Before the decision... If I were an advisor to Sinwar!!

As a political advisor to Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh (may God have mercy on him) for five years (January 2006-December 2010), during the tenth and eleventh governments (the National Unity Government), I offered many opinions and advice to the movement and the government, verbally and in writing, some of which were taken into account, while others were considered “tweeting out of step”!!

Among those papers was a brochure titled: “Hamas and the Necessity of Separating the Political from the Military,” in which I concluded with the following advice:

Separating the political and military wings is a national necessity, as combining them weakens the national project and confuses the movement's priorities as an organization and as a governmental component. Therefore, I called at the time for the establishment of a political party to manage public affairs, while the military wing would maintain its resistance role, far removed from political tensions. I also warned against repeating the mistakes of other Islamist movements, which mixed these roles in more than one Arab country, causing them to lose much of their popular and national credibility.

I also pointed out the need to be cautious about militarizing the movement or expanding its armed wing, lest it monopolize political decision-making or directly influence it.

Today, some are asking a hypothetical question: If I had been an advisor to Yahya Sinwar (may God have mercy on him), what advice would I have given him before making the decision, some details of which were later revealed, as Professor Fayez Abu Shamala indicated in an interview conducted with him months before the October 7 battle?

Although the question comes late—after the axe has fallen—I answer based on what I learned in my graduate studies in political science: anyone who embarks on an armed confrontation or military action must carefully consider the consequences and repercussions. These are the deciding factor, upon which calculations of profit and loss are based.

You may win a battle, but lose the war, given the number of casualties and losses.

As a veteran Palestinian thinker and politician who is over seventy years old, I have a number of pieces of advice and warnings that, in their entirety, lead to one piece of advice: Do not take such a step, because it would be a "shaver" that would destroy the movement and bring the nation and its people to ruin.

By asking some brothers who specialize in management and decision-making, we concluded that the event is very serious and has many dimensions. Therefore, the decision-maker must consider the following points:

First: Defining the political objective precisely. This requires asking the pivotal question: What is the clear political objective of the operation?

Is it to: Break the siege? Return the Palestinian issue to the forefront of global attention? Embarrass the Palestinian Authority? Establish a new deterrence equation with the occupation? Release prisoners? And so on.

The lack of clarity in the political objective makes any military operation an uncalculated risk, even if it appears successful at the time.

Second: Assessing the Israeli response. Does the resistance have the capacity to withstand the Israeli response, which is expected to be broad and not limited to the military structure, but also includes civilians and infrastructure? Has the possibility of a prolonged war of attrition and a battle for existence, which could last for months or years, been taken into account?

Here's the advice: Don't start a battle unless you're prepared for the worst-case scenario, militarily, politically, and popularly.

Third: The moral equation and the human dimension. Is there sufficient field control to prevent chaos or the commission of transgressions that would tarnish the image of the resistance and deprive it of its moral legitimacy?

The advice here is to establish clear ethical rules of engagement for the fighters, so that the operation does not become a burden on the Palestinian narrative and serve the occupation's narrative.

Fourth: Regional and international impact. Does the timing of the operation serve the Palestinian cause? Will it open doors or close them? How will the international community react to it? What impact will it have on the positions of regional countries such as Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye, and Iran?

The advice here would also be to measure the impact not only on the occupation, but on the entire international and regional environment.

Fifth: An accompanying political plan. Any operation of this magnitude must be part of a long-term strategic plan, not merely a tactical surprise. Who will speak on behalf of Gaza after the operation? What are the official political demands? How will the media and political momentum, not just the military one, be managed?

Therefore, the bottom line of advice for decision-makers is: Don't start a major battle, no matter how just, unless you are prepared for what comes after it. Fortify your position politically, morally, and popularly, both internally and externally. Always assume that matters may falter or fail temporarily, and that the enemy may escalate to the highest levels of brutality using annihilation and brute force.

Here comes the most essential question to ask: Have you planned for your people's resilience? Have you prepared public opinion? Have you built a strong support network?

In conclusion, the core advice underlying all of the above is to transform Hamas from an armed resistance movement into a national liberation movement with a comprehensive political strategy, while maintaining popular legitimacy without becoming embroiled in destructive wars. However, the final decision—and herein lies the crux of the matter—remains dependent on the balance of power within Hamas itself.

The definition of crisis management is planning for what might not happen. Now that it has happened, our advice comes too late, a futile attempt to sow seeds in the air.