies of escalation in Gaza and the West Bank to avoid the most important goal: resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. He points out that displacement attempts may temporarily cease in Gaza, but will continue in the West Bank. He also notes that reopening the Lebanese front remains a possibility within the Israeli framework, supported by Netanyahu's recent visit to Washington.

Netanyahu will not agree to a full cessation of hostilities.

Dr. Qusay Hamed, a professor of political science at Al-Quds Open University, asserts that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will not agree to a full ceasefire, but rather seeks to establish a new geographic reality that emerged after October 7, 2023.
Hamed explains that this reality is based on keeping the occupation forces inside parts of the Gaza Strip, allowing Israel freedom to launch military operations whenever it wishes, similar to what happens in the West Bank.
Hamed points out that Netanyahu's most prominent strategic goal is to completely eradicate Hamas from the Gaza Strip, whether administratively, politically, or militarily. This poses a fundamental dilemma for Israel, as it has so far been unable to find an alternative leadership formula it trusts to manage the Strip after Hamas's demise.
He explains that Netanyahu seeks to establish a political and administrative leadership that will complete the implementation of his goals and continue to eliminate the military power and strategic capabilities of Hamas.

Netanyahu still lacks a "day after formula"

Hamed points out that Netanyahu still lacks a "day after formula" for Gaza, which makes him unlikely to pursue a long-term truce. Meanwhile, Hamed believes Netanyahu will likely resort to intermittent, temporary truces that will deplete Hamas's strengths, particularly the issue of living and dead prisoners, with the goal of weakening the movement in negotiations and imposing Israel's conditions in the coming stages.
Hamed believes Netanyahu aims to release the prisoners with minimal costs and losses, without compromising his strategic plans in the Gaza Strip.
He asserts that the gains Netanyahu is promoting at the regional level, such as neutralizing Hezbollah, reducing Iran's power, and weakening the Assad regime, will remain worthless if he does not complete his project in Gaza.
Hamed warns that Israel's long-term plan could lead to the gradual displacement of the Strip's population by making living conditions so difficult that they become uninhabitable, forcing people to leave.
Hamed believes that the Lebanese scenario, whereby Israel would be free to engage militarily at any time, remains a preferred target for Israel, which may retain partial control over areas of Gaza to establish military bases that it could use to carry out targeted strikes whenever necessary.

The current negotiations are no different from previous rounds.

Regarding the negotiations, Hamed believes they are no different from previous rounds of negotiations, with the Israeli side seeking to achieve its goal of uprooting Hamas and ensuring that Gaza does not become a future threat, while Hamas clings to its negotiating tools, most notably the prisoner issue.
Hamed believes that Hamas is seeking to at least ensure the Israeli army's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip through Arab and regional guarantees, but it is not yet confident that this goal will be achieved.
Hamed asserts that the situation is still far from a final ceasefire, noting that any potential truce would be a repetition of previous ceasefires, with short periods of time and guarantees for continued negotiations regarding the future of the Gaza Strip and humanitarian aid, while Israel continues its efforts to undermine Hamas's negotiating power and weaken internal pressure on it.

Complications stand in the way of any final agreement on the war.

Writer and political analyst Firas Yaghi explains that the meeting between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Washington reflected profound contradictions that reveal the extent of the complexities facing any final agreement regarding the war on the Gaza Strip. Yaghi notes that Trump spoke clearly about the existence of a "deal" and that he would exert strong pressure to end the war, while Netanyahu, in contrast, emphasized his categorical rejection of the establishment of a Palestinian state, indicating that the war would only end under full Israeli control.
Yaghi points out that Netanyahu's statements about the shape of the "day after" the war remain unclear and increase the political ambiguity in the scene. He explains that Netanyahu rejects the idea of establishing a "Hamasstan" or "Fatahstan" in Gaza, and appears to be seeking a formula described by Yaghi as "Youthstan" within the Strip, in reference to the actions of the so-called Yasser Abu Shabab, which the Palestinian people in both Gaza and the West Bank reject.

Speed up the formation of a strong national unity government

He emphasized that confronting this scheme requires the rapid formation of a strong Palestinian national unity government capable of consolidating the Palestinian position, with genuine Arab support and backing. He emphasized that this is the only way to put an end to attempts to fragment the Palestinian position and impose partial solutions under American and Israeli pressure.
Regarding the Doha negotiations, Yaghi explains that the US is still focused on achieving the "60-day deal." However, Yaghi expresses his lack of optimism regarding the end of the war or the resolution of major issues after this temporary period, emphasizing that the fate of the negotiations afterward is entirely tied to Netanyahu's goals and his domestic situation in Israel, especially given the possibility of him calling early elections.
He explained that Netanyahu is attempting to exploit this issue to achieve "any accomplishment" in the prisoners' case, to bolster his domestic standing after the "false victory narrative" against Iran. He noted that he plans to withdraw from parts of the Gaza Strip and redeploy to the Philadelphi Corridor and the buffer zones to the north and east to besiege Gaza and hold it "hostage" within the so-called comprehensive deal promoted by Trump for the Middle East.
Yaghi believes that Netanyahu does not actually want to end the war, but rather seeks to transform it from one form to another under the rubric of "imposing peace by force," in accordance with Trump's vision. He points to the moral paradox in their relationship, as Trump has described Netanyahu as a "great man," despite the fact that he is wanted by the International Criminal Court and convicted of war crimes and domestic corruption.
Yaghi believes that Netanyahu's nomination of Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize reveals an absurd paradox, describing it as a "disregard for the principles of justice and humanity" that transforms the award from a tribute to peace into a "Nobel Prize for genocide," as he put it.

The meeting... and revealing the features of the "next day"

Writer and political researcher Dr. Tamara Haddad believes that the recent meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump is one of the most revealing encounters yet to reveal the "day after" for the Gaza Strip.
Haddad explains that the expected scenario for Gaza closely resembles the "Lebanese model," whereby Israel will continue to launch airstrikes under the pretext of fighting armed groups within the Strip, with freedom of military action when necessary.
Haddad points out that Trump's statements during the meeting clearly expressed his complete alignment with Israel's vision, particularly when he linked the Palestinian statehood issue to Netanyahu's position and clearly stated that establishing a Palestinian state was not on the table. Instead, the alternative was to implement the "day after" concept, which would begin immediately after Netanyahu's return from his meeting with Trump.
Haddad believes this scenario is based primarily on continuing security and military operations until Hamas is eliminated and undermined from its roots, including disarming it and exiling its leadership.
Haddad asserts that the negotiations in Doha are still ongoing, but they will take more time given Hamas's refusal to comply with key provisions such as disarmament, ending its rule, or exiling its leaders. These provisions are essential for consolidating the temporary truce agreement and transforming it into a sustainable ceasefire.
Haddad explained that Israel will not withdraw completely from Gaza, but will remain stationed in strategic axes such as the Morag axis in Rafah, the buffer zone, and the north. This means the war will continue in a new form based on an "offensive defense" strategy. If intelligence becomes available about any threat from Gaza, Israel will use aerial bombardment and humanitarian pressure according to the same model applied in the West Bank, or perhaps a model combined with the Lebanese model, allowing it to enter and exit and launch strikes whenever it wants.

Israeli security control and Palestinian self-rule

Haddad emphasizes that "the day after" effectively means reimposing Israeli security control and sovereignty over Gaza, while granting Palestinians self-administration on the condition that it be peaceful and free of any connection to Hamas or any form of armed resistance. In parallel, Israel will work to create conditions for the displacement of Palestinians by facilitating the exit from Gaza and opening the Rafah crossing, while establishing a humanitarian zone in Rafah to accommodate approximately 600,000 Palestinians who will be separated from Hamas, and giving those who wish to emigrate the opportunity to do so.
Haddad notes that Israel might allow members of the Palestinian Authority, with tribal support, to govern the Strip with the goal of ending Hamas rule completely. The core of the vision, however, remains Israeli security control and demilitarized Palestinian self-rule, with Israel retaining the right to launch military strikes if any threat to Israeli national security arises.

The substantive points of disagreement were reduced to minor amendments.

Writer, political analyst, and expert on Israeli affairs, Hani Abu Al-Sabaa, explains that the meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump raises several key issues, most notably the Israeli demand to strengthen military reserves following the recent confrontation with Iran. The meeting also explores the possibility of concluding an agreement with the new Syrian regime and its accession to the Abraham Accords, which aim to expand the circle of normalization and end the state of hostility and conflict in the region.
Abu Al-Sabaa asserts that the most prominent issue at this meeting remains the truce agreement currently being finalized in the Qatari capital, Doha. He points out that the atmosphere indicates that an announcement is imminent, and that it may be officially announced next Thursday, based on leaked statements from the parties.
Abu Al-Sabaa explains that the fundamental points of disagreement between the parties have been reduced to minor modifications, which enhances the chances of reaching an interim agreement that could open the door to a comprehensive agreement and a complete cessation of military operations.
Abu al-Saba' asserts that this truce holds a higher chance of survival than previous attempts, noting that the absolute US support for Israel in its recent attacks on Iran and the bombing of nuclear reactors clearly indicates the existence of prior understandings regarding the resolution of the Gaza crisis at this stage.

Likud shares improve, Netanyahu may resort to early elections

He points out that recent opinion polls have shown an improvement in the Likud Party's standing, prompting Netanyahu to seriously consider running in early elections early next year, armed with what he touts as political and military achievements—a position that will be incomplete if the war in Gaza continues.
Abu al-Saba'a points out that recent Israeli security reports have confirmed the impossibility of achieving a complete military victory or recovering the prisoners by force. He adds that the continuation of the war means further losses among the army, with the death toll rising to 38 soldiers since the resumption of recent operations.
He points out that the rapid developments on the ground prove that the resistance in Gaza has been able to reorganize its ranks and intensify its operations despite the circumstances, reinforcing Israeli decision-makers' conviction of the need to calm the situation on the ground through a new truce.
Abu al-Sabaa explains that the internal situation in Israel is now pressing for an end to the war, especially after the Israeli opposition announced its willingness to provide a safety net for Netanyahu's government, giving him room to overcome pressure from his more extremist partners, such as Ben-Gvir and Smotrich.
Abu Al-Sabaa explains that Trump, in turn, seeks to portray himself as a "man of world peace" with Nobel Peace Prize ambitions, which makes him eager to quickly end the war in Gaza so he can devote himself to more complex international issues, most notably the economic conflict with China and monitoring the situation within the United States.