Questions in Tel Aviv: How Did Intelligence Succeed Against Iran and Fail to Prevent October 7th?

Fundamental questions are escalating in political and security circles within the occupation state regarding the stark contradiction in the performance of intelligence agencies, especially after claims of liquidating about forty high-ranking Iranian officials in a swift operation that lasted only forty seconds. This alleged success reopened the wounds of the disastrous failure suffered by the security system on October 7th, amidst confusion over the air force and intelligence's ability to monitor highly secret meetings abroad and their inability to detect movements on the Gaza Strip borders.

In this context, Nachman Shai, former Minister of Diaspora Affairs and former spokesman for the occupation army, considered Israel's recent assassinations of political and military elite leaders in Iran to represent an exceptional capability. He explained that Israeli-American coalition aircraft were able to detect a highly secret meeting, allowing the air force to carry out a precise strike that eliminated all participants, which raises a bitter question about the absence of this vigilance on the morning of the major attack.

Shai pointed out in an analysis published by Maariv newspaper that military operations since October 8th have shown very high capabilities of the air force and intelligence, which are considered the 'preferred' forces in the army. Despite these achievements, which included widespread assassinations across the Middle East, the painful failure in October continues to haunt these institutions and highlights the incomprehensible gap in strategic performance.

The former official believes that precise assassinations are only part of a broader intelligence picture presented to decision-makers to enable them to choose targets and timing of attack. However, these intelligence 'miracles' raise a question that future generations of Israelis and Jews around the world will ask: Where were all this technology and human capabilities when events began in the Gaza envelope?

The Israeli question focuses on how all security agencies combined failed, starting from military intelligence and the advanced Unit 8200, all the way to the 'Shin Bet' agency directly responsible for the Gaza file. Even the 'Mossad' agency, which monitors Hamas activities abroad, did not escape criticism as it possessed parts of the overall picture that preceded the attack in one way or another.

Shai emphasized in his reading of the scene that it is difficult to comprehend the idea that the army and intelligence agencies achieving astonishing successes today are the same ones that led Israelis to the October catastrophe. This deep gap between 'amazement' at current success and 'astonishment' at previous failure has created fertile ground for the spread of conspiracy theories, stories of betrayal, and baseless accusations within Israeli society.

He also drew attention to the fact that mutual personal accusations among leaders have not yet revealed the full truth, expressing his doubts about the possibility of forming an investigation committee capable of providing satisfactory answers. The question that lacks any logical answer in Tel Aviv remains: What exactly happened at 6:49 AM on that day that changed the face of the region?

The analysis concluded that the image of 'lethal' intelligence that Israel now boasts in pursuing Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian leaders increases the ethical and professional dilemma of the security establishment. The more precise current operations become, the deeper the conviction that the failure of October 7th was not due to a lack of means, but rather to a structural flaw and disregard for information that could have changed the course of history.

It is inconceivable that this is the same state, the same army, and the same intelligence agencies that plunged Israelis into this failure.