Over the past year, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu successfully prevented a ceasefire and prisoner exchange agreement with Hamas. He then agreed to it at the beginning of this year, and such an agreement entered into force on January 19. Under the agreement, prisoner exchanges will be carried out in stages, leading to a permanent ceasefire.
It was clear that Netanyahu was forced to agree to this agreement. This was not because US President Donald Trump and his Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, were putting intense pressure on him, but rather because Netanyahu wanted to ease the pressures he was facing, particularly from within the government, which demanded the return of the prisoners from Gaza. However, he was planning several steps forward, which he began implementing last Monday night when he resumed the war on Gaza.
It emerged that Netanyahu had reached understandings with Trump regarding his plans to resume the war. Among these understandings was that "Netanyahu pushed the Americans to put forward a series of new proposals (which Witkoff had presented in the negotiations) in an attempt to circumvent the central pledge that Hamas had agreed to in the original deal (during Biden's term), which was Israeli agreement to a permanent ceasefire," according to journalist Barak Ravid on the Walla website.
Netanyahu has his own personal justifications for resuming and continuing the war, primarily his continued rule and an attempt to evade trial on serious corruption charges. From the outset of the war, following the October 7 attack, Netanyahu set two goals: eliminating Hamas and returning the Israeli captives. He thus appeared to have set a high bar for ending the war, as military experts and analysts warned at the time that these two goals were contradictory and unachievable. This warning proved to be true until the ceasefire two months ago. With the exception of the deaths of tens of thousands of Gazans and the massive destruction in the Gaza Strip, Israel has neither eliminated Hamas nor recovered all of its captives throughout the year and a half of war.
Israel claims that the resumption of the war aims to soften Hamas's position in the negotiations, thus making Netanyahu appear as if he wants to stop the war and recover the prisoners, while Hamas is the one refusing to do so. However, it turns out that Netanyahu is setting an impossible condition that Hamas cannot agree to: disarming and agreeing to the exile of its members abroad.
With the resumption of the war, Israel reiterated the same two goals—eliminating Hamas and recovering the prisoners—and that this would be achieved through "military pressure," as if the war, which had lasted a year and a half, had not been a military one. Netanyahu also stated that negotiations would now be conducted under fire, as if they had not been conducted in this manner before January 19.
Israel's two goals in the war have been the same since the beginning of this war, and it has not achieved them since October 7, 2023. Israeli military experts and analysts now also assert that these goals are contradictory.
What next?
The continuation of the war means that the war is an end in itself, intended to kill more Palestinians and inflict further destruction on the Gaza Strip. It will also lead to the deaths of more Israelis, particularly soldiers, while difficulties in recruiting reserve forces are currently emerging, according to Israeli media. There have also been cases, albeit few so far, of officers refusing military service in protest against the resumption of the war without the return of prisoners from Gaza.
Expectations in Israel are that the social rift and division will widen and deepen. This has already become evident in the mass demonstrations of recent days, which demanded the return of the prisoners, which would mean a ceasefire. Israel's international standing will also decline further after the leaders of pro-Israel European countries, such as Germany, called for an end to the war.
But Netanyahu doesn't seem to care about such calls. What matters to him is the American position, particularly that of Trump, who returned to the White House with plans in his arsenal, which he announced, including his desire to end the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, a major deal with Saudi Arabia that would normalize relations between the latter and Israel, and a new nuclear agreement with Iran. It now appears that Netanyahu will obstruct these plans by Trump.
Meanwhile, Netanyahu is managing to maintain his government, which was re-elected this week by the Otzma Yehudit party, headed by Itamar Ben-Gvir. He expects to further bolster his government's stability by enacting a law exempting ultra-Orthodox citizens from military conscription, but this will only deepen the divisions within Israeli society.
Given this situation—with no resolution in Gaza and a worsening internal Israeli crisis—and in an attempt to heal the rifts within Israeli society, Netanyahu may move to implement statements and hints he has made in recent months and expand the war. He may resume the war on Lebanon, but he may also carry out his threat/dream of attacking Iran's nuclear facilities. He will likely leave the Houthi issue in Yemen to the United States and Britain.
In Lebanon, the war ended as a two-sided battle. Hezbollah adhered to the ceasefire agreement and withdrew its forces to the north of the Litani River, while the Lebanese army deployed its forces in southern Lebanon. However, Israel violated the agreement and continued its raids in Lebanon, claiming to prevent the rebuilding of Hezbollah's military forces. Its aircraft regularly violated Lebanese airspace, and it refused to withdraw from five positions on Lebanese territory, claiming that its continued occupation would enhance its security.
Israel's allegations against Hezbollah are somewhat similar to its allegations against Hamas. Although Israel is the party launching the attacks and raids, it demands that the resistance in Lebanon and Gaza disarm. Furthermore, Israel refuses to rebuild the areas it destroyed in southern Lebanon, to which its residents want to return.
During his visit to Washington early last month, Netanyahu sought to persuade Trump to attack Iran. Trump currently appears to favor a new nuclear agreement with Iran and appears to be seeking to avoid war. However, Netanyahu may believe that Israel could attack Iran's nuclear facilities alone if the United States provided it with the appropriate munitions, as some in Israel argue.
This escalation scenario is not unlikely in Israel, which is promoting the notion that the "axis of resistance" led by Iran has become weak and that Syria has withdrawn from it. A large-scale Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear facilities could receive support, and perhaps even funding, from Arab states, which have remained silent throughout the war of extermination in Gaza.
If Netanyahu decides to embark on such a major escalation, backed by the Israeli right—not just the right in his government but also in the opposition—as well as the military and security establishment, as is the case with the resumption of the war on Gaza, there will be no Israeli opposition that can influence the decision. For Israelis, war or "external threats" are the glue that unites them.
