The Authority Between Contraction and the Risk of Disintegration.. What to Do to Redefine the National Project?

The Palestinian crisis is no longer reducible to an imbalance of power with Israel, nor to the bias of an American administration here or a retreat of a European stance there. We are facing a historical phase that goes beyond diplomacy and daily politics, to a question of meaning and function: What remains of the national project when the Authority, which was born as a transitional framework towards a state, contracts to find itself today closer to an apparatus managing a population under occupation, if not within the context of its own plan?

In light of the accelerating creeping annexation in the West Bank and the Judaization of Jerusalem, the continued siege and obstruction of Gaza's reconstruction, the fading of any political horizon during the Trump administration, and the international community's contentment with the rhetoric of a "two-state solution" without enforcement tools, the challenge is no longer solely external for Palestinians. The deeper danger is the gradual transformation from a supposedly temporary authority to a permanent administrative reality, stripped of sovereignty and horizon. The erosion here does not come in the form of a resounding collapse, but in the form of a slow habituation to contraction.

The most likely scenario in the foreseeable future is a formal survival of the Authority, more financial and political tightening, accelerating expansion of settlement facts, and a cumulative decline in popular trust. But it is not an entirely predetermined path. Even in the context of erosion, the question remains: Is the Authority's function redefined, or is the crisis managed with the bare minimum?

Redefinition means transforming the Authority from a service apparatus into a tool for societal resilience; from managing salaries to protecting land; from waiting for external transformation to investing internally. It means redirecting resources towards supporting productive sectors, fortifying Jerusalem and threatened areas, strengthening the resistant local economy, and opening up public space for genuine political participation that restores trust. Reform with its national content here is not a moral demand, but a condition for political survival. For an authority without societal legitimacy becomes more fragile in the face of any external pressure.

However, erosion may slide into functional disintegration or disorganized collapse, under accumulated financial-security pressure. Here, the issue is no longer managing contraction, but confronting a vacuum. And a vacuum in the Palestinian context is not a neutral space; rather, it is an open invitation for external arrangements, or for internal chaos, or for a forced reshaping and engineering of the political system. Therefore, thinking of a reserve national framework, "a broad consensus network of political and societal forces capable of managing an organized transition," is not a coup, but a preventive measure that protects society from collapse turning into liquidation.

In contrast, the possibility of re-establishment remains, even if it seems less spontaneous. This path can only be achieved by rebuilding national representation on comprehensive democratic foundations, redefining the relationship between the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Authority, and formulating a political contract that defines the Authority's function as a tool subject to the national project, not a substitute for it. The essence of the transformation is shifting the center of gravity from relying on external factors to restoring legitimacy from within, so that society itself becomes a lever of pressure to redefine the direction.

In this context, the call for National Council elections or engaging people with a draft constitution emerges. In principle, renewing representative legitimacy and drafting a new constitutional contract represent undeniable national entitlements. But the value of any electoral or constitutional process is not measured by its announcement, but by its political conditions. Elections held amidst deep geographical and political division, and without prior agreement on a comprehensive national program, may turn into a reproduction of existing power balances, or a mechanism for managing the crisis rather than solving it. And a constitutional discussion in the absence of actual sovereignty, and continuous erosion of geographical space, is nothing more than an illusory compensation for field impotence, or an internal rearrangement of the system without affecting the core of the predicament.

The problem is not with elections or the constitution, but with the danger of the compass shifting from the priority of the question of liberation to the question of administration. When the conflict shifts from protecting land to organizing texts, the national project becomes vulnerable to being reduced to limited governance engineering, while facts on the ground redefine borders and sovereignty without waiting.

Hence the central question arises: Who has the ability to break this path?

The answer does not lie in a single institution, nor in a specific faction, but in what can be called the "historical bloc," i.e., a broad alliance of social, cultural, trade union, economic, and political forces whose interests intersect at protecting the national project from final contraction.

The responsibility of this bloc is not limited to criticism or issuing statements. Its historical responsibility is on three interconnected levels:

First, imposing the priority of political unity as a condition for any electoral or constitutional process. There is no meaning in renewing procedural legitimacy without restoring the minimum level of unity and a common program.

Second, restoring the public space as an arena for discussion, accountability, and participation. Legitimacy is not restored by a top-down decision, but by re-engaging society in defining the path.

Third, transforming steadfastness from rhetoric into public policy through supporting local production, protecting land, fortifying civil peace, and building community solidarity networks capable of absorbing shocks.

The historical bloc is not a new party, but an organized collective consciousness, pushing to redefine the Authority's function before it is redefined from outside. It is the force capable of preventing erosion from becoming fate and collapse from becoming liquidation, and elections or the constitution from becoming cosmetic illusions to fill the vacuum.

The current moment of contraction carries a deep paradox: the narrower the political space, the heavier the burden of internal responsibility. Either the national project is reproduced from within, or it is reshaped from without. It is not enough to wait for changes in administrations or shifts in international positions. History does not grant peoples the luxury of long waiting when the land itself is in the process of redefinition.

So what is to be done?

Not a coup or an adventure, but a transition from crisis management to redirecting the path. And if the moment is one of contraction, the response is not withdrawal, but a rearrangement of power balances within society itself. Here, responsibility shifts from a moral question to a historical duty for the broad national bloc.

First: Establishing the minimum national base; the first step is not an election or a constitution, but a political agreement on undisputed priorities: stopping creeping annexation, lifting the siege on Gaza, protecting Jerusalem, and preventing the entrenchment of geographical and political separation.

This minimum is not a factional program, but a unifying umbrella under which secondary differences are suspended. Without this foundation, any political process "electoral or constitutional" becomes merely a reproduction of division, not its transcendence.

Second: Restoring the public space as an internal sovereign domain; legitimacy cannot be restored without reopening the public sphere.

Political freedom is not a luxury, but a condition for mobilization. What is required is to free trade union, student, and civil work from restrictions, and to restore the importance of public debate as a tool for correction, not a threat to stability.

For an authority that fears its society loses its ability to represent it. And a society that is excluded from decision-making loses its willingness to defend it.

Third: Practically redefining the Authority's function;

Instead of the Authority remaining an apparatus for managing salaries and services, it must be transformed into a tool for steadfastness:

•Redirecting budgets towards productive sectors, agriculture, and small industries.

•Supporting the steadfastness of areas threatened by annexation through real, not symbolic, empowerment plans.

•Transforming municipalities into community protection institutions, not platforms for administrative competition.

Here, the economic dimension becomes part of resisting imposed realities, not just managing the financial crisis.

Fourth: Rebuilding national representation;

Addressing the erosion of legitimacies controlling the national destiny must start from acknowledging their failure, leading to the building of democratic national representation that responds to current priorities in strengthening people's ability to steadfastness and preserving the unifying identity, the right to self-defense, and confronting plans to liquidate the right of return and self-determination. As for constitutional discussion, it must be linked to redefining the national project and the Authority's function, and not entrenching the current situation that has led the national cause to this impasse; otherwise, it becomes merely a distraction that contradicts popular priorities, especially in the absence of real sovereignty and imminent existential dangers.

Fifth: Building a transitional safety net;

In the event of collapse or forced transformation, a reserve national framework "non-confrontational" capable of managing any sudden transition must be established.

This framework includes personalities, community forces, and factions that agree in advance to protect civil peace and prevent the vacuum from turning into chaos or guardianship. For preparing for the worst-case scenario is a condition for preventing it from happening.

Sixth: Shifting the center of gravity from external to internal;

This does not mean closing the door to diplomacy, but reordering priorities. External reliance without an internal base turns into a long wait. But when the external relies on cohesive internal legitimacy, it becomes a supporter, not a substitute. Negotiating power is not derived from statements, but from the unity and resilience of society.

Seventh: Crystallizing the historical bloc as a carrier of change;

The historical bloc is not a slogan but a cumulative process through an alliance between cultural elites, trade unions, the business sector, youth forces, and political leaders willing to make mutual concessions for the larger project. Its function is not to overthrow the system, but to redirect it. And not to dispute legitimacy, but to restore it.

This roadmap does not promise quick solutions, but it prevents erosion from becoming fate, collapse from becoming liquidation, and elections or the constitution from becoming cosmetic tools or a distraction to buy time. It moves the question of "What is to be done?" from the level of rhetoric to the level of organized action.

The question is no longer: Will circumstances change?

But: Will a collective will capable of transforming the moment of contraction into a moment of re-establishment be formed, before Palestine is redefined from outside, not by Palestinians themselves?