Scenarios for holding the Cairo meeting

Despite the low expectations of the Cairo meeting, in this article I will try to present the different scenarios for holding the meeting.

First scenario: canceling or postponing the meeting

This scenario is possible against the background of the continuing wide gap between the factions, as shown by the loss of common ground, which is an unlikely scenario. Because the factions do not want to bear the responsibility before the Palestinian people by appearing blatantly unconcerned with unity, at a time when the need for it is increasing, just as the factions do not want to anger Egypt by not responding to its call.

As for the threat of a large number of factions not to participate if political prisoners are not released, it is an attempt to harmonize with their previous calls about the inability to combine the options of resistance and settlement, and to improve the conditions for participation, although there are promises to release political prisoners or some of them, and if not The release of political prisoners or some of them, especially from the Islamic Jihad, it can boycott the Jihad as its Secretary General threatened, or it can raise this issue forcefully during the meeting, and the consequences that may ensue.

The second scenario: Reproducing previous dialogues and agreements

This scenario is likely, and it has a great chance of being realized through the issuance of a statement by the two parties along the lines of the Algiers Declaration, and the previous agreements that were not implemented or partially implemented and quickly collapsed.

This scenario can be achieved by adding a point to Algeria’s declaration that talks about a government of national unity or a government of national accord, which was present in the first draft, and was later dropped on the grounds of a lack of agreement on its commitment to international legitimacy, which is used as a hidden synonym for the conditions of the Quartet, and the meeting is adjourned with the issuance of a statement, and it remains The situation is the same.

The third scenario: division management

This scenario is achieved by actually agreeing to form an agreed-upon government (a government of unity or reconciliation) that consolidates the fait accompli and gives it a common factional legitimacy. Files, such as dealing with the plans and policies of the Israeli government, and its implementation of the decisiveness plan, which could escalate its measures against the Palestinians in light of the continuation and exacerbation of the internal crisis in Israel. The government also seeks to agree on the file of the reconstruction of Jenin camp and the file of gas... and others. It covers the fact that division has turned into separation.

The fourth scenario: a serious start in facing the challenges of this stage

This scenario is unlikely. Because the two parties to the division, especially the president, are sticking to their conditions that prevented the success of unity efforts in the past, in addition to the external factors that impede unity, the impact of which cannot be underestimated. A team from both sides of the division does not want unity unless it manages to bring the other team under its leadership, without tying its hands and its political movement at various levels, and a team wants to retain power in the sector, and add to it other achievements, such as joining the organization, or participating in the decision-making process. By forming a temporary leadership framework, which is now more comfortable than before; Because the realistic acceptance of his authority has increased, and the internal and external threats against him have receded.

And if the first and fourth scenarios are excluded, then there is competition and a race between the second and third scenarios. This is reinforced by the presence of information that the president will participate in the meeting, and if this happens, then it will be for the first time. He always does not participate until he maintains a large margin to thwart any agreement and control the course of matters.

Rajoub and Al-Arouri seek to avoid mines

Sources indicated that Jibril Rajoub and Saleh Al-Arouri resumed contacts between them, and began preparing for the meeting, and this needs to be confirmed. Files that constitute a major obstacle or a mine that could explode at any moment, so they chose the approach of postponing ending the division and deciding on the political option and the Oslo commitments, and focusing on mitigating the effects of the division, even by managing it, and focusing on searching for politically and other agreed points, such as holding elections within The formula of the Joint List, and the agreement to nominate the president as a consensual candidate in the presidential elections.

The challenge facing Rajoub and Al-Arouri is that the previous formula they agreed on failed. Because of the internal and external opposition, especially the American and Israeli opposition, which vetoed the elections, even if Hamas did not obtain a majority if it did not agree to the Quartet’s conditions, and the reasons for failure still exist.

Of course, the Fatah disputes and the nomination of several lists affiliated with the Fatah movement contributed to the failure of the implementation of the Istanbul understandings, which there is no guarantee that their implementation through holding elections, if they were to take place, would lead to an end to the division. Because the same reasons that made him accept the approach to the elections in light of the division will make him accept the management of the division afterwards, and at that time the winning parties to the division will have obtained popular legitimacy.

The current efforts face a greater obstacle in the form of an Israeli government that is more extreme than its predecessors and will be more opposed to any move that could unite the Palestinians, including holding Palestinian elections that would strengthen the Palestinians in the face of it, and it seeks to further weaken and fragment the Palestinians; It is easy for it to liquidate the Palestinian cause in all its dimensions.

Those gathered in Cairo can choose to focus on agreeing on a common program or strategy in confronting the government of (Netanyahu-Smotrich-Ben Gvir). This is a good start, but it requires a later step, which is the need to detach from the political, economic and security commitments of Oslo, and agreement can be made in this regard. the case to postpone steps such as forming a government or heading to elections; Where we are facing a transitional period aimed at exploring potentials, possibilities, and upcoming developments and acting in their light, and this requires agreement on a temporary leadership transitional formula that does not constitute an alternative to the institutions of the PLO, but it has broad powers to be agreed upon, and this did not succeed previously in the experience of the provisional leadership framework. In the Cairo agreement of May 2011, there are not enough indicators to allow for optimism about success this time. In this context, a qualified national committee representing all colours, groups, sectors and generations, and of both sexes, could be formed, tasked with drawing up a national rescue map.

Why is pessimism prevailing in this article?

This is due to a simple reason, which is that the groups of interest in continuing the division are the strongest and control over the two conflicting authorities, while the forces, groups and movements that move to end the division and embody the national interest and unity are still weak, and are not unified in their visions and demands, as some of them focus on holding elections or on the organization First, some of them demand the overthrow of the controlling group first, and the establishment of an alternative leadership title from the leadership that has relinquished its leadership role, and some of them refuse to participate with a faction or factions linked to regional political projects under a religious title and so on.

There is no way but to accumulate strength to crystallize a third current that includes forces and movements that believe in the necessity of change, and work to provide the requirements for its occurrence. The region and the world are witnessing transformations and changes that can open the doors of opportunities and Palestinian change, without which it is not possible to proceed on the path of national salvation.