Will this war on Iran be completed?

The current Israeli-American war on Iran comes to complete the short war launched against it last summer, which I then described as an example of an incomplete war ("Al-Ayyam" 25-5-2025). The sought-after goal was and still is to overthrow the regime in Iran and replace it with a domesticated one that meets all Israeli-American conditions. It is clear that Netanyahu has been trying for years to drag Washington into doing the job on behalf of Tel Aviv, to achieve Israel's goal of fully domesticating and dominating the entire region, which will not be achieved with the continued existence of a strong regional power hostile to Israel, curbing its absolute control over the entire region. For this purpose, Israel exaggerated Iran's military capabilities and magnified the dangers of its nuclear program, to instill fear in many, inside and outside the region. It is worth noting that Iran's policies and evasions gave Israel comfortable space to do so. As for the Trump administration's involvement in the two successive wars on Iran, although it seems like a drag that aligns only with the Israeli purpose, it is worth noting that Washington, panicked by the continuous decline of its absolute dominance over the international system, due to the accelerating rise of China, on the one hand, and Russia regaining some of its lost status after the collapse of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, means that America also has its own goals it wants to achieve. American goals do not contradict the Israeli goal, but rather intersect with it, as the control of the trusted organic ally in the region secures American interests in the long run. In addition, Washington, in its quest to secure the continuation of its global dominance, aims to specifically contain China's rise, by absolute control over the widest oil-producing regions in the world, as it is the artery feeding the prosperity of the Chinese economy. By controlling Venezuelan oil, on the one hand, and tightening the control loop over "Middle East" oil, on the other hand, the artery supplying China with what it needs of this essential and vital material becomes subject to American control. For these intersecting, but aligned, reasons, getting rid of the Iranian regime becomes a vital priority for Israel and America. But since Israel alone cannot overthrow this regime, it has always needed American support to do the job for it. However, America, which also wants to overthrow the Iranian regime, had a self-restraint as a result of its experience in two bitter wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which is its unwillingness to engage in a new military "adventure" that would involve it in a new open war. Therefore, its means of achieving the overthrow of the regime in the first short war on Iran, and the current war as well so far, has been limited to launching a "remote war" on it, with attacks from the air and sea, without a ground invasion it is trying hard to avoid. However, it is known from historical experiences that overthrowing a well-established regime by external military intervention is difficult to achieve through launching "remote attacks," and ultimately requires ground intervention to achieve the purpose. So, will Washington be content with limiting its war on Iran to remote strikes, or will it get involved in a long and costly war that does not have the support of American public opinion? *** There are three possibilities (scenarios) for overthrowing the Iranian regime by launching an American-Israeli "remote war": First, continuing to carry out continuous attacks from the air and sea on Iran with the aim of striking the regime's capabilities and undermining its ability to maintain cohesion and control, which allows organized opposition forces to seize it from within, or allows allied forces from outside to do the job. However, this possibility remains weak, as the organized opposition represented by the "Mujahedin-e Khalq" movement does not have a vital presence inside Iran, and because employing allied forces to do the job by infiltration from outside requires the existence of such forces capable of carrying out the mission, and their acceptance of doing so, which is not currently available or guaranteed. Second, relying on an uprising of angry popular groups against the regime, who wish for its demise, by having American and Israeli attacks weaken the regime's control over internal affairs, which allows these groups to take to the streets in large numbers sufficient to eliminate the existing regime and hand it over to a new leadership loyal to America and Israel. At the beginning of this war, the American president expressed his reliance on this scenario, and stated that what America is currently doing is preparing the appropriate ground for this possibility to occur. However, this possibility remains weak currently because the Iranian regime is an ideological regime based primarily on the support of a guaranteed loyal popular base on ideological grounds, and because other groups are expected to unite with it during an external aggression against the country, and because the regime itself is expected to fight fiercely in its defense when it is subjected to external aggression aimed at removing it, which means it will not allow any unorganized "popular" opposition to exploit the opportunity to overthrow it. Third, that America and Israel rely on bringing about change in the Iranian regime from within, by a "soft coup" that brings forth a new leadership that is conducive to reaching "understandings" that achieve American and Israeli conditions, and gradually turns Iranian affairs in the desired direction by Washington and Tel Aviv. For this, the first strike targeted the Supreme Leader himself and a large group of first-tier leaders, especially military ones, which opens the way for a new leadership movement. The American president also expressed Washington's reliance on this option by stating the possibility of three personalities, who appear to be current regime leaders, taking over the leadership of Iran in the next stage. This possibility remains the most important and probable of the previous two possibilities, but it opens the door to questioning whether a deal has been struck with parties from the current Iranian regime for a "soft coup" against it when military attacks take effect by exhausting it. Although this possibility is plausible and brings to mind what happened in Venezuela, the structure of the Iranian regime is more complex and includes the presence of many safety valves protecting the regime, especially the "Revolutionary Guard" which, if not infiltrated, will not only be the defender of the regime's continuity, but also of ensuring the continuity of its ideological direction. *** Driven by Israel, but also to achieve American goals, it is clear that the Trump administration has started a war to complete the previous war to change the Iranian regime. It is also clear that it started this war without a clear plan for how to achieve this goal, as the available possibilities to achieve it through launching a "remote war" are weak and uncertain. If one of these three possibilities mentioned above is not achieved soon, Trump may find himself involved in a long, exhausting, and uncertain ground war that the majority of the American people, and even he himself, do not want or support. If that happens, Netanyahu will have dragged the American president into a muddy confrontation that will disrupt the remainder of his term. A side note: Contrary to Trump's goal of this war being swift, the Iranian regime's goal currently may be to expand its scope and prolong its duration, as this exhausts those with short breath, and Trump is at the top of the list. Another note on the subject: This war, if it does not achieve American-Israeli goals quickly and decisively, will be another important nail in the coffin of the organic American-Israeli relationship. There is a lot of change happening within the American arena in this direction, and this war will reveal this ongoing transformation.