Death may strike Gazans during a family outing or even while sleeping in a tent, and Palestinians in Gaza may die just by crossing the yellow line.

This is the true face of Israel. It is a state based on racial superiority, and not a democracy.

This method of fuel distribution is unfair and suspicious, raising questions, as it reflects a desire to disrupt local and national hospitals in favor of those managed by foreign teams.

As the global trade system concludes one of its most transformative years in a century, 2026 enters laden with additional risks threatening stability and growth.

Israeli settlers, on Thursday, burned an excavator belonging to Palestinians and inscribed slogans in Hebrew south of the occupied West Bank.

Children are the most affected by the Israeli attacks, and they suffer indescribable pain due to the ongoing attacks since two years ago.

Al-Aqsa Flood was not just a military event, but a blessed moment of birth, and the emergence of a free consciousness without deception or falsification.

The humanitarian situation continues to become more complicated in the Gaza Strip after two months of the ceasefire taking effect, where forced displacement persists and living conditions worsen.

Two people were killed on Thursday by a drone strike carried out by Israel on a small bus in the Al-Hermel district east of Lebanon, in a new violation of the ceasefire.

The program aims to reduce Israel's dependence on foreign suppliers 'including friends'

The explosion that occurred in the Rafah area occurred in the area fully controlled by the Zionist occupation forces, and no Palestinian works there.

The suffering of Palestinian prisoners is not just a story of prisons, but a tragedy of an entire nation whose sons, mothers, and children are imprisoned along with it. In the cells of the Israeli occupation, the prisoner is not only deprived of his freedom, but his humanity is confiscated day by day, under harsh detention conditions that deprive him of his most basic rights: sufficient food, treatment, visits, and even safe sleep.

Prisoners starve just as the people of Gaza starve, and they are besieged just as cities are besieged, but the prisoner's hunger is silent, behind the walls, without cameras or urgent headlines. It is deliberate hunger, a systematic policy of humiliation, and collective punishment that targets both body and soul.

The families of prisoners... the punishment that no one sees

And the suffering does not stop at the prison walls. Outside the prison, the families of prisoners live another siege no less cruel:

Wives bearing the burden of the family alone, children growing up on a deferred image of an absent father, and fathers and mothers aging at the prison gates.

The painful question that is not asked enough: Who supports these families? Who protects their economic dignity? And who turns their resilience from mere endurance into a real ability to continue?

These families pay a high national price, and yet they are often left on the margins of attention, as if their suffering is a side detail, not the essence of the issue.

Between official efforts and the absence of popular momentum

One cannot deny the efforts made by the Prisoners' Affairs Authority and the Palestinian Prisoners' Club in legal follow-up, solidarity stands, and continuous media presence. These are commendable and necessary efforts, but they remain limited in impact unless they turn into broad and pressing popular movement.

Why do the stands not exceed dozens or hundreds, in an issue that is one of the most central and fateful in Palestinian consciousness?

Why does the prisoners' issue not turn into a permanent mass engagement, not seasonal or occasional?

The absent street... and the postponed international pressure

The prisoners' issue is not an issue of a class or organization, but of the entire Palestinian people. And real international pressure cannot be built without a living street, and the occupation cannot be morally embarrassed without an active internal public opinion that makes prisoners a permanent priority, not a passing news item.

The absence of popular momentum not only weakens the prisoners' voice, but also drains their suffering of its ability to turn into a pressing human rights issue at the international level.

Dignity before salary... and rights before aid

Talking about the families of prisoners and martyrs is not complete without stopping at the economic aspect, not as a matter of 'aid', but as an authentic national right.

Any discussion about transferring salaries or allowances, to any party, must be a discussion based on dignity, value, and respect, not on cold administrative logic or narrow political calculations. For when money is given without dignity, it turns from support for resilience into a psychological burden, and from a national right into a feeling of belittlement.

The families of prisoners and martyrs need: real and stable economic empowerment, not temporary solutions. And clear policies that protect their rights away from blackmail and pressures.

An official discourse that recognizes that what is provided is a due for sacrifice, not a favor or a conditional reward.

It is time to move the issue of prisoners and their families: from the circle of speeches to the circle of real interaction, from verbal sympathy to actual participation, and from symbolism to practical pride.

When the prisoner feels that his family is protected with dignity, when the child feels that his imprisoned father's salary is a badge of honor not charity, and when the mother feels that the nation stands with her as support, dignity, and protection, only then does resilience turn from a slogan to daily practice.

The prisoners' issue is not only a battle for freedom, but a test of dignity, social justice, and national sincerity. And any national project that does not place the dignity of prisoners and their families at the core of its policies will remain an incomplete project... no matter how high its slogans, and no matter how much it talks about freedom.

Prisoners are not numbers, nor postponed files, nor pictures on walls. They are the pulse of freedom, the conscience of the cause, and our true moral test. And if their suffering does not turn into a popular outcry, the world will not hear the groans of the cells, and prisoners will continue to starve alone... behind the bars.

In a moment of Palestinian turmoil that is cruelly disrupted, the electoral atmosphere returns with the language of entitlements, lists, and alliances. While cities and villages are preoccupied with calculations of lists and chances of victory, Gaza drowns in material and political darkness due to a genocide war whose chapters have not ended, and the collapse of the foundations of life. This synchronization does not seem like a passing detail, but reflects a crisis in the national scene, where politics moves in one path, while our people live outside any political horizon. The return of elections in isolation from this open wound raises questions about the political system's ability to read the historical moment.

 In this context, the old debate with the local elections law is reopened. Are we facing service elections aimed at improving the management of daily affairs? Or a new political tool for re-sorting politically? The core of the problem is that the law requires candidates to commit to the organization's program and its international obligations and decisions of international legitimacy as a condition for candidacy. The condition is not a technical detail, but a direct political entry point for elections that are supposed to be local and service-oriented.

 The street does not deal with this text as a mere legal matter, but as a question about the relationship of the political program to a council required to repair a water network, remove waste, and repair a street destroyed by occupation bulldozers or depleted by years of neglect? Here, the discussion shifts from the right to candidacy to the right to service, and the implicit message is clear: local representation is conditional on a political ceiling, even if the candidate is the most administratively capable or the list has no partisan color. Instead of expanding the participation approach, it narrows it, and turns elections into a space of exclusion, not competition.

 The problem is not born of a legal text, but an extension of a long path, where service institutions were politicized and turned into links in the struggle of legitimacies. When bodies become part of a network of influence, or political satisfaction and conditional budgets, elections turn from a means of reform to a tool for protecting existing balances of power, and the condition becomes a safety valve for the system, not a service standard. But this bet ignores the fact that the citizen does not hold institutions accountable for their discourse, but for their performance.

 The most dangerous thing is that this redefines competence, so instead of integrity and management ability being at the forefront, the political cover becomes the protective shield, and with it, administrative failure turns into failure protected by loyalty, which explains the objections of civil and rights parties that saw it as an assault on pluralism.

 Here, the paradox emerges, as the law will backfire on the Fatah movement, not tightening on its opponents, and it is the one that bears the consequences of the general performance since Oslo, and has paid the cost of economic and service accumulations and others. When the local body fails, the citizen will not discuss the articles of the law, but will ask who was holding the joints, and when it is linked to conditions of sorting and exclusion, it becomes the facade of the coming failure, and closes on itself the door of pleading competition or pluralism.

 The prediction here is not an adventure, but a reading of a repeated experience, for whenever political options narrowed, anger widened. Local bodies are a point of daily friction, and the citizen may tolerate political debate, but he does not tolerate poor service, or paying bills without compensation, which reproduces the same cycle: service failure, anger, then political punishment.

 This burden becomes heavier in a moment when the street sees a blatant duality in the international system, especially with the continuation of aggression and settlement without accountability. When he sees his candidacy restricted by this logic, he will feel that what is required is not only a political stance, but acceptance of a system of restrictions and experiences that did not protect him, and this is enough to drain the elections of their content, and even turn them into a formal procedure that increases resentment, not relieves it.

 Defenders of the law may say that it will protect the system from the infiltration of opposing forces, or from politicizing bodies against the national project, but this logic will collapse before one single question: have these conditions succeeded in curbing failure and corruption? And reality says that politicizing services has not immunized politics, but weakened it, and the mixing between loyalty and administration is nothing but a recipe for a new crisis.

Dr. Ahmed Rafiq Awad: The rapid American anger at Katz's statements stems from considering them disruptive to Trump's plan, especially regarding the transition to the second phase

Mohammed Abu Alan Draghma: Katz's statements should be understood within the framework of electoral bidding, especially in light of the absence of any official Israeli decision confirming this direction

Niveen Abdel Hadi: These positions cannot be dealt with as implementable policy in light of the clear American rejection of any change in the war-ending plan

Dr. Abdel Majid Sweilem: Show-off statements that enjoy no acceptance and reflect concern in the ruling coalition that Netanyahu is heading towards making concessions required by America

Nizar Nazal: Any settlement in Gaza would disrupt the broader American project in the region, and Washington may allow Katz's statements but will not allow their implementation

Lubib Tah: Katz's statements are not transient but represent a mix of electoral discourse and the strategic vision and political and military doctrine of the Zionist project

The statements of Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (wait, correction: the text says يسرائيل كاتس, which is Yisrael Katz) regarding settlement in the Gaza Strip come to stir controversy, quickly retracted under direct American pressure, revealing that the goal of launching them was more electoral showmanship than practical.

And writers and political analysts, in talks with "Al-Quds", see that these statements came in a context of internal competitions within the right-wing camp, where tough language is exploited to gain popular support and raise the level of discourse, without reflecting implementable government orientations on the ground, but also coming within an electoral context.

And according to the writers and analysts, these positions show that the settlement file is used as a tool to send multiple messages, internally to prove strength before the Israeli street, and externally to test international reactions, while keeping Gaza's future ambiguous.

And the writers and experts see that Washington plays a fundamental role in regulating this Israeli discourse on settlement in Gaza, having allowed verbal escalation for internal consumption, but set strict limits to prevent its transformation into practical steps, fearing failure of President Donald Trump's plan to stop the war in Gaza.

A deeply rooted strategic position in the core of the Zionist project

The writer and political analyst Dr. Ahmed Rafiq Awad sees that the statements of Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz regarding settlement in the Gaza Strip, which he launched and retracted after hours under American pressure, cannot be described as tactical or circumstantial, but reflect a deeply rooted strategic position in the core of the Zionist project, even if retracted formally.

And he explains that this retraction does not change the essence of the statements, as Katz expresses a complete vision that sees settlement as a central tool and more lethal than direct military force, as it is not limited to the geographical dimension only, but forms a cultural, economic, security, military, and demographic weapon, aiming to change the existing reality comprehensively.

And Awad points out that settlement in Gaza, like in the West Bank, serves long-term strategic goals of the current Israeli government and successive governments, including dismantling the Palestinian people, controlling their resources, preventing the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and cutting off the geographical and political connection between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in addition to reproducing old-new solutions emanating from the Zionist project with biblical roots.

And Awad considers that these statements cannot be separated from attempts to disrupt the relationship between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the American administration, specifically President Donald Trump's plan, leading to embarrassing Washington and politically besieging it, despite the American administration opposing such steps verbally only, without opposing them practically on the ground.

Washington is unwilling to rein in Israel 

And Awad points out that the United States moves out of diplomatic motivation aimed at not angering its allies or the domestic public opinion, but in reality is unwilling to rein in Israel or prevent it from consolidating settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

And he notes that the rapid American anger at Katz's statements stems from considering them disruptive to Trump's plan, especially regarding the transition to the second phase, and from arousing concern among allies, funders, and parties nominated to participate in the planned stabilization forces.

And he confirms that these statements suggest that Israel is not interested in cooperating with any party, nor in implementing Resolution 2803, nor in transitioning to the second phase, but is committed to occupation as the only option, which practically means that funders will not provide financial support, and that any possible stabilization force will not come to serve the Israeli agenda.

And Awad sees that the American response, despite its speed and apparent severity, is not a real response to build on, warning against exaggerating reliance on the American position, as it often ends with adopting the Israeli position, despite Katz's formal retraction and the plan remaining on the table.

 Individual positions of some far-right ministers

The writer specializing in Israeli affairs Mohammed Abu Alan Draghma considers that Israeli statements about re-settlement in Gaza, the latest being Katz's statements, still fall within the framework of individual positions of some ministers belonging to the far-right, and do not reflect an official government direction or a binding political decision at the state level so far.

And he explains that talk of settlement in Gaza is limited to personalities known for their tough discourse, such as Itamar Ben-Gvir, Bezalel Smotrich, and Rotem Shtruck, and Yisrael Katz recently joined them, without this being matched by any official government decision or practical steps on the ground, such as approving budgets or adopting implementation plans. According to Draghma, these statements come in the context of attempting to gain more support within the Israeli right-wing street, especially with Israel entering a sensitive political phase.

And he points out that the electoral context plays a central role in escalating this discourse, as Israel prepares for general elections, in addition to Likud's tendency to hold internal elections (primaries), which pushes some of its leaders to launch tough positions to strengthen their political presence within their party bases.

And Draghma considers that Katz's statements about settlement in Gaza should be understood within this framework, especially in light of the absence of any official decision confirming this direction.

And in contrast, Draghma emphasizes the existence of a fundamental difference between what is raised regarding Gaza and what is actually happening in the West Bank, where the Israeli government recently approved the establishment of 19 new settlements, a step reflecting a clear strategic direction to enhance settlement as much as possible, aiming to eliminate any future political horizon, and definitively end the possibility of applying the two-state solution.

Despite ruling out the return of settlement to Gaza in the near term, Draghma did not deny that the occupation army seeks to impose long-term security control over the sector, and perhaps military occupation, considering that this path is different from the decision to re-settle, which requires governmental consensus and political and economic preparations not currently available.

And Draghma points out that reactions within Israel itself reinforce this assessment, as Israeli media spoke of shock in political circles following Katz's statements, and questions about their background, before the minister retracted indirectly.

And he notes that the American administration does not show a tough position towards these statements, aware that they are part of internal political competitions, and knowing that settlement in Gaza is not practically raised in the near term, while continuing to turn a blind eye to the accelerating settlement expansion in the West Bank.

"Marathon of show-off statements"

The writer and political analyst Niveen Abdel Hadi, editor-in-chief of Al-Dustour newspaper, sees that the far-right government in Israel has entered what resembles a "marathon of show-off statements", in which its ministers compete to launch positions far from political balance, carrying serious risks to the Palestinian cause, and to any real efforts to achieve fair and comprehensive peace and end the war on Gaza.

And she explains that the recent statements by Katz about future settlement in Gaza fall within this provocative context, noting that they do not reflect an integrated strategic vision as much as they express an electoral tendency and attempts to rally the far-right within Israel.

And Abdel Hadi confirms that these statements inject "political poisons" into the atmosphere of seeking peace, and contradict the Palestinian, Arab, and international efforts aimed at stopping the war and granting Palestinians their legitimate rights.

And she points out that Katz's talk about Israel's incomplete withdrawal from Gaza, and his pledge to establish new military and agricultural bases north of the sector instead of settlements, is a dangerous verbal escalation, especially as it came at a sensitive time when various parties are working to establish a political path to end the war.

And Abdel Hadi sees that these positions, despite their danger, cannot be dealt with as implementable policy, in light of the clear American rejection of any change in the war-ending plan.

And she confirms that Washington, as the main sponsor of the agreement to end the war in Gaza, will not allow undermining Trump's proposals through unilateral Israeli statements carrying ambiguous and dangerous dimensions.

And Abdel Hadi points out that the American reaction came quickly, where the American administration expressed surprise at Katz's statements, and demanded official clarifications, while affirming the necessity of the Israeli army's withdrawal from Gaza as an integral part of the American plan.

And she stresses that the insistence of the occupation government's ministers on launching statements contradicting the agreed path will lead to more political isolation, and perhaps put the Israeli government in direct dilemma with the American administration.

And Abdel Hadi points out that these statements, even if they cause tension or negative results on the ground, will remain mostly within the framework of electoral propaganda or attempts to "taint" the peace path, in light of the decisive American rejection of any return to settlement in Gaza.

And she explains that dealing with these positions should be with extreme caution Palestinian and Arab, with clear condemnation of them, and not underestimating the possibility that some Israeli government ministers may try to translate their words into practical steps, even partially.

Statements lacking any real political value

The writer and political analyst Dr. Abdel Majid Sweilem considers that Katz's statements about settlement in Gaza lack any real political value, describing them as show-off statements that their issuer does not believe and do not enjoy acceptance to be relied upon within Israel itself, in addition to lacking credibility at the international level.

And he explains that what came from Katz falls within the framework of struggles and bidding within the Israeli government coalition, and reflects a state of apprehension and concern prevailing within it, especially with the growing conviction in wide circles in the coalition that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is heading towards making concessions required by America.

According to Sweilem, these bidding seem outside any political or realistic logic, and do not express implementable policies.

And he points out that these statements are nothing but attempts to reassure the Israeli interior and the ruling coalition, in light of real fears of Israeli submission, whatever its form or formula, to American dictates, confirming that this submission has become inevitable in light of the existing balances, and that the positions declared by Katz or others, even Netanyahu himself, cannot constitute a real exit from this path.

And Sweilem points out that there are ongoing differences, even if not clearly appearing in the media, between the American and Israeli positions on several major files, including the Turkish role in the region, mechanisms for dealing with Hamas's weapon, the situation in Lebanon and the way to approach Hezbollah's weapon file. As for the Iranian file, Sweilem sees it settled, considering it an American file par excellence, and the decision in it belongs to the United States not Israel.

And Sweilem notes that the new American National Security Document, presented in Trump's name, but in essence the product of a broad dialogue within what is known as the American "deep state", clarifies that the Middle East is no longer an advanced priority in the American interests scale, and that engagement in wars is no longer raised within the current strategy.

And he confirms that the United States sees that Trump's plan for the region must start and be implemented, and there is no room for Israel to bypass the framework set by Washington, as any Israeli attempt to exit this context will create major crises within the ruling coalition.

And Sweilem points out that Washington will deal with Katz's statements in the usual way, by ignoring them and focusing on actions, placing these statements in the margin category, considering them "political bravado" that has no relation to reality or regional developments.

Election propaganda wrapped in a strategic dimension

The researcher specializing in Israeli affairs and conflict issues Nizar Nazal considers that Katz's statements fall within the framework of election propaganda wrapped in a strategic dimension, confirming that they are not feasible in the foreseeable term, and do not reflect a practical direction that Israel can actually pursue.

And he explains that these statements contradict the American vision currently presented, which speaks of transitioning to the second phase of understandings, including an Israeli withdrawal from areas still occupied in Gaza.

And Nazal notes that any real attempt to implement what Katz proposes requires a long time and radical changes in the regional and international contexts, which makes it, at the present time, mere political discourse for internal consumption.

And Nazal points out that Katz addresses through these statements the audience of the ideological right and settlers, at a sensitive political timing with the approach of the 2026 Israeli elections, and amid fierce competition within the right camp itself, especially with the pressures exerted by both Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.

And he confirms that raising settlement in Gaza represents a high rhetorical ceiling and not implementable, given that the sector constitutes a security, demographic, and economic burden on Israel.

And Nazal explains that the real goal of these statements is to blackmail the right-wing partners within the Israeli government, and redefine the war as an "existential war", which justifies continuing military operations and not fully committing to stopping the war, in addition to attempting to project what is happening in Lebanon onto Gaza and create future negotiation pressure papers.

Regarding the American position, Nazal stresses that Washington deals with Katz's statements as internal political and media noise, and will not allow their transformation into practical policies.

And he explains that the United States looks at Gaza from the angle of regional stability and preventing the explosion of situations with Egypt and Jordan, especially in light of the state of military movement and instability that the Middle East witnessed after the Gaza war.

And Nazal confirms that any Israeli settlement in Gaza would disrupt the broader American project in the region, at its head the normalization path, and expel Arab allies from the scene, in addition to creating a clash with the official European position and the United Nations, noting that Washington may allow Katz the statements, but will not allow their implementation.

Katz's statements are not a political slip

The researcher and political analyst Lubib Tah considers that the statements of the Israeli Defense Minister regarding settlement in Gaza cannot be dealt with as a transient event or political slip, but represent a mix of electoral discourse and the strategic vision and political and military doctrine of the Zionist project, which has not changed since its inception, despite the change in international and regional circumstances and the change in its tools and mechanisms.

And he explains that the electoral dimension in these statements reflects one of the paradoxes of Israeli politics, where extremism, racism, colonial tendency, and military attitude towards Palestinians and Arabs become a basic means to harvest popularity within Israeli society, noting that any politician seeking to rise and achieve electoral gains finds himself forced to raise the level of aggressive discourse, which explains such statements in the context of internal competition.

In the strategic dimension, Tah stresses that Israel, according to its fixed vision, does not believe in final geographical borders, explaining that its borders, in the Israeli strategic mind, are the point where its army stands at a certain time point.

And Tah considers that this rule has become obvious and known worldwide, and that it forms the core of Israeli thinking that has not changed and will not change in the foreseeable future.

And he points out that the political and military doctrine, even the religious one, is based on expansion and seizure of others' lands and resources, under the pretext of security.

And Tah notes that the concept of security for Israel is a rolling concept, expanding continuously, where it starts by determining a certain point, then demanding a buffer zone, then establishing settlements, before moving to expansion again under the pretext of the need for "additional security", and this model may repeat not only in Palestine but perhaps in Lebanon and Syria.

And Tah points out that Israeli military expansion forms the other face of the political project, where military tools are used to serve political goals, while the political project is implemented through military mechanisms, confirming that the settlement project has been and remains one of the basic pillars of the Zionist project since the beginnings of the Zionist movement.

In commenting on the Defense Minister's retraction of his statements, Tah sees that what happened may be like a "test balloon" launched to measure reactions, but at the same time reflects what lurks within the Israeli political institution of ambitions and desires.

And he confirms that the rapid American opposition, and the request for clarifications, pushed Katz to retract and justify, despite the settlement ambitions not disappearing, recalling previous statements by Israeli ministers about settlement in Gaza, and even in Syria and Lebanon.

And Tah believes that the United States appears determined to implement its plan regarding Gaza in the current phase, despite the maneuvers of Israeli politicians, likely to proceed with it for reasons related to its own interests and the current international variables and circumstances.

Next year will determine whether reconstruction will lead to breaking the cycle of violence in the region and the world 

How do we prevent Gaza's recovery from turning into an eight-decade project?

The American magazine "Foreign Policy" published an article by Shelly Culbertson addressing the challenges and mechanisms for rebuilding the Gaza Strip after the war, focusing on the fact that the issue is not just an engineering or material operation, but a comprehensive project that combines the human, social, and political dimensions with realistic planning, financing, and implementation.

When wars end, the focus should shift to what follows: the hard work of reconstruction. In the Gaza Strip, this effort will be on the scale of what Europe witnessed when its cities were destroyed during World War II, as well as what happened in Iraqi and Syrian cities that were razed during the war against the "ISIS" organization.

The fragile ceasefire in Gaza, and the 20-point peace framework, raise a degree of hope, but implementation requires strict realism. The destruction in Gaza is immense; about 70% of buildings are damaged or destroyed, 90% of the population has been displaced, basic infrastructure has been crushed, entire neighborhoods have been razed, hospitals and schools have been disrupted, and basic services have been almost completely cut off. The total cost of comprehensive reconstruction is estimated at more than $70 billion.

Reconstruction cannot begin, of course, until the political and security obstacles are overcome, as neither "Israel" nor "Hamas" has shown genuine commitment to rebuilding Gaza or enabling the governance arrangements necessary for such an effort. Nevertheless, even with these issues unresolved, it is time to think carefully about the measures required for real recovery. If the international community and regional actors approach Gaza's reconstruction without a shared vision, realistic timelines, and sufficient planning, the project is doomed to failure.

If planners, funders, and governments coordinate from the outset, the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip will be a vital element in creating the conditions for lasting stability. The way Gaza is rebuilt in the coming years will determine whether this moment will break the long cycle of violence in the region or be just another false dawn.

The war in Gaza has destroyed Palestinian heritage, and the natural environment has been damaged to the extent that many Palestinians may be unable to recognize their homes and fields. While recognizing the extent of the loss and acknowledging the impossibility of fully restoring what was is necessary, moving forward may require viewing this moment as an opportunity to start anew and replan the sector's entire infrastructure.

The RAND Corporation has developed a documented vision for Gaza and the West Bank, and this work shows that Gaza can be rebuilt, not just to restore what was lost, but to become a modern, sustainable area serving its population, contributing to the regional economy, and perhaps attracting tourists in the future. Gaza's cities could join other major economic cities in the Middle East, such as Amman, Dubai, Muscat, and "Tel Aviv". This vision ensures transforming Gaza from a symbol of destruction into a model of regional renewal.

Nevertheless, even with a clear vision, reconstruction efforts in Gaza will take longer than reconstruction in Iraq after ISIS, or recovery from Hurricane Katrina in the United States, much longer than many leaders and donors expect. Plans that envision fully rebuilding Gaza within five years do not account for this reality. Despite the importance of accelerating the pace of reconstruction in the short term, even prosperous countries have found that recovery from major disasters often takes a decade or more, and in unstable and conflict-prone contexts, it may extend to generations.

Germany, for example, after World War II, is a clear model; even after ten years, West Germany was hailed as an economic miracle, while reconstruction in East Germany remained incomplete. Without a precise approach, the timeline for Gaza's reconstruction could extend to decades. This should not be a cause for despair, but for preparation. A practical reconstruction plan addresses inevitable challenges before launch, centered on unclear property rights, debris, the need for immediate housing, restrictions on materials, weak management, and labor shortages. Each of these challenges is capable of obstructing Gaza's recovery path before it begins. However, the impacts of these obstacles can be mitigated through foresight and advance planning.

Property ownership is a fundamental issue in Gaza's reconstruction. Every piece of land is owned by someone, but ownership is often unclear. Even before the war, the ownership system was a complex mix of local, Israeli, Ottoman, British, and Egyptian laws, intertwined with claims to rights amid lost records, leading to ongoing disputes. It is essential to establish a clear framework for ownership, compensation, and dispute resolution before embarking on new urban development and community restoration.

Dealing with debris is the next challenge, as Gaza faces an estimated 68 million tons of debris, a figure far exceeding what cities like Mosul experienced, where debris ranged between 7 and 8 million metric tons after the war with the Islamic State. Under Gaza's debris lie human remains, in addition to about 7,500 metric tons of unexploded Israeli munitions. The United Nations estimated that debris removal alone could take 20 years. In Mosul, where debris was only about 15% of Gaza's level, the cleanup process remains incomplete eight years after the war's end.

It will be necessary to prioritize areas that can be cleared and rebuilt first, cordon off dangerous areas, provide sufficient equipment, remove unexploded ordnance, secure aggregation sites for processing removed debris, and handle victims' remains carefully. Debris removal requires effective international cooperation, and perhaps adopting new technologies, such as AI-based risk mapping, to accelerate the work.

Similarly, Gaza's debris can be turned into a valuable resource if recycled in building roads, ports, or even offshore islands, as part of innovative reconstruction projects. This huge amount of material can contribute to building future Gaza. In contrast, providing housing for all displaced Palestinians during reconstruction will be a major challenge. With most homes damaged or destroyed, Gaza residents currently live in temporary shelters on the beach, in semi-destroyed schools, and in tents near the ruins of their destroyed homes.

Up to 1.5 million Palestinians may need temporary shelter in safe, weather-resistant buildings, in addition to the need for water and electricity, while their permanent homes are rebuilt. The usual option in post-conflict areas is to establish camps intended to last for months, but which in reality turn into permanent cities. About a third of registered Palestinian refugees still live in camps in the Middle East established after 1948 and 1967, a reality that is repeating today with the outbreak of the war in October 2023.

The optimal approach is to develop temporary housing designed to avoid long-term camping. Given the number of affected people, camps become inevitable. Therefore, the RAND Corporation's plan suggests creating purpose-built camps, "future-oriented", that can later be developed into permanent residential neighborhoods. These camps will include tents and mobile homes within planning frameworks that allow for the construction of permanent homes later, with provision of transportation and basic services linked to neighboring cities. This also includes rehabilitating partially habitable neighborhoods to enable families to stay in them during the gradual reconstruction process. In areas where destruction is total, everything must be demolished and rebuilt completely, often through contracts with major international construction companies.

Reconstruction materials pose another challenge. For years, Gaza's economy has suffered from strict restrictions on dual-use materials, as Israel has prevented their entry, which today requires a serious review of this policy that destroyed Gaza's construction sector without preventing Hamas from building its tunnel network. Continuing to ban basic building materials will only deepen Gaza's poverty, and thus lead to a new round of violence in the future. In contrast, Israeli security concerns can be addressed through effective monitoring mechanisms and transparent supply chains. Bearing some calculated risks regarding materials necessary to enhance recovery may be the safest path forward.

No less important is the issue of financing and managing reconstruction. Billions of dollars from donors and private investments are expected to flow into Gaza in the near future. However, money alone does not guarantee success, as Gaza cannot afford funding inflows faster than management mechanisms can absorb. In previous experiences, inadequate administration has often hindered post-conflict recovery. A recent military report pointed to several factors behind the failure of the $145 billion American investment in Afghanistan, including oversight structures that failed to prevent corruption.

Hence, the need for governance and administrative structures capable of prioritizing projects, integrating local decision-making with international expertise, overseeing major capital projects, coordinating donor efforts, and ensuring transparency in financial flows. Gaza will also need proven technological systems, including unified platforms for coordinating donor efforts, similar to those developed by the European Union for Ukraine.

Finally, Gaza's reconstruction will require a skilled and extensive workforce, including engineers, builders, accountants, planners, and administrators. Gaza's labor capacity has been depleted by the war, with thousands of men of working age killed or injured, while women's participation in the labor market remains low. Other recovery experiences show the danger of underestimating this issue; reconstruction of the US Virgin Islands after hurricanes slowed for years due to shortages of skilled labor and insufficient housing for incoming workers. To avoid similar paralysis, Gaza will need vocational training programs to qualify Palestinians for reconstruction work, in addition to bringing in international labor managed through large-scale contracts, with provision of nearby accommodations, such as in Egypt across the border.

However, physical rebuilding is only one part of the recovery process; it must be accompanied by social and institutional rehabilitation. Reconstruction cannot advance without sustainable security and political stability. The ceasefire may collapse, donor appetite may wane, or regional tensions may resurface. Planners should not underestimate the human dimension, as widespread psychological trauma, physical disabilities from injuries, loss of social cohesion, and lack of trust among Palestinians after years of war all constitute serious obstacles to recovery.

Nevertheless, history shows that countries and cities destroyed by wars, from Berlin to Ho Chi Minh City to Beirut, are capable of rebuilding and even thriving if given time and the right approach. Next year will determine whether Gaza's recovery begins on realistic foundations or remains stuck in a quagmire of waiting. The difference lies in the details, from workforce plans to institutional coordination mechanisms. These details may seem technical, but they are in fact the foundation of peace and prosperity. Ignoring them can abort even the most generous international efforts, while mastering them can give Palestinians what they have lacked for decades: not just temporary relief, but a real opportunity to rebuild and stay in their homeland.

The incident occurred in the city of Haifa the day before yesterday, during the Christians' celebration in the city of the glorious Christmas, during which they were subjected to mockery and the blackout of Christmas lights, which returned after a darkness that prevailed for two full years of extermination.

The arrest of Santa Claus is not an ordinary fleeting arrest, but rather an arrest of joy, happiness, and delight, as he was caught while flooding the hearts that were wounded and deprived of it throughout the two years of extermination, during which the Christmas tree was not lit, in mourning and grief for the souls of the victims in the slaughtered sector, whose churches were subjected to massacres in which children, women, and families perished who took refuge in them considering them a safe place from the mad war, which targeted mosques, schools, universities, hospitals, and all means of life.

The matter did not stop at arresting joy, but extended to the official presence expressing national joy, by Israel preventing the Vice President and his representative Hussein Al-Sheikh from attending the midnight mass in the Church of the Nativity, before retracting its decision after American intervention, which carries political connotations and meanings, for Netanyahu and his ruling coalition have long expressed their pursuit to undermine the status of the Authority, and what it represents as a legal personality expressing the rights of the Palestinian people, and their aspirations for freedom and independence, ending the occupation, and establishing the independent state.

If the enemy of the sun, the enemy of life, is capable of extinguishing the lights, arresting Santa Claus, and preventing the official attendance of a religious celebration, then he will not be able to arrest the air, which is fragrant with joy, and illuminates the wounded hearts with the Christmas star, which heralds life, and promises the end of injustice, and the receding of darkness no matter how long it lasts.

Cross-referenced information attributed to various diplomatic sources in the American capital, Washington, indicates that the administration of US President Donald Trump is conducting a sensitive review of the concept of Israel's "qualitative military edge," in the context of its preparations to conclude major arms deals with Gulf states, primarily the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This review comes at a moment of extreme regional turmoil, where considerations of deterrence, alliances, and commercial interests intersect, in a scene that revives old questions about the limits of American commitment to Israel's security.

According to the sources, a high-level official from the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the US Department of State visited Israel last week, where he held talks described as partly aimed at addressing Israel's growing concerns. At the same time, American military officials held closed meetings in the Capitol building (Congress) with members of Congress, during which briefings were presented on potential defense deals and their implications for the military balance in the Middle East.

These discussions have been ongoing since the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Prince Mohammed bin Salman to Washington last November, which brought back to the forefront the file of advanced arms sales to Gulf countries. According to informed sources, the Trump administration is not only reviewing specific deals, but is also reconsidering the conceptual framework that has governed Israel's military superiority policy for decades.

An informed source told Al-Quds newspaper correspondent that this review reflects a gradual shift in American strategic thinking, where Israel's military superiority is no longer treated as a fixed given, but as an adaptable element within a broader equation that includes international competition, ensuring the loyalty of Gulf allies, and maximizing economic returns. The source, who requested anonymity, added that "this does not mean Washington is abandoning Israel by any standard, but rather redefining its position within a regional system whose balances are managed in the language of changing interests."

The Trump administration, according to informed sources, is seeking to formulate points of understanding before the end of the year, coinciding with the anticipated meeting between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on December 29, 2025. However, other sources express skepticism about the possibility of reaching a final formula at this time, given the complexities of the file and its sensitivity within the political and legislative institutions in the United States.

The discussions in Congress included members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Armed Services Committee, and Senator Republican Lindsey Graham (from South Carolina) met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the beginning of this week, limiting his public statements to noting his awareness of data related to the rearming of Hamas and Hezbollah, in addition to Iran's ballistic missile program, without directly addressing the file of Gulf arms deals.

Graham's avoidance of publicly delving into the sales file reflects an awareness of its political sensitivity, not an absence of disagreement. Congress, despite Trump's repeated attempts to sideline it on military issues, still possesses effective tools to obstruct or delay arms deals. This makes any understanding with Israel insufficient unless it enjoys broad legislative coverage, especially amid growing divisions over American foreign policy.

According to leaked information, the Trump administration is studying two main deals: the first with Saudi Arabia, including the sale of F-35 fighters, and the second with Qatar within similar talks. Trump had publicly announced, during his meeting with Mohammed bin Salman (last November at the White House), his intention to sell these aircraft to the Kingdom, acknowledging that Israel is pressuring for Saudi Arabia to be provided with a less advanced version. However, the American president hinted at rejecting this proposal, affirming that both countries "are at a level that qualifies them to obtain the latest aircraft."

In contrast, Israel shows increasing concern that the influx of advanced weapons to Arab countries will lead to the erosion of its qualitative military superiority. This concern is inseparable from recent regional tensions, including Israel's targeting of Hamas negotiators in Doha, and Netanyahu's public opposition to selling F-35 fighters to Saudi Arabia.

The paradox is that Israel, which has built its security strategy for decades on monopolizing military superiority, today faces a more fluid regional environment, where power is measured by the ability to build flexible alliances, not by technological superiority alone. With Gulf countries seeking to expand their defense partnerships with Washington, maintaining Israel's superiority becomes a political negotiation matter, not an automatic guarantee.

The concept of Israel's qualitative military edge dates back to the Cold War era, when the United States was keen to ensure Israel's superiority over its Arab neighbors, especially after signing the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979. This concept was legally enshrined in 2008, with the obligation on the American administration to conduct periodic assessments of any arms sales to the Middle East.

Israel is the only country that enjoys an unprecedented right to modify American weapons systems, including F-35 fighters, in terms of software, stealth systems, and radar. However, these privileges, which have long formed the cornerstone of Israel's superiority, now appear to be subject to re-testing amid accelerating regional and international changes.

The New York Times revealed in an extensive journalistic investigation published last Sunday a grim picture of what is happening away from the spotlight in the West Bank, where Palestinian villages are turning into a daily stage for a systematic land seizure operation. The investigation documents how settler attacks, supported by negligence or direct intervention from the Israeli army, have become a central tool to force Palestinians to abandon their historical lands. In the village of Al-Mughayyir northeast of Ramallah, the seventy-year-old farmer Rizq Abu Na'im recounts how his land is invaded weekly by herds led by armed settlers, who destroy olive trees and deplete water sources, in a clear attempt to push him and his family into forced displacement from land they have lived on for successive generations.

Abu Na'im's story, as presented in the investigation, is not an isolated incident, but part of a recurring pattern that has accelerated since the outbreak of the war on Gaza in October 2023. While the world was preoccupied with scenes of destruction in the sector, the West Bank was witnessing profound field transformations, redrawing its political and demographic map at an unprecedented pace. The land that is supposed to be the core of the future Palestinian state is eroding piece by piece.

The investigation indicates that throughout the West Bank, from Hebron to Jenin, the same mechanism repeats: an unlicensed settlement outpost suddenly appears on a hill near a Palestinian village, followed by an escalation in settler attacks, from crop destruction and livestock theft, to direct threats with weapons. Then the Israeli army intervenes, not to protect the indigenous population, but to issue military orders restricting Palestinian movement or declaring their lands "closed military zones" or "state lands".

In this way, Palestinian villages are pushed into slow suffocation. Roads are closed with iron barriers, agricultural lands are isolated behind wires, and farmers are prevented from accessing their fields. In contrast, the settlement outposts expand to become full settlements, with bypass roads built for them and schools and homes constructed. According to data from Israeli organizations, about 130 new outposts were established during 2024 and 2025, a number exceeding the total built over the previous two decades.

Violence forms the backbone of this policy, where United Nations data indicates an unprecedented surge in settler attacks, at a daily rate that is the highest since the documentation of these incidents began more than twenty years ago. The olive harvest season, which lasts no more than a few weeks annually, turns into a period of terror for Palestinian farmers, where dozens of assaults are recorded, often ending with the expulsion of the victims, not the perpetrators.

The investigation documents in the village of Hawara south of Nablus an attack by armed settlers on two brothers while they were working on their land, before the army arrived and prevented Palestinians from returning to the fields with a temporary military decision. In Singel, a similar clash ended with the killing of a Palestinian youth holding American citizenship, in an incident officially described as "under investigation," without announcing notable results.

According to the investigation, the demolition policy completes the circle of emptying. In just one year, more than 1,500 Palestinian structures were destroyed in the West Bank, double the annual rate in the previous decade. The village of Al-Ma'arjat al-Sharqiya in the Jordan Valley provides a stark example: a violent nighttime attack carried out by masked settlers, followed by mass displacement of residents, then gradual demolition of the remaining homes, while the army merely said it did not detect "violent events."

In all these facts, the imbalance in the scales of justice is evident. Settlers are subject to Israeli civil law and are rarely held accountable, while Palestinians are subject to military law that allows arrest without charges, and land confiscation without an actual judicial process. The Palestinian Authority, with limited powers, appears unable to protect its people, while the occupation consolidates its full control over the land.

The right-wing Israeli government does not hide its orientations. Statements by prominent ministers explicitly affirm that settlement expansion aims to bury the two-state solution. With the continuation of international silence, Palestinians' fears are increasing that what is happening is no longer reversible, and that the West Bank is being pushed toward a permanent reality of fragmentation and isolation.

What the facts in the West Bank reveal cannot be separated from the concept of settler-colonialism, where extremist civilian groups, protected by regular military force, are used to achieve long-term political goals. This model allows the state to deny direct responsibility, despite the fact that the field results clearly serve its project.

The international role, especially the Western one, is characterized by blatant hypocrisy. While warnings are repeated that settlement undermines peace opportunities, political and diplomatic support for Israel continues without effective conditions. This contradiction turns international law into a rhetorical tool with no practical effect.

According to experts, if these dynamics continue, the occupied West Bank is heading toward a model of isolated cantons, where Palestinians live in besieged pockets without sovereignty or political horizon. Then, the question will no longer be about the two-state solution, but about the nature of a permanent system of control and inequality, and its ethical and security implications for the region and the world

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is heading to the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida, where he will meet US President Donald Trump on Monday, December 29, in a visit that reflects a growing divergence in priorities between the two sides. While Netanyahu seeks to push for a renewed military confrontation with Iran, considering it Israel's most prominent strategic threat, Trump focuses on a different goal: pressuring Netanyahu to proceed with the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement and prevent the region from slipping into a broader regional confrontation.

From Netanyahu's perspective, Iran remains the cornerstone of Israel's security doctrine. Recent Israeli intelligence estimates indicate that Tehran is working at an accelerated pace to restore its military capabilities damaged in recent months, including missile infrastructure and the development of deterrence means, alongside strengthening the influence of its regional allies. Netanyahu believes that delaying the confrontation gives Iran additional time to rebuild its strength, raising the cost of any future military action.

In contrast, Trump adopts a more cautious approach toward engaging in a new conflict in the Middle East. The US President, who strives to present himself as a deal-maker rather than a leader of open-ended wars, recognizes that any direct confrontation with Iran could entail broad political and economic repercussions, not only on the region but also on global US interests. From this standpoint, Trump sees maintaining the de-escalation path in Gaza as an immediate priority.

The second phase of the Gaza ceasefire gains particular importance, as it goes beyond the mere exchange of prisoners and hostages that characterized the first phase, to include a more sustainable halt to military operations, expanding the entry of humanitarian aid, and opening initial discussions on the future administration of the sector after the war. The Trump administration believes that achieving progress in this phase constitutes a fundamental condition for relaunching broader diplomatic paths in the region, including regional normalization projects, which would be severely damaged in the event of a war with Iran.

This divergence places Netanyahu before a complex domestic political equation. His government relies on a fragile alliance that includes extreme right-wing forces that reject any concessions in the Gaza file and push for constant escalation with Iran. Moreover, exploiting external threats has long been a political tool for Netanyahu to divert attention from internal crises, including widespread criticism of his war management, and accumulating judicial and popular pressures.

In contrast, Trump possesses effective leverage tools over the Israeli government. The United States remains Israel's most important military and diplomatic supporter, and Trump can threaten to reduce political cover, slow down arms supplies, or even issue public messages reflecting Washington's impatience with the continuation of the war in Gaza. Moreover, the personal and informal nature of the meeting at Mar-a-Lago gives Trump a wider margin to present direct demands without adhering to traditional diplomatic frameworks.

Regional calculations play an additional role in Trump's position. The Gulf states, despite their hostility toward Iran, do not desire a comprehensive war that threatens the stability of energy markets and their economies. Egypt and Qatar, the main mediators in the Gaza file, also pressure Washington to prevent any escalation that could undermine de-escalation efforts. For Trump, pushing Israel toward completing the ceasefire aligns with the interests of regional partners he relies on in multiple files.

Accordingly, the meeting is not expected to witness a public rupture, but it may reveal a reordering of priorities. Netanyahu may seek American guarantees to continue containing Iran through sanctions, intelligence work, and regional deterrence, without going to a direct military confrontation at the present time. In contrast, Trump will try to frame progress in Gaza as a strategic necessity to prevent a broader war, not as a political concession.

In conclusion, the Mar-a-Lago meeting reflects a deeper struggle between the logic of escalation and the logic of containment. Netanyahu's ability to reconcile his demands regarding Iran with Washington's pressures on Gaza will be a true test of the strength of the US-Israel alliance in a highly turbulent regional phase.

This divergence between Netanyahu and Trump reveals a growing gap between Israel's narrow security calculations and the broader American vision for regional stability. While Israel sees military force as a permanent preventive tool, Washington has become more aware of the political and economic cost of open-ended wars. This shift reflects an increasing American realization that managing crises, not igniting them, has become a condition for maintaining influence.

In contrast, the question arises about the extent of Netanyahu's ability to maneuver without colliding with his domestic reality. Responding to American pressures in the Gaza file may threaten the cohesion of his government, while ignoring them may expose his relationship with Washington to the most serious test in years. This dilemma illustrates that the crisis is no longer confined to foreign policy, but has become a direct reflection of a governance crisis within Israel itself.

Residents thwarted an attack by settlers on the Omriyin gathering on the outskirts of the Mughayyir village, northeast of Ramallah, before the army intervened and fired bullets towards the Palestinians.

Sleep soundly, O Muawiyah. For Damascus is ours until the Day of Judgment.

The current estimates indicate that the second phase of the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip will begin after the anticipated meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump.

Honoring the sacrifices of our righteous martyrs, our heroic prisoners, our wounded, and their steadfast families, is a firm national and moral commitment, not subject to bidding or political exploitation.

With Netanyahu's pursuit of decisive American support, and Trump's desire to curb escalation and impose his own priorities, the upcoming meeting seems governed by a delicate balance between partnership and disagreement.

Israel will continue its operations in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza Strip, and Yemen, despite the existence of cease-fire agreements.

Hamas' open and ongoing refusal to disarm is a blatant and continuous violation, and its violent intentions and violations have been confirmed today.

These developments come amid the continuation of fierce confrontations in various axes of penetration inside the sector, where Palestinian resistance factions rely on setting ambushes and mining paths to hinder the advance of vehicles.

The Palestinian people's weapon cannot be handed over to the Israeli occupation.

Yesterday, Tuesday, at the headquarters of the Faculty of Engineering at Al-Quds University – Abu Dis, the official headquarters of the Chair of Moroccan Studies was inaugurated, in the presence of official and academic figures, led by the University President, Prof. Hanna Abdul Nour, the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco to Palestine, Abdul Rahim Meziane, the Acting Director of the Bayt Mal Al-Quds Al-Sharif Agency, Mohamed Salem Al-Sharqawi, and the Chair's President, Dr. Safa Nasser Eddin.
This inauguration embodies the transition of the Chair's work from the establishment phase to the phase of institutional and knowledge empowerment, where on this occasion, summaries of the professors and students participating in the first research call of the Chair of Moroccan Studies were presented, addressing historical, cultural, architectural, and artistic axes related to the Moroccan presence in Jerusalem and its civilizational manifestations, within a specialized academic discussion, framed by the members of the Chair's scientific committee.
On this occasion, the President of Al-Quds University expressed his pride in opening the official headquarters of the Chair of Moroccan Studies within the university campus, confirming that this headquarters constitutes a distinctive aesthetic and architectural addition, and 'a valuable symbolic gift from Morocco to Palestine'.
Mr. Abdul Nour pointed out that the importance of the Chair lies in 'its documentary and academic role in studying the dimensions of the historical and urban Moroccan presence in Jerusalem, preserving the shared memory, and enhancing specialized scientific research in this field'.
For his part, the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Morocco to the State of Palestine expressed his happiness at participating in the opening of the official headquarters of the Chair of Moroccan Studies at Al-Quds University, appreciating the university's hosting of this unique academic project.
Mr. Meziane confirmed that allocating an official headquarters for the Chair represents 'an important step in consolidating its institutional presence, recalling that this Chair was born from the womb of the deep-rooted historical relationship that unites Morocco with Palestine, and embodies one of the forms of deep Moroccan solidarity with Jerusalem and the steadfastness of its people, especially in light of the symbolism of the Moroccan Quarter and the Moroccan Gate and the ancient Moroccan presence in the city'.
In turn, the Acting Director of the Bayt Mal Al-Quds Al-Sharif Agency confirmed that Al-Quds University's hosting of the Chair of Moroccan Studies 'provided it with a comprehensive academic and institutional framework that ensures its success and sustainability'.
Mr. Al-Sharqawi explained that the Agency, which operates under the supervision of His Majesty King Mohammed VI, President of the Al-Quds Committee, views education and scientific research as 'a fundamental pillar for protecting identity and supporting social stability'.
From her side, the President of the Chair of Moroccan Studies confirmed that the opening of the official headquarters of the Chair 'does not mean opening an administrative space only, but consolidating a long-term scientific and knowledge path, aimed at producing knowledge, preserving memory, and building deep research questions in the context of the Moroccan-Palestinian relationship, with Jerusalem at its heart'.
Ms. Nasser Eddin pointed out that since its establishment, the Chair 'was built as a sustainable knowledge project, not limited to studying the Moroccan presence in Jerusalem and Palestine, but starting from a broader vision concerned with the Moroccan experience in its civilizational and knowledge dimensions, with special focus on the Moroccan presence in Jerusalem as a living model of the Moroccans' contribution to protecting the city's identity, urbanism, and cultural memory'.
It is noted that the opening of the official headquarters of the Chair of Moroccan Studies comes as a culmination of a foundational academic path that began in March 2025, and constitutes a institutional base for implementing the Chair's future plan, enhancing its research presence within Al-Quds University, and consolidating the Moroccan-Palestinian academic space as a living space for producing knowledge and preserving shared memory.

The State of Belgium has filed an official declaration to intervene in the legal case brought by the Republic of South Africa against the occupation before the International Court of Justice in The Hague.