Why might Israel turn against Netanyahu soon?

Israel is experiencing an unprecedented, multi-dimensional, and multifaceted historical dilemma, which is reflected in the extent of polarization and conflict regarding the most important issues that concern the state and its future.

Although Israel has been in a state of crisis since its establishment in the wake of the Palestinian Nakba, over the years it has succeeded in maneuvering between war and peace, between regional and international demands, and, most importantly, within its own domestic context.

In its first decades, it succeeded in neutralizing most of its internal contradictions, creating a kind of melting pot for Jewish communities from more than 100 countries and 80 languages. But all this began to change on a large scale after the right-wing succeeded in coming to power in 1977.

Over the next two decades, amid a steady shift to the right, the picture was completely reversed. Instead of a kibbutz vanguard with "socialist" values, a fascist, religious settler vanguard emerged from among the settler herds.

Almost immediately after Netanyahu came to power, the remnants of liberalism began to disappear, even within the ranks of the right, until Netanyahu's most recent government became a symbol of the former right-wing fringes' control over the center of public life in Israel.

The extreme right found in Netanyahu a skillful, eloquent, and charming leader who knew how to manipulate the game to serve the right's interests and aspirations. On the path to this leadership, Netanyahu skillfully utilized all available tools, adhering to the principle that "the end justifies the means."

When his goal was to attain the leadership of the Likud, he built what was called at the time a "submarine," which led him and his then-director-general, Avigdor Lieberman, to the top of the Likud. Using mafia-like methods, the two men succeeded in removing the so-called "princes," sons of Herut's historic leaders—such as Benny Begin, Dan Meridor, Ehud Olmert, and Reuven Rivlin, among many others—from positions of influence.

They were replaced by a group of opportunists who obeyed his orders and showed no objection. The last of the princes he removed from the Likud was Gideon Sa'ar, who, after opposing him and joining his attackers, quickly returned to the government.

On his path to leadership, Netanyahu refused to accept the word "no" from any of his close associates, which led to his closest confidantes turning against him and becoming his bitterest enemies, despite their lack of opposition to his right-wing views. Among the most prominent of these are Avigdor Lieberman and Naftali Bennett.

As previously mentioned, Lieberman led Netanyahu's submarine to the leadership of the Likud Party and was even his partner in the clash with Ariel Sharon. He became the director general of the Prime Minister's Office and held the reins of the Knesset and state ministries on Netanyahu's behalf, to the point where he was dubbed "Yvette the Terrible," akin to Ivan the Terrible in Tsarist Russia.

A dispute arose between them, and Lieberman established the "Israel Beitenu" party against him, relying primarily on his influence among Russian immigrants, before transforming it into a generally right-wing party.

Naftali Bennett, who had been one of Netanyahu's closest advisors, also quickly left Netanyahu's office and became one of his most bitter enemies. Bennett joined Religious Zionism to lead it in partnership with others, but Netanyahu's hostility toward him prompted him to form the most important coalition to confront Netanyahu, in cooperation with Yair Lapid, leader of Yesh Atid.

With a small number of seats in the Knesset, Bennett succeeded in establishing himself as prime minister of the opposition government to Netanyahu. It is possible that the Bennett-Lapid government, which demonstrated that Israel could survive without Netanyahu, prompted Netanyahu and the far right to wage the most vicious and distorting propaganda campaigns against their opponents, leading to their success in winning a narrow majority in the last election. It was these elections that produced the Netanyahu-Smotrich-Ben-Gvir government.

Given the nature of the two men, Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, it would have been almost impossible for them to meet had it not been for Netanyahu's efforts, who promised to fulfill their personal and national dreams. It was Netanyahu who brought together the two extreme right-wing fringes, Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, promising them and their parties victory and the highest positions in the state.

Immediately after he succeeded in forming a government, he agreed to grant them critical ministries such as Finance, a branch of the Ministry of Defense responsible for the West Bank, and the Ministry of National Security.

And that's what happened. They won the elections and became central players in Netanyahu's coalition. They quickly fell out within the government, contradicted each other, and separated. A constant race between them to win the upper hand is the extremism.

Netanyahu wasn't forced into this coalition formation, but he not only chose it, but he also created it, and he viewed it as a "full right-wing government." This government, without objection, is capable of realizing the right's dreams of building a Greater Israel and rebuilding the Temple.

It is no coincidence that Netanyahu was driven by personal and ideological motives in all his positions and alliances. His wife, Sara, and his son, Yair, played a central role in his stance against secularism, the left, democracy, and everything that contradicts fascism.

Due to his and his family's proclivity for extravagance and luxury, he established dubious relationships with numerous business leaders and billionaires, some of whom were driven to purchase several major Israeli media outlets, both visual and audio, in an effort to reshape Israeli public opinion in favor of the right.

Indeed, an American billionaire, Sheldon Adelson, established a free newspaper, Israel Hayom, to compete with widely read and historic newspapers like Yedioth Ahronoth and Haaretz. He led to the collapse of Maariv and its restructuring, and attempted to take control of the Walla news website.

In general, these relationships have served as the basis for several corruption cases for which Netanyahu is being prosecuted, including the case of receiving expensive gifts from businessmen to facilitate their control of interests or media outlets.

Because of these legal prosecutions, Netanyahu has agreed with a number of right-wing forces to overthrow the judiciary and even the state's structure and institutions, serving the goal of deflecting the wrath of the law from himself.

Initially, he attempted to enact a law preventing his prosecution. When that failed, he attempted to change the direction and composition of the judiciary in general and hand over its authority to the Knesset, thereby eliminating the independence of the judiciary and subjecting it to the legislative authority, which he succeeded in eroding and subjecting to his command.

Almost everything we hear today in Israel about the conflict between the political and military levels, conflicts with the Shin Bet at one time, with the Mossad at another, with the police leadership, and with the Attorney General, stems from this point.

Netanyahu—and the right wing behind him—want complete and unconditional control over all state institutions, transforming them into tools serving the leader or the right wing, rather than working in the interests of the state.

Naturally, this approach provoked widespread opposition from within institutions and society. Over time, the conflict intensified, with demonstrations and protests sweeping across Israel.

Some believe this rift and conflict was a major reason behind Hamas's rush to detonate the Al-Aqsa flood on October 7, 2023.

But the war and its length did not help quell this opposition; rather, they greatly intensified it. The failures of October 7 revealed not only weaknesses in the Israeli military and political system, but also a collapse in the concepts upon which Israel relied in dealing with contradictions.

It has become clear to everyone that blocking the path to a regionally and internationally acceptable peace settlement does not guarantee security for Israel. Israel's failures in the war and its prolonged duration also demonstrated that dealing solely with force and using more force whenever the initial force fails to achieve the goal does not guarantee victory.

But if this is the conclusion of the Israeli public and its balanced institutions, it is not the conclusion of Netanyahu and the ruling right. This is the true meaning of opinion polls, which show that a majority of Israelis, and a majority of former and current military and security leaders, support a ceasefire, a prisoner exchange deal, and the formation of an official commission of inquiry into the events of October 7 and into the political and military performance before and after that.

This also demonstrates why Netanyahu and the right-wing insist on refusing to stop the war and even developing a theory of permanent war as a means of remaining in power. In their view, stopping the war would mean the defeat of Netanyahu and the right-wing's political and intellectual project.

In this context, Israeli President Isaac Herzog's call for a settlement emerged, not just late last month, offering a deal to halt prosecutions against Netanyahu in exchange for a "pleasure plea" and a departure from political life.

Of course, this isn't just a call, as the Israeli president also has the power to pardon even a convicted criminal. Many therefore understood this as a call from a centrist president who wants to spare Israel from continuing to spiral into a cycle of conflict, judicial coups, and the search for and clash with the "deep state."

Israeli authorities had submitted a request to Herzog to consider this proposal late last year, but he stipulated that the request should come from authorized parties. The resubmission of the proposal appears to be a testament to the bleak outlook that awaits if the conflict between Netanyahu and other state institutions continues, and the president himself seeks a way out.

But one thing can be said: Netanyahu, who has become the longest-serving prime minister in Israel's history and has ruled the country longer than its historical founders, finds it difficult to accept his expulsion from political life. In his own eyes, and perhaps in the eyes of many others, he is one of the prophets of the global New Right, and there are those who have read and embraced the ideas he has presented in his books on politics, counterterrorism, and the clash of civilizations.

The extreme right, not only in Israel but also in America and perhaps in some European countries, will not accept such a withdrawal from political life. This would be a defeat for an idea that would leave behind a profoundly impactful earthquake.

In Israel, the matter is clear and requires no explanation. Netanyahu is not just a person, but rather an expression of the extreme right's transition from the most distant and marginal corners to the center of decision-making.

What will likely bring down Netanyahu is the conflict within the right wing between its Haredi, religious, and fascist nationalist components. This is currently evident in the conflict between Likud and the Haredim over the conscription law, with the Haredim beginning to abstain from voting in favor of the government's proposals.

There is a struggle between the parties of Smotrich and Ben-Gvir over who will prevail among voters in the upcoming elections, and many supporters of the traditional right are abandoning it in favor of more or less extreme trends.

The public mood in Israel under Netanyahu has also become more pessimistic, meaning that the upcoming elections, as opinion polls indicate, are not promising for either Netanyahu or the right.