What if...?

Since October 7, the situation in Palestine has shifted from a chronic state of "no war, no peace" to a raging regional war, encompassing Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, and then, for the first time, to a direct exchange of fire between Tel Aviv and Tehran.

This event was not merely a local explosion, but a seismic moment that shattered the traditional balance of deterrence. Tel Aviv saw this as an opportunity, which it exploited well. It mobilized East and West behind a distorted narrative, and with their support, it plunged into Palestinian bloodshed, creating an unprecedented humanitarian tragedy and redrawing the map of regional alliances.

The question, “What if October 7 had never happened?” provides an opportunity to explore this, the opportunities that were “wasted” and the “alternative” paths that were completely closed.

Humanitarianally, the aggression claimed the lives of nearly sixty thousand martyrs, most of them women and children, and the internal displacement of two million Palestinians. International reports documented starvation, killing, and systematic genocide. Hospitals were transformed into morgues, with water and electricity being cut off. Had it not been for this, Gaza would have avoided this devastation, and the minimum level of services, which were destroyed by more than 80%, would have continued.

Economically, Gaza was experiencing unemployment of nearly 45%, one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world, international "subsistence" networks, food programs, limited job opportunities in settlements, and projects that were being studied. However, the aggression halted everything. Unemployment jumped to nearly 80%, the crossings were closed, the blockade was tightened, and any prospects for economic growth evaporated.

Diplomatically, October undermined the normalization process in the region, which had reached advanced stages, with symbolic incentives for the Palestinians, such as a partial "freeze" on settlement construction and a "broader" security role for the Palestinian Authority in some of its areas of influence. The continuation of these incentives made it likely that a framework agreement would be reached, restoring the Palestinian Authority's political and financial room for maneuver, and presenting Hamas with a choice: reconciliation or increasing regional "isolation."

Regionally, this pushed the confrontation to a direct confrontation stage, with Tel Aviv bombing the Iranian consulate in Damascus, followed by Operation True Promise, where hundreds of Iranian missiles were launched towards occupied Palestine. Tel Aviv then targeted nuclear facilities inside Iran, and Tehran responded with ballistic and hypersonic missiles. In the alternative scenario, the situation would have remained within the framework of a “grey war,” with cyber attacks, spy networks, and limited assassinations that did not threaten to drag the region and the world into an open war. Tehran would have maintained greater freedom of maneuver and continued enrichment without preemptive strikes.

Internally, the aggression and legendary steadfastness generated widespread popular sympathy for the resistance in general, leaving the government without a clear political project and sliding into the most dangerous internal paths. It was possible to envision a gradual reconciliation process, under Arab-American sponsorship, conditional on the unification of power and arms, and funding for development and reconstruction plans.

Tel Aviv, for its part, has lost the stability of its "quiet deterrence" and the boom in normalization and investment with the escalation of the war. Its economy has suffered hundreds of billions in losses, due to the cost of the war and capital flight, and its internal front has been fractured politically and socially. However, it has also removed key "players" from the scene and reaped unprecedented Western support and exceptional arms packages.

Internationally, October brought the Palestinian cause back to the forefront, sparking diplomatic activity, a wave of global solidarity, media debates, international courts, and a momentum that would not have been as loud as it had been under the "peace for security" approach, cementing a status quo that marginalized Palestinian rights.

The comparison reveals a situation without October 7th. It would have saved tens of thousands of lives, preserved infrastructure, and saved the dignity of many countries around the world, allowing them to continue to praise humanitarian values. It would have kept the door to partial settlements open, and prevented a regional nuclear slide. However, it would also have entailed a loss for the Palestinians: it would have consolidated the status quo, frozen it without resolving it, as regional deals were concluded over their heads, and issues postponed for decades, such as Jerusalem and refugees, would have been marginalized indefinitely. It would have kept Gaza under siege, without a political horizon, and prolonged a fragile “cold peace” that would explode in the future, under more dangerous circumstances.

The status quo, which has been characterized by minimal violence, may seem like a comfortable option for the powerful parties, but it is fueling potential explosions. The absence of October may have delayed the outbreak, but it does not guarantee lasting stability unless the core of the dilemma is addressed: ending the occupation and providing a political horizon for the Palestinians. Therefore, the "alternative scenario" will remain an additional argument for the necessity of achieving rights before the region pays the price of a new, more costly, and more bloody "what if?"