Open, organization and power

If Fatah was an iron ideological party, it would have melted and become extinct, as many parties have become extinct.

If it were one unified faction, the phenomenon of its spread in all fields and squares, and even directions, would not have emerged, agreeing and different.

Had it been unified behind the option of armed struggle until liberation, Yasser Arafat and his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, would not have gone to the parallel option, which is negotiations. I say “parallel” because it is the euphemism for “alternative,” even if it is temporary.

It has been like this since its inception and through all the stages of its growth and leadership of the Palestinian stage since the first shot, to the present day. It was the sure guarantee of national unity through its transformation of the "Liberation Organization" into a combative frontal framework within which all Palestinian forces coexisted or antagonized, regardless of their programs and even their associations and whatsoever. A battle that was fought inevitably, either in defense of the revolution or imposed on it, but it was "some of each" even though it is the largest, the greatest potential, and the widest spread among the Palestinians, the Arabs and the world, which made President Abdel Nasser declare that the Palestinian revolution was found to remain, and many Arab and world leaders followed suit.

In an objective observation of the course of history, and the growth and atrophy of political entities, the reality of the situation shows a fundamental difference between what was and what is now between Fatah at the time of the revolution and Fatah at the time of power.

Yasser Arafat led the experiment fraught with danger, while he was aware of the difficulty of marrying the military option with political action. And as soon as an option falters, there is an alternative to it, and when the strong military presence of the revolution in Lebanon was liquidated - for example - it could be compensated by opening important doors for politics.

Despite all the pitfalls, defections, and expulsions from the arenas, the world found no choice but to knock on the door of the PLO, its leader Fatah and its leader Yasser Arafat, in order to make the major international attempt to solve the Middle East issue a success, with a comprehensive recognition that the Palestinian cause is its center and the strongest factor influencing its paths and outcomes.

Yasser Arafat was excluded from the Madrid conference, and the irony is that those who were excluded due to Israel’s desire, the Americans, the godfathers of the process, were aware of the fact that the excluded is the most influential of those present in the course. stronger than those present.” It produced another track, the Oslo track, whose secret chapters were led wholesale and in detail by Arafat and Abbas.

In view of Arafat's central and historical position in both fighting and politics, the founding scholar of the "Historic Peace" project saw that no one is able to manage his affairs except Arafat, and there is no room for the success of the difficult experiment unless he is the one who carries it out on its soil.

Arafat returned to the homeland, and from the early days he discovered the fragility of the agreement on paper in the face of the rigidity of the obstacles to implementation. The relationship with the Palestinians will be built, progress and retreat on a security basis wrapped in a thin political membrane, and the difference between those at the decision-making table and those in the opposition is just one vote, and so that it does not appear as if there are no differences in this regard between the government and the opposition in Israel, i.e. between Likud and Labor. The Likud was more clear in expressing its understanding of the new relationship with the Palestinians, which is security without any cover, then economic, just to keep the politician away.

The Liberation Organization and Fatah were at their strongest when Yasser Arafat and his leadership found "Fatah and the Organization", but when he returned home to engage in the challenges and difficulties of implementing what was agreed upon in Oslo.

The organization appeared to be devoid of its most important components, and the authority over some parts of the country became the objective place for the Palestinian situation as a whole.

It is obvious that the PLO will be harmed by its merger with the authority, and the Palestinians, who are scattered everywhere inside and outside the homeland, will be harmed by the repercussions resulting from this merger.

If the matters that were formulated on paper had found a way to be applied on the ground, it would have been possible to coordinate complementary relations between the authority and the organization. on its land.

The organization is, in fact, Fatah first, and what happened provides Fatah with an effective margin of independence from power, as long as it occupies its presidency and all presidencies emanating from it, and as long as the functional and political infrastructure is basically Fatah.

Voices appear from time to time trying to show that Fatah is different from the authority, and that the options of the authority do not necessitate Fatah, but that seems far from reality. In my estimation, there is a possible, albeit difficult, way out of this comprehensive impasse, in which Fatah, the organization, the authority and the people share. And all factions. It begins with Fatah first, according to the principle that if Fatah is reformed, the state of the nation will be reconciled, and it must reunite its children who have been separated for a long time and have gone far. The elections are even working from the moment to win them through the ballot box. This is how the beginning should be without delay. An article by Dr. Ibrahim Abrash that he recently published and which I transmitted with passion and interest and on a large scale on all communication platforms, including Fatah platforms, spared me from many details.