The Limits of Confrontation Between Trump's America and Its Allies… and the Turn Eastward Towards China and Its Impacts on Developing Countries

American foreign policy under Donald Trump is no longer interpreted within the context of traditional alliances that formed the backbone of the international system since the end of World War II. Instead, it has become closer to a project of redefining the alliance itself.

Trump does not view partners as permanent strategic pillars, but rather as parties in a cost-benefit equation, which is reformulated whenever political and economic calculations change.

In his relationship with traditional allies, from Canada to Europe and Britain, Trump does not seek to dismantle alliances as much as he works to empty them of their value content and transform them into conditional relationships.

NATO is no longer, in his discourse, a collective security umbrella, but a financial bill that Europeans must pay.

 And the European Union is treated more as a commercial competitor than a political partner.

 Even Britain, which has long enjoyed the status of a “special ally,” has not escaped this logic, as privileges have become linked to economic and political compliance.

In this sense, the confrontation with allies is not a direct clash, but a gradual pressure process to reset their positions within narrow American priorities, based on the slogan “America First” in its most pragmatic and harsh form.

In contrast, China, in Trump's view, represents the real and structural adversary. The conflict with it goes beyond tariffs to the core of the global economic system: control over advanced technology, dominance over global supply chains, and leadership in the digital economy and artificial intelligence.

Here, Trumpism appears in its clearest form: no illusions of Chinese integration into the liberal system, no bets on changing behavior through trade, but a long-term struggle for influence and leadership.

However, the strategic paradox lies in the fact that pressure on Western allies weakens the front that is supposed to be united in confronting China. Weakening trust between the two sides of the Atlantic gives Beijing wider room for maneuver and confuses Western calculations instead of uniting them.

Here lies the central contradiction in Trump's policy: reducing international commitments on the one hand, and engaging in a wide-ranging global conflict on the other.

These transformations are not confined to the Western-Chinese sphere but extend their effects to developing countries, especially Arab countries. The transition of the international system from a “system of alliances” to a “system of deals” means a decline in the role of multilateral institutions, an escalation of protectionist tendencies, and a disruption of trade and investment rules.

Developing countries, which rely on the stability of global markets, the flow of investments, and open trade, find themselves in a more volatile and less predictable environment.

For Arab countries, the impact is evident at several levels.

 Firstly, rentier economies dependent on energy face dual risks: fluctuating global demand due to trade conflicts, and the accelerating global shift towards clean energy, in the absence of a stable international system to manage this transition in an organized manner.

 Secondly, non-oil Arab countries are affected by the disruption of global supply chains and the decline of foreign direct investment in an environment characterized by geopolitical uncertainty. Thirdly, the decline in American commitment to the multilateral international system opens the door for other powers to fill the vacuum, which forces Arab countries to strategically reposition themselves between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow, a repositioning fraught with risks if not managed wisely.

In conclusion, we are facing a world moving from a logic of rules to a logic of deals, and from relative stability to strategic fluidity.

 The limits of confrontation between Trump's America and its allies are not limits of war, but limits of trust that are gradually eroding.

 As for the confrontation with China, it is an open struggle over the shape of the international system in the twenty-first century. Between these two paths, developing countries find themselves in a gray area, where risks are increasing and margins for maneuver are shrinking.

It is a less certain, more pragmatic, and harsher world for countries that do not possess the tools of economic and political power.

In this context, Arab countries must not merely react, but develop strategies for economic diversification, multi-directional partnerships, and flexible foreign policies that protect their interests in a time of global turmoil.

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In contrast, China, in Trump's view, represents the real and structural adversary. The conflict with it goes beyond tariffs to the core of the global economic system: control over advanced technology, dominance over global supply chains, and leadership in the digital economy and artificial intelligence.