Occupation Generals Warn of Escalating Iranian Nuclear Threat After the War

A number of senior researchers and generals in the Israeli security establishment have expressed growing concern about the potential escalation of the Iranian nuclear threat following the ongoing military confrontations. These experts believe that failure to address this issue radically during the current phase could lead to catastrophic consequences for the security of the occupation in the near future.

In this context, Reserve General Amos Gilad, former head of the Political-Security Division in the Ministry of War, warned against the Iranian regime remaining resilient despite the blows it has received. Gilad indicated that Tehran might do its utmost to acquire nuclear weapons while maintaining its military proxies in the region.

For his part, General Nimrod Sheffer, former head of the Planning Division in the army, expressed his dissatisfaction with the absence of a clear strategy to deal with the direct nuclear threat. Sheffer stressed that the retention of large quantities of enriched uranium by Iran after the war constitutes an existential threat that cannot be overlooked.

General Tamir Hayman, director of the Institute for National Security Studies, in cooperation with researcher Raz Zimmt, presented a comprehensive working paper outlining the required Israeli action. The paper emphasized the necessity of clearly defining Israeli interests in any negotiations led by the United States to end the current conflict.

The two researchers believe that the Iranian regime, if it withstands, will move towards adopting a national security doctrine based primarily on nuclear deterrence to compensate for its field losses. This potential shift requires the international community and Israel to ensure that Tehran does not acquire any technological capabilities that would allow it to build an atomic bomb.

The study clarified that previous models for managing the nuclear threat are no longer valid for the new reality created by the war, necessitating a more stringent approach. The paper called for insisting on the complete dismantling of infrastructure dedicated to uranium enrichment as a vital condition for any future diplomatic or military path.

Israeli assessments indicate that the current war has shaken the foundations of traditional Iranian deterrence based on proxies and ballistic missiles. This failure in deterrence may lead decision-makers in Tehran to conclude that nuclear weapons are the only guarantee against direct attacks on their territory.

The report also warned of the collapse of previous international monitoring systems, especially after the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018. Researchers considered that the idea of 'limited enrichment' under supervision is no longer acceptable or safe from the Israeli security perspective at present.

The working paper touched upon the loss of diplomatic trust between the parties, noting that Iran feels deceived, which reduces the chances of reaching 'soft' understandings. It added that any new round of negotiations might be interpreted by Tehran as an additional deception, which will further complicate the security and political landscape.

Despite intelligence operations targeting Iranian nuclear scientists, the report confirmed that Iran still possesses high-quality human and academic resources. This accumulated knowledge allows the regime to complete technological deficiencies and achieve a rapid breakthrough towards a nuclear bomb in record time if it decides to do so.

Based on these facts, Israeli recommendations called for the necessity of dismantling nuclear facilities located deep in tunnels, such as Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Experts considered that destroying these fortified sites against conventional attacks is the only way to ensure the crippling of Iran's nuclear military capabilities.

The demands also included transferring highly enriched uranium out of Iranian territory, or reducing its enrichment levels to non-military grades. The recommendations also called for a complete ban on the acquisition of advanced centrifuges and a freeze on all research related to the development of warheads.

The researchers proposed replacing the current monitoring system with a stricter and more intrusive system through the International Atomic Energy Agency, without any specific time limit. This system must ensure full transparency at all stages of the nuclear production chain, including sites that were previously secret.

In conclusion, the generals stressed that Israel must lead a tough line with its allies, especially Washington, to reject a return to the 'containment' model. They considered that dismantling underground sites and removing enriched uranium must be a 'red line' that cannot be crossed in any ceasefire agreement.

Ending the war will place Israel and the international community before a new strategic reality, where Iran may adopt a security doctrine based on nuclear weapons as an existential deterrent force.