Palestinian No and Israeli No in the Face of America

In international politics, words may sound similar, but their impact and meaning differ radically, depending on who utters them and who possesses the tools to implement them. The Palestinian "no" and the Israeli "no" in the face of American pressure present two contrasting models for how to use the word "no." The first is governed by the logic of falsehood and translates into "power" and political gains. The other, which is governed by the logic of clear truth, translates into isolation and the erosion of one's position.

Since its inception, Israel has not hesitated to say "no" to its closest allies when it comes to what it considers "strategic interests" and "national security." During the 2000 Camp David summit, Barak refused to cede "full sovereignty" over Jerusalem despite American "pressure." Later, Sharon proceeded with the "unilateral disengagement plan" from Gaza without coordination with the Palestinians or full American "approval," insisting on imposing a fait accompli. At the height of the aggression on Gaza, Netanyahu explicitly rejected—according to his claim—the Biden administration's pressure to halt the aggression or accept the establishment of a Palestinian state, claiming that his country is subservient to no one and that Washington will not dictate its terms to it, even if the price is diplomatic tension.

These positions did not stem from an emotional challenge, but rather from careful calculations of power. He realizes that he is protected by a system based on strategic alliances, and that he is capable of overcoming disagreements with America without incurring real losses. In many cases, he has used these disagreements to bolster his internal discourse and increase the cohesion of his fragmented political front.

On the other side, the Palestinian "no" was no less stubborn or clear, but it always came with a "heavy" price. Since the Camp David Summit, the late Abu Ammar refused to accept settlements that diminished Palestinian rights. He was confronted with isolation, both internally and externally, and accusations of sabotaging the "peace process." This situation continued with President Abu Mazen, who said "no" more than once in the face of American and Israeli pressure, refusing to give up Jerusalem or accept the "deal of the century." Each time, he declared Palestinian constants, even if they were not the subject of Palestinian consensus, as some of them represented the minimum or less. However, the results were completely different. The Palestinian "no" was often met with a halt to aid and more pressure, and was considered "obstinacy," without anyone seeing it as a legitimate position.

The difference between the Israeli "no" and the Palestinian "no" lies not in the pronunciation of the letters or their intonation, but in the balance of power between those who possess a "strong" army, a "solid" economy, and effective lobbies within decision-making centers, not only in America, but around the world, and perhaps in the Arab world, while the Palestinians fight their battle alone, with limited tools, besieged by internal division, a crumbling Arab world, and an obsolete international system.

Perhaps a broader comparison requires a look at history, and a brief revisit to the history of the Arabs. After the 1967 setback, the Arabs held the famous Khartoum Summit and issued their three "Nos." This was a reflection, on the surface, of a collective will insisting that the Palestinian issue was not just a Palestinian affair, but a fateful Arab issue. It was also an explicit declaration that defeat does not mean surrender, but rather calls for greater adherence to principles and sovereignty.

However, the Arab scene today presents the opposite of that spirit, will, determination, and unity of destiny, and an absolute surrender to helplessness and defeat, and an acknowledgment that the Palestinian issue is the concern of the Palestinians. We wanted it, and they found what they were looking for in it. You see Arab capitals racing towards normalization, sometimes voluntarily, or under American pressure at other times, without any real compensation - for the Palestinians at least - many Arab countries are becoming tools for implementing American and Israeli policies, instead of being centers of support for the Palestinian position. Today's "no's" are no longer "no's" of sovereignty, but rather conditional, restrictive "no's" subject to a will, but not the will of the Arabs. The concept of Arab consensus on the Palestinian issue has declined to mere protocol statements, while actual positions reflect a surrender to the status quo and a gradual surrender of historical rights.

The Palestinian "no" today appears more muted than ever, given the regional landscape in which Arab consensus has eroded and many regimes have become agents of the policies of the old and new colonialism. Nevertheless, this "no" retains symbolic and historical value, representing the last line of defense for the idea that rights are not built solely on a balance of power, but also on steadfastness in the face of dictates, no matter how harsh.

Reading the trajectory of the Palestinian and Israeli "no"s clearly reveals that the word "no" is not sufficient in and of itself. Its true value is measured by the ability to translate it into effective political positions and to build alliances and strategies that protect against the isolation of rejection. Otherwise, the word becomes a mere slogan issued by the weak, while the strong impose their reality without the need to raise their voices. Palestinians and Arabs are at a crossroads: either they reclaim the spirit of their old "nos," or they continue their slide toward a reality in which the word "no" becomes a mere wish, with no weight in the equations of international politics.