Benjamin Netanyahu's last battle

A security negligence of this magnitude requires immediate lessons to be drawn, but for some reason, what is currently required is to postpone the investigations into the “Gaza envelope” disaster until another day. This is a mistake. It is possible to wait for a formal investigation committee and the resignation of high-level officials at the end of the fighting, but drawing preliminary lessons is necessary to prevent additional disasters in the future.

The army and Shin Bet will examine intelligence failures in assessments and in analyzing the facts. The public has no way of knowing who was aware of this there, who was not aware, and how the decision was made to allocate 30 battalions to the West Bank, compared to only 4 battalions to the Gaza Strip. There are speculations regarding the composition of the current extremist coalition, but even if they are unfounded, this does not exempt the security establishment from providing answers regarding the reason for the reduction of forces in the Gaza Division, and the fragility of the first line of defense. Lessons must now be learned regarding defensive doctrine, because the reality on the northern front changed radically overnight, as well as in the West Bank, and this could happen in other sectors.

On the political level, drawing lessons is no less important. During the last years of Benjamin Netanyahu's rule, the country witnessed a serious political crisis that weakened its institutions, including the security establishment. At the root of the problem is Netanyahu, the criminal defendant, who is waging a struggle for survival, dragging with him his supporters, his party, and his partners on the right and in the Haredi parties. He is the one who turned everyone who did not stand to his right into an enemy: the judicial system, the police, a section of the media, the leaders of the security services, and opponents of the judicial coup. In parallel, he improved the position of the sycophants around him - petty, bad and weak people, to whom he entrusted extremely important functions. They had one mission: to defend it, even if the price was the destruction of state institutions.

They succeeded in their mission, the institutions were destroyed. The commanders of the army and Shin Bet bear great responsibility for the negligence, but any investigative committee cannot ignore the atmosphere in which the Chief of Staff, the commanders of the Air Force, and the head of the Shin Bet worked in the past year. The warnings they issued about the seriousness of the situation, and the danger that the enemy would exploit the internal rift in Israel to attack, fell on deaf ears. Netanyahu even refused to receive the Chief of Staff before the law abolishing the reasonableness argument was passed in the Knesset.

The direct lesson is that a criminal defendant should not be prime minister, as Netanyahu previously warned in the case of Ehud Olmert, when he said: “There is a fear that he will make fateful decisions, based on his personal interest and political survival, and not based on the national interest.” Even in these moments, Netanyahu is preoccupied with his political survival, and it does not seem that he intends to resign, or take responsibility for the disaster. The least that is required of him is to abandon politics, public relations, and his personal survival, and devote all his energy to managing the dangerous security crisis. He cannot postpone investigations and clarifications until another day, and at the same time, collect materials before establishing the investigation committee, and ask his supporters to attack senior military officials.

There is a way to manage this battle professionally, without resigning: announcing that he will resign at the end of this battle. It is reasonable to assume that this was the decision reached by senior officials in the army and Shin Bet, who deep down understand their responsibility for the disaster. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which Netanyahu survives this disaster and remains prime minister. Even before the massacre in the Gaza Envelope, his and his government's popularity had declined due to the damage of judicial reform. After more than 1,300 dead and about 220 kidnapped, this seems more clear. The question remains: How will this happen? When will his partners in his party and in the coalition realize that he has turned from an asset into a burden?