Israeli Warnings: Palestinian Prisoner Execution Law Will Not Achieve Deterrence and Will Backfire on the Occupation

Recently, a state of rampant desire for bloody revenge has escalated within Israeli circles, paving the way for the Knesset to vote on a law allowing the execution of Palestinian prisoners. These moves come amid a charged public atmosphere demanding maximum penalties against perpetrators of operations, without considering the long-term strategic consequences of this decision.

In this context, Ariel Mari, a researcher at the Institute for Counter-Terrorism Policy at Reichman University, warned that succumbing to emotions could harm Israeli security. He explained in an analysis published by Maariv newspaper that the shock resulting from major operations evokes a desire for severe punishment, but public policies require prioritizing rationality over momentary emotional reactions.

Research sources indicated that the death penalty for Palestinian prisoners will not only fail to deter Palestinian organizations but may also cause real damage to ongoing security efforts. Scientific studies in criminology do not provide conclusive evidence that execution reduces ordinary crime rates, let alone operations with national ideological motives.

Observers believe that Palestinian resistance fighters act based on a sense of mission and a complete readiness for sacrifice, which makes the threat of execution an ineffective means. Organizations that send their members to carry out attacks, knowing in advance the possibility of their death, will not back down from the possibility of their execution after capture.

Furthermore, the death penalty could turn into a powerful propaganda tool in the hands of Palestinian factions, as those executed will be portrayed as national symbols and martyrs. This would encourage the recruitment of more young people into the ranks of the resistance, leading to results completely contrary to what the law aims for.

Strategically, serious concerns arise that the issuance of death sentences could lead to a wave of kidnappings of Israelis or Jews around the world. Palestinian organizations would seek, through these operations, to pressure the Israeli government to revoke the sentences or exchange hostages for convicted prisoners.

The Israeli government faces a real dilemma if this law is implemented, especially since it has a long history of succumbing to exchange operations. It is difficult to imagine any government being able to proceed with an execution while the lives of Israeli hostages hang on a decision to halt the execution.

Implementing the death penalty will put Israel in a political and public predicament. Retreating from the sentence under pressure will be interpreted as surrender to Palestinian organizations. Conversely, insisting on implementation despite threats could lead to the death of hostages, which would ignite internal public anger against the political leadership.

Analyses confirm that combating armed operations requires a calm and deliberate policy, far from reactions driven by anger and pain. The pursuit of a temporary feeling of retributive justice may undermine the foundations of real security and create international and local crises that the occupation cannot easily contain.

In conclusion, it appears that the Knesset's vote on the law reflects purely vengeful motives lacking sound legal or political depth. Instead of contributing to reducing resistance, the law may give it new momentum and additional means of pressure, ultimately leading to 'the magic turning against the magician'.

The real question is not what achieves a temporary feeling of justice, but what actually contributes to achieving security away from emotional impulses.