Trump and the Rolling War

The winds of war did not blow as Trump wished; quite the opposite, he found himself in a predicament whose effects are deepening and widening day by day.

First, he started this war with a wrong decision. He entered it hastily, without a consensus from all wings of his administration, or prior preparation for a strong internal front, or a reliable and effective external alliance, or a clear definition of the objectives to be achieved, or a detailed and clear plan for how to achieve those objectives, or good calculations and estimations of the potential risks from an adversary whose capabilities and resilience were underestimated, in addition to a lack of sufficient military preparation to accomplish the mission professionally and skillfully, and to ensure victory in the war.

Countries, normally, do not wage a war they are likely to lose, which requires adequate preparation, based primarily on a prior accounting to assess the risks arising from it versus the anticipated benefits. But Trump's decision to wage this war was hasty and arbitrary; it did not come after the necessary calculations, as it was made under the impression, falsely embellished by Netanyahu, that it would be a swift, clean, and guaranteed-to-succeed war: an intense and painful air strike for a few days, which would lead masses of anti-regime Iranians, already exhausted, to take to the streets to finish the job and uproot it, with ease.

A tempting recipe for an easy and profitable "deal" that tickled the feelings and desires of an arrogant, deluded president who believes he is the center, abode, and stable of the universe, not just the world; capable of doing what he wants, when he wants, and how he wants: to be able to replicate what he did in Venezuela, and easily overthrow a regime that seeks to transform its country, Iran, into a major power in a region vital to Israeli and American interests.

Second, the outcome of the war was not decided within the promised days. On the contrary, a month after its outbreak, and despite Trump's successive statements that the mission was accomplished and Iran was completely destroyed, the Iranian regime held its ground and continued to deliver painful blows to Israel and American forces deployed in the region.

The hoped-for "deal" did not come swiftly and cleanly as Trump wished, but rather rolled into an extended, open-ended, and unpredictable conflict. The reason is not due to the weakness of the air strikes carried out by Washington and Tel Aviv, as they are violent, continuous, and escalating day by day. But the reason is, as history teaches us, that wars cannot be won by air strikes alone, no matter how powerful or continuous they are.

No matter how effective these strikes are, wars are only decided on the ground; ground forces invade, occupy, and win, to impose terms on the defeated party.

And it is not enough for invading forces to occupy peripheral parts of the hostile state being invaded; to achieve victory, these forces must control the "heart"; the seat of government, i.e., the capital, and seize power there, and from it impose a new reality on the rest of the country. After occupying all Russian territories west of Moscow, Hitler's invading forces of the Soviet Union reached the outskirts of the capital, Moscow, but were unable to occupy it, so they were repelled and lost the war.

Throughout its war on Vietnam, American ground forces were unable to establish control over Hanoi, the seat of the North Vietnamese regime, and were eventually repelled and lost the war.

Third, after falling into the trap and realizing the predicament he was in, Trump could have ended his reckless war within the first two weeks of its outbreak. He could have declared a significant tactical victory; air strikes had eliminated the first and second echelons of Iranian leadership, and there was widespread destruction of Iran's military capabilities.

Such an announcement, and a halt to continued air strikes, could have opened an avenue for him to begin negotiations that could have achieved a number of American demands and saved face for America. But instead of seizing this precious opportunity, which would have stopped the subsequent deterioration of the American situation, Trump's narcissism and excessive self-esteem, and his underestimation of others and of reality and facts, led to this window closing on him, and it is no longer available. And because it closed, and the exit was lost, and the possibility of a turnaround ended, he had no choice but to continue down the one-way street; to continue the war instead of ending it.

Fourth, thus, not only does involvement in a wide-open war continue, but the predicament deepens. America's prestige and standing as the world's superpower are now at stake, not just the arrogance and haughtiness of its president. Allies and adversaries alike are watching the situation with utmost interest, and they will base their future positions on the outcome.

And given that the international system is currently at a transformative turning point, the outcome of this war will have a significant impact on the future of this system, and on America's place within it; as it may lose its unique position as a superpower in favor of the rise of other countries to share the top of a pluralistic international order.

Consequently, and for this reason, Trump's reluctance to draw the necessary lesson from a reckless war has led to the entanglement and complexity of its repercussions; America's prestige and standing in the world have become subject to questioning and under scrutiny and examination.

It is no longer possible to rely on America using the "point of no return" in this war, as the predicament has become rolling, and it is likely to grow if it is not addressed in a way that avoids embarrassment, not only personal for Trump, but also moral for America.

Fifth, if the inventory of targets struck by the American and Israeli sides from the air is nearing exhaustion, according to Trump's successive statements in which the number of targets struck reached 13,000, and only 3,000 remain on the list, how will victory be achieved in a war where the targets have run out?

This implies that the continuation of this war inevitably drives it to shift from air strikes to ground intervention. This flow from one state to another will increase the level of involvement and move the conflict from an impasse to further impasses. Involvement in a ground landing, even if it starts limited and targets specific areas, such as occupying Kharg Island and/or occupying small islands in the Strait of Hormuz, will not overthrow the regime in Tehran, nor will it end Iranian resistance. Instead, it could help it escalate and concentrate, causing a continuous cascade of casualties among American forces.

If this happens, it will intensify opposition to the war within the United States, on the one hand, and increase the likelihood of expanding the ground invasion towards Tehran, on the other.

If the situation rolls in this direction, this war will then extend for a long period, and its data and repercussions will become so complex that it will be difficult to predict its final outcomes, except that it will turn the current American predicament into a deep and prolonged "quagmire." With a ground invasion and the involvement of soldiers on the ground, the chances of falling into the "mud" increase, and the Iranian mud trap will not be easier for Americans than the Vietnamese or Afghan, or even Iraqi, mud traps.

Sixth, Trump does not want to fall into the trap of what he arbitrarily and hastily got involved in a rolling war, as there are political costs he certainly does not want to pay. With internal and external pressures pushing him to end his reckless campaign and stop the possibility of it sliding into an open and long-term war, the only remaining opportunity to achieve this lies in a limited ground landing, which has become closer to happening than ever before, followed by an announcement from Trump declaring the end of the mission and the commencement, through the continued intervention of mediating parties, of achieving the goal of this war, which is to put in place measures to ensure the opening and flow of international navigation in the Strait of Hormuz for international navigation, as if it had been closed at the beginning of the war and was the cause of its outbreak. However, this opportunity remains subject to the interaction of two factors. First, the Iranian reaction to the American ground intervention after it occurs, and the level of Iranian capability to effectively confront it.

He who started the war as a result of a wrong decision and calculations is not necessarily the one who has the sole decision to end it; rather, the performance of the opposing party on the battlefield also has a significant impact in this regard. The second factor is the continued Israeli pressure on Trump to continue the war and not end it before overthrowing the regime in Iran.

This is the goal for which this war broke out, and although Trump's goal from it has shifted with its sliding course to exceed a month now, and he is no longer considering ending the rule of the Iranian revolution, but rather promotes that the current rulers of Iran are a different and favorable version for America than the situation was at the outbreak of the war, the goal of removing this regime remains a supreme goal for Israel, and it will continue to push towards achieving it.

It is no secret that Israel needs continued American involvement in this war, as it is a proxy war; Americans fight the battles for the Israelis.

In conclusion, we must await whom Trump will ultimately listen to: the rumble of battles, or the pressures of intervening parties seeking to find a way out of the predicament he has gotten himself into, or the incessant and pressing screeching from Tel Aviv?