Iran and the Arab Region: A Reading of the Complexities of Positions Between Sectarianism and National Interests

The relationship with Iran is one of the most complex issues in the Arab political consciousness, having begun with the Islamic Revolution in 1979 as a state of popular fascination with the fall of a tyrannical ruler protected by American will. A whole generation's awareness of this revolution was shaped by the writings of prominent thinkers such as Fahmy Howeidy and Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, who provided early readings of what was happening in Tehran.

Despite initial popular sympathy, official Arab positions, especially in Egypt during the eras of Sadat and Mubarak, were characterized by hostility and estrangement. This orientation was driven by security and political calculations aimed at rapprochement with Western powers and Gulf states, as rapprochement with Tehran was considered a red line in American policy.

The Iran-Iraq War revealed deep divisions, but the most prominent shift occurred during the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. At that time, political sectarianism appeared in its clearest form through Iranian support for the invasion to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime, which enabled Tehran to control key aspects of the Iraqi state.

The scene of the execution of the former Iraqi President on the morning of Eid al-Adha represented the peak of sectarian provocation, as many considered it a transgression of all norms and international laws. This sectarian behavior weakened the argument of those defending the Iranian Revolution as a model for national liberation, and revealed another face of the regional conflict.

In the aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution, there were calls to open a new chapter with Tehran to break regional isolation and protect the gains of the revolution. However, the partisan and emotional calculations of some political forces, in addition to regional pressures, prevented the achievement of a real rapprochement that would serve Egyptian national interests.

The scene became more complicated with the outbreak of the Syrian Revolution, where Tehran and Hezbollah fully sided with the Syrian regime against the will of the people. This direct military intervention led to the depletion of the Iranian axis's capabilities in side battles, weakening its position in the face of direct external threats.

Observers believe that Iranian policy fell into the trap of 'exporting the revolution,' a slogan that caused long wars of attrition that destroyed the region's armies. This continuous threat pushed Gulf states to seek external protection, which legitimized the presence of American bases that became part of the regional security landscape.

Despite the sharp criticisms of Tehran's policies in Arab capitals, the supreme political interest dictates distinguishing between internal disputes and external aggression. Israeli expansion in the region represents the greatest danger, and any setback for Iran in confronting Tel Aviv will necessarily lead to an imbalance of power in favor of the occupation.

The stance on Iran should not be taken as a monolithic block, but rather should be disaggregated according to positions and circumstances. It is possible to reject Iranian intervention in Arab affairs, and at the same time reject any American or Israeli aggression targeting Iranian territory, without falling into the trap of contradiction.

The ethical and political challenge arises when trying to convince peoples who have suffered from Iranian interventions, such as Syrians and Iraqis, to align with Tehran. It is difficult to ask the victim to stand with those who contributed to the destruction of their country, even if the common enemy is the Israeli occupation.

American bases in the Gulf, which came as a justification for protection from the 'Iranian threat,' have proven through experience that they do not provide real protection during crises. This reality forces the countries of the region to search for new formulas for regional security based on good neighborliness instead of relying on external powers.

Strategically, the defeat of Iran is considered a direct weakening of the Palestinian resistance front, which finds in Tehran important military and logistical support. Therefore, maintaining the balance of power requires a vision that transcends narrow sectarian differences in favor of the central issues of the nation.

Dealing with Iran 'piecemeal' rather than 'wholesale' allows the Arab decision-maker to maneuver and protect national interests. Agreement on issues such as confronting the occupation does not necessarily mean overlooking crimes committed in other issues such as the Syrian or Iraqi files.

In conclusion, matters in the Middle East appear more complex and intricate than simple media propaganda suggests. Iran remains a major regional player that cannot be ignored, and dealing with it requires political wisdom that combines the rejection of sectarianism and the preservation of Arab national security.

The defeat of Iran is a deduction from the Palestinian resistance's balance, and gives the enemies of Arabs the opportunity to rise twice in the land.