Iran and the United States: Between Containment Policy and the Possibility of Slipping to the Brink

The strained relationship between the United States and Iran returns to the forefront of the regional and international scene at a highly sensitive moment, where signals of de-escalation intertwine with the logic of deterrence, and an increasing awareness prevails on both sides that slipping into an open confrontation would not be in either's interest.
US President Donald Trump's statement that "Iran is communicating with us and we'll see what we can do" is met by the Iranian President's affirmation that "war is not in the interest of either party," which reflects, beyond diplomatic language, a shared conviction that the cost of war would be exorbitant, and that managing the conflict might be less costly than resolving it militarily.
Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the relationship between Washington and Tehran has been characterized by structural tension, yet it has never been a relationship of absolute severance or permanent conflict.
This relationship has witnessed unannounced cooperation and coordination when the interests of both parties converged, revealing a pragmatic nature governing their behavior, and explaining each's ability to separate ideological rhetoric from the requirements of strategic interest.
Points of convergence in interests: History as a key to understanding ...
During the Iran-Iraq War, the "Iran-Gate" affair revealed the leakage of American weapons to Iran, in the context of Washington's endeavor to prevent a decisive victory for either side and maintain a fragile regional balance.
In the crisis of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, Iran did not align itself with Saddam Hussein's regime; instead, it adopted a positive neutral stance that practically contributed to facilitating the formation of the international coalition against him, in line with its regional calculations at the time.
The most significant juncture was the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, where Iran played a pivotal role in overthrowing the Ba'ath regime and contributing to the dismantling of the Iraqi state structure, benefiting from the vacuum created by the invasion.
 American and Iranian interests practically converged in getting rid of a common strategic adversary and facilitating the reshaping of the Iraqi political system, despite the deep divergence in long-term visions.
Nor can the indirect coordination between the two parties in Afghanistan after 2001 be overlooked, where their interests converged in overthrowing the "Taliban" regime and fighting "Al-Qaeda."
These historical junctures confirm that the relationship between Iran and the United States is a manageable, adaptable conflict, interspersed with circumstantial cooperation whenever interests dictate, which opens the door for a realistic understanding of the possibilities of the current phase.
The Nuclear File: The Legal Framework and the Limits of Political Disagreement ...
The nuclear file constitutes the core of the existing tension, and it is a file with a clear international-legal nature.
Iran, as a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), possesses a legal right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
However, this right is matched by an explicit commitment not to seek to acquire nuclear weapons and to be subject to an effective monitoring and inspection regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In contrast, the United States proceeds from the principle of non-proliferation as a cornerstone of international security and believes that any ambiguity in the Iranian nuclear program threatens regional and international stability.
 Hence, the essence of the disagreement is not in the legal texts, but in the level of trust, verification mechanisms, and the political-security dimension associated with Iran's regional behavior.
The Most Likely Scenario: A Phased Understanding and Calculated Management of Tension ...
In light of these facts, the most likely scenario appears to be neither an all-out war nor a final peace agreement, but rather a phased understanding or a limited agreement that re-establishes the rules of engagement and prevents slipping to the brink, an understanding based on:
A clear Iranian commitment not to seek to acquire nuclear weapons.
Enhanced and verifiable international oversight.
Practical recognition of Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Gradual and measured easing of economic sanctions.
Unannounced understandings regarding regional behavior, without requiring the dismantling of Iranian influence all at once.
This type of understanding does not end the conflict, but it transforms it from a potentially explosive situation into a managed conflict within calculated limits.
The Regional Role: From Mediation to Preventing Explosion ...
Regional powers play an increasingly important role in tipping the balance towards de-escalation.
 The Arab Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, now view regional stability as a fundamental condition for development and security, and seek to neutralize the region from major conflicts that drain resources and hinder strategic projects.
Oman and Qatar also play quiet mediation roles, while Turkey operates within a complex equation that combines competition and coordination according to its own interests.
In contrast, Israel remains a major pressure factor, as it views any understanding that does not strictly constrain the Iranian nuclear program as a direct threat to its security, making its position a present element in American calculations.
In conclusion:
Containment as a rational option for decision-making centers ...
Ultimately, it is clear that the relationship between Iran and the United States is not an existential conflict, but a manageable conflict of interests and influence.
 Therefore, the most realistic option for decision-making centers is a rationally managed mutual containment that does not seek to change the regime in Tehran, nor does it simultaneously allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.
This containment is not based on trust, but on a balance of deterrence and interests, and on partial, renegotiable agreements, but it remains less costly than war, and more consistent with the ongoing transformations in the international system, where the appetite for direct confrontations is declining, and reliance on crisis management instead of explosion is increasing.
However, the success of this path remains conditional on a clear political will and an effective regional role capable of transforming de-escalation from a temporary measure into a sustainable path. Failure to capitalize on this moment will mean a return to the logic of the brink, where small errors accumulate, and indirect confrontations expand, until an explosion occurs without a conscious political decision.
Between containment and escalation, the fragile but viable understanding remains the most rational option to spare the region a new war and give it an opportunity to reorder its priorities in a highly turbulent international system.