Netanyahu's visit to Washington... Will he clash with Trump's demands regarding South Lebanon?

Ahead of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's anticipated visit to Washington, the South Lebanon file tops the political and security agenda, not only as one of the most prominent unresolved issues between Lebanon and Israel, but also because it has become a clear point of divergence in visions between the administration of US President Donald Trump and the Israeli government.

While Washington seeks to solidify the framework agreement it sponsored and push for the implementation of what are known as "experimental zones" as a first step towards the redeployment of the Israeli army and strengthening the presence of the Lebanese army in the South, Netanyahu appears more committed to maintaining the buffer zone established by the Israeli army inside Lebanese territory, considering it part of Israel's security doctrine after the last war.

The disagreement between the two sides is not only about military arrangements but also reflects a difference in the nature of their objectives. Trump, who seeks to market himself as a dealmaker capable of ending conflicts, sees stability on the Lebanese front as an opportunity to achieve a new political and diplomatic accomplishment, especially in light of his efforts to redraw the map of regional balances through US-sponsored security and political agreements.

Netanyahu, on the other hand, views the issue from a completely different angle. He realizes that any unconditional withdrawal from South Lebanon could be interpreted within Israel as a retreat in the face of Hezbollah, and could provide his political opponents with new material to attack him in a crucial election year, at a time when his government still faces significant internal pressures. Therefore, he tries to combine formal acceptance of the American initiative with practically maintaining the realities imposed by the Israeli army on the ground.

The idea of "experimental zones" is based on a gradual Israeli withdrawal from specific areas where the Lebanese army would assume security responsibility, with American monitoring of the implementation as a test of the possibility of expanding the experiment later to other areas. However, this mechanism still faces many obstacles, most notably the dispute over the nature and limits of the withdrawal, and Israel's insistence on retaining freedom of military movement, which raises Lebanese concerns that the process could turn into a re-formulation of occupation rather than its termination.

Conversely, the American administration insists on the necessity of showing tangible progress before moving to broader political stages, because the success of this experiment will enhance Washington's position as a key mediator in the region, while its failure would mean the shaking of the entire framework agreement, and perhaps a return to the cycle of military escalation.

However, historical experience with Israeli governments makes many approach promises of withdrawal with caution. For decades, Israel has adopted a policy of imposing facts on the ground and then turning them into bargaining chips, which raises questions about whether the "experimental zones" truly represent the beginning of a real withdrawal, or whether they are merely a means to entrench new security arrangements that grant Israel long-term influence within South Lebanon.

Netanyahu also realizes that maintaining a buffer zone gives him a permanent leverage over Lebanon and Hezbollah, and establishes a security equation that allows Israel to intervene whenever it wishes under the pretext of "preventing threats," which contradicts the American vision that prefers stability serving its regional interests and reducing the chances of a new confrontation.

These divergences reveal that the American-Israeli alliance, despite its strength, is not without disagreements when it comes to defining each party's priorities. The United States seeks a political achievement that enhances its regional influence, while Israel seeks to consolidate its military gains and avoid making concessions that could be interpreted internally as a defeat or retreat.

Ultimately, the future of South Lebanon remains contingent on Washington's ability to exert real pressure on Netanyahu's government to implement what has been agreed upon, and on Lebanon's ability to impose its full sovereignty over its territories. However, if narrow Israeli calculations prevail over political commitments, the "experimental zones" may turn from a gateway to de-escalation into a new title for conflict management, not its termination, leaving the region suspended between settlement projects and the realities of occupation, and between Washington's diplomacy and the doctrine of force that still governs Israeli decision-making.

In the end, the disagreement between Trump and Netanyahu will not just be a divergence of views on the mechanism of withdrawal from South Lebanon, but a real test of who holds the decision-making power within the American-Israeli alliance. If Washington seeks to impose a settlement that entrenches its influence and presents it as a sponsor of stability, as it claims, then Netanyahu's government is trying to turn any agreement into a cover that grants it legitimacy to maintain the occupation in a new form, under different security designations.

Hence, Netanyahu's visit to Washington will not only determine the future of the "experimental zones" but may also shape the features of the next phase in the relationship between the American administration and Israel. If Trump fails to compel Netanyahu to implement the understandings sponsored by his country, it will be confirmed once again that Israeli governments only view agreements insofar as they serve their interests, and that they quickly disavow them when they conflict with their expansionist project. However, if Washington succeeds in imposing its vision, it will be a rare precedent revealing that American interests may temporarily take precedence over the calculations of the Israeli right.

The most important question remains: Will the "experimental zones" be the beginning of the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, or merely a new experiment to reproduce the occupation with different tools? Previous experiences confirm that Israel does not relinquish land except under real pressure, and does not grant peace for free, but always seeks to turn it into a means to consolidate its military and political superiority, not to end the conflict or respect the sovereignty of others.