By DAVID HOROVITZ
It appears that the prime minister is being asked to choose between his own interests and those of Israel, while Hamas is being urged to accept its own demise. But there may also be a more limited American action plan
US President Joe Biden's speech on Friday - during which he revealed many details of a proposal submitted by Israel for a ceasefire with Hamas - gives comes at a moment of truth for Israel. But not only that: this moment of truth is accompanied by a fateful choice which was placed in the hands of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu by the American head of state.
Urging Hamas to take up this offer, Biden sought to ensnare Hamas and test its bluff: “Hamas says it wants a ceasefire. The deal is an opportunity for him to prove that he really wants it. Hamas must accept this agreement... and put an end to this war that it itself started. »
Of course, things are not that simple. Hamas will only accept a deal if it believes it can survive, rebuild and resume its plans to destroy Israel. He will only accept this agreement, in other words, if he believes that he can avoid very precisely the consequences of the agreement as they were specified by Biden in his speech: "A 'better tomorrow' 'where Hamas will no longer be in power in Gaza' and a strip 'reconstructed in such a way that Hamas will not be able to rearm itself'.
By strongly asking Israeli leaders to “support this agreement”, Biden alluded to the challenge he is launching today to Netanyahu at a moment he described as “really decisive”.
“A thorough approach that begins with this agreement will bring the hostages home and lead to a more secure Israel,” Biden said. Once concluded, this agreement “on the hostages and on the ceasefire” will open the door, for Israel, “to the possibility of much greater progress, including calm on the northern border that Israel shares with the Lebanon”, “a potential historic normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia” and “a regional security network to counter the threat posed by Iran”.
With so many potential benefits, why did the president then feel the imperative to implore Netanyahu to secure his support for a proposal that the prime minister and his other colleagues in the war cabinet, Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant and Minister Benny Gantz, themselves approved and which they have just transmitted to Hamas? (The proposal presented by Biden "is, indeed, a deal that we have accepted," Ophir Falk, a Netanyahu adviser, confirmed on Saturday in case anyone was led to believe that the president had distorted this essential fact).
The answer relates to Netanyahu's personal interests, his political needs and the definition of national priorities that will shape Israel's destiny.
Netanyahu's moment of truth
On a personal level, presenting this proposal from the war cabinet, the government's military command cell, offers Netanyahu the prospect of avoiding arrest by order of the International Criminal Court. This guarantees him an enthusiastic bipartisan reception during his impending speech to the US Congress (an invitation that was confirmed, not coincidentally, shortly after Biden's address). And it offers him the opportunity to retransform his entire legacy – from the man who failed to prevent the catastrophe of October 7 to the leader who had to bounce back from the disaster and, as Biden said, who had to put Israel back on its feet. the rails of long-term security and regional integration.
As for his political dilemma, things have already started to play out.
Biden may have chosen the start of Shabbat in Israel to deliver his speech to give Netanyahu twenty-four hours to consider which political path to take. And at the end of Shabbat certain “members of the governing coalition” clearly established – as Biden had precisely envisaged – that they “will not accept this plan and that they will call for the war to continue for a indeterminate period ". The leaders of the coalition's two far-right parties, Bezalel Smotrich (Hatzionout HaDatit) and Itamar Ben Gvir (Otzma Yehudit), said the provisions approved by the war cabinet that they themselves helped establish by their vote were unacceptable, and they (again) promised to leave and overthrow the government established by Netanyahu if such an agreement were to see the light of day.
In contrast, HaMahane HaMamlahti party leader Benny Gantz called for urgently convening the war cabinet in order to promote the process. Stressing that the repatriation of the hostages is the most urgent priority of the war, Gantz thus potentially set aside the ultimatum he had given to the Prime Minister on May 18, when he had announced that he would leave the coalition dated June 8 if by then, Netanyahu does not make major strategic decisions regarding the war. And Yair Lapid, the opposition leader, insisted: "We must make this deal now... before the hostages die there in Gaza" and repeated his promise to offer the prime minister a safety net security to ensure that the government will not be overthrown.
Netanyahu's political – and personal, indeed – problem is that Ben Gvir and Smotrich between them have fourteen seats in parliament and his coalition would not survive long in their absence. Gantz is a rival whose party holds only eight Knesset seats; he is not an ally and Lapid will remove the promised safety net as soon as an agreement allowing the hostages to regain their freedom, in exchange for a ceasefire, is finalized. And if the two far-right parties desert the coalition, the majority that Netanyahu can confidently rely on will disappear.
Hence the fateful decision – for Israel – that Biden imposes on Netanyahu today.
Hamas “destroyed”?
The president not only dangled the extraordinary benefits that Israel would gain from a deal and the spectacular, long-term improvements it could bring to Israel's fundamental – even existential – reality, to its regional reality. and global. He also assured “the people of Israel” that they “can make this offer without additional risk to their own security because the Israelis have devastated Hamas forces over the past eight months. At this point, Hamas is no longer capable of committing another October 7, which was one of the main objectives that was pursued by Israel and, quite frankly, which was a justified objective. »
“We cannot miss this opportunity,” added the president. “An endless war in pursuit of this undetermined idea of ‘total victory’ will only bog Israel down in Gaza, drying up economic, military and human resources and reinforcing Israel’s isolation in the world.”
Hamas undoubtedly experienced a reduction in its armed forces and it is likely that it would no longer have been able to carry out another October 7 very soon after October 7, when the Israeli army belatedly mobilized (If Hezbollah had tried to join the fighting with all its might and in the first days of the war, it is difficult to determine what the two terrorist armies could have accomplished in a simultaneous fight on two fronts).
But last week – so this is very recent – it seems that American intelligence services estimated that only 30% to 35% of Hamas gunmen had been killed, reporting that nearly 65% of the tunnels built by Hamas terrorist group were still intact. And it is difficult to say, from the details of the Israeli proposal that have been made public by Biden, how Hamas could continue to be dismantled – if it can still be dismantled.
And it is therefore difficult to say at this stage how Netanyahu was able to outright approve the Israeli proposal – a proposal which also includes in its provisions, according to Biden, the prospect of “a definitive cessation of hostilities” in the second phase of the 'agreement. A press release which was issued on Saturday afternoon by the Prime Minister's Office nevertheless took care to recall that "the conditions necessary for the end of the war have not changed: the destruction of military capabilities and governance of Hamas, the release of all hostages and the guarantee that Gaza will no longer pose a threat to Israel.
Netanyahu also stressed in his statement that Israel “will continue to emphasize the need for these conditions to be respected before a permanent ceasefire can be put in place.” The idea that Israel could accept a permanent cessation of hostilities before these objectives are achieved is crippling.”
When and how will Hamas be destroyed, and to what extent, if Israel's offer of agreement provides for a permanent cessation of hostilities?
Biden provides a potential response by saying that “if Hamas is unable to respect its commitments under the agreement, Israel will be able to resume its military operations. But Egypt and Qatar have assured me that they continue to work to ensure that Hamas will not do this. And the United States will also help ensure that Israel lives up to its obligations.” This seems to suggest that Hamas would still be likely to pose a substantial threat if it were to choose to do so.
Biden's detailed presentation of the three phases contained in the Israeli proposal also made no specific reference to any particular Hamas demand – he demands the release of all detainees who had been recaptured after being released during of the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange in 2011, also insisting that the organization will itself choose the murderous terrorists, sentenced to life in prison, who will be released in exchange for the Israeli soldiers who had were kidnapped on October 7. The American president also did not address the subject of Hamas's rejection of the request submitted by Jerusalem, which claimed to be able to oppose the presence of leading terrorists in the West Bank upon their release within the framework of the deal – Hamas demands that were carefully calculated to lead to a new round of terrorist acts against Israelis in and from the West Bank.
The details that are missing
The US president's advisers said the proposal consisted of a four-and-a-half page, highly detailed document that arguably addresses all the essential aspects of a potential deal with a barbaric terrorist organization that has wreaked unthinkable devastation on the Israeli soil and who fully acknowledges that he intends to do so again if given the opportunity.
“There will be differences on specific details that will need to be debated. It’s natural,” admitted the American president.
But, he stressed, "If Hamas comes to negotiate, ready to make a deal, then Israeli negotiators will have to get a mandate with the flexibility to make a deal." »
Indeed, it will be necessary.
For starters, Netanyahu will have to decide whether he is willing to jettison the extremists he brought to the heart of his government and who would happily occupy Gaza again, and whether he is willing to "support" the proposal he had gave its approval in the name of the vital long-term interests of the nation. Then, he will have to ensure that Israeli negotiators have the necessary mandate to finalize an agreement which, in fact, will bring back the hostages and guarantee that Hamas will be dismantled.
But that might not be enough. Because the Israeli proposal, as Netanyahu specified and as Biden partially implied on Saturday evening, will require Hamas to consent to its own disappearance. And why would he accept it?
A more limited objective
All of this brings us to the possibility – I emphasize, the possibility – that Biden and his team do not ultimately envisage that the Israeli proposal will actually achieve the results envisioned, and that they are instead seeking to achieve more immediate objectives, nourishing only a vague hope of decisive change in the long term.
There are no winners in this race: Israel wants to destroy Hamas; Hamas wants to survive and wants to be able to continue its historic mission, that of the destruction of Israel. Neither party will agree to arrangements that will undermine their own objectives.
Thus, as a result, complete clarity from Biden would have condemned from the outset an agreement that he will try to conclude in a more realistic manner. This could involve implementing the first phase – but perhaps only the first phase – of a truce for hostages agreement.
In this way, at least a large number of the living hostages could be freed and leave Hamas jails.
In this way, too, a modicum of calm could return to Israel's northern border.
In this way again, greater quantities of humanitarian aid could enter Gaza. Hostility towards Israel around the world may dissipate, if only a little. Smotrich and Ben Gvir would leave the coalition, Gantz would remain there. This is encouraging information from the point of view of the American administration and, she believes, also from the point of view of Israel.
Even this more limited process does not limit the danger of Hamas obtaining the release, at the start of the first phase, of extremely dangerous terrorist leaders in the West Bank, an escalation of terrorism on this front and an early breakdown of the agreement, with very few hostages released.
But the strategy, for the Americans, could well be that “it is time to enter this new phase”. With the hope that the launch of this process could lead to new benefits.
A risky bet? This is perhaps what the entire American administration is feeling at this moment.
