When Movements Exhaust Their Actions: Towards a Post-"Fatah" and "Hamas" Horizon

The idea here is not to issue a moral judgment on Fatah or Hamas, nor to solely blame either of them for the current state of the Palestinian situation, but rather to attempt to read the national experience from a deeper analytical angle: the angle of the "foundational act" produced by major movements at a critical historical moment, which then transforms over time into a structural imprint that reshapes the entire political sphere and stamps the movement itself with a character difficult to escape. In comparative literature, these moments are described as "critical junctures": moments that not only change the course of politics but also create new paths with self-reliance, constrain subsequent choices, and make the foundational act a silent reference for everything that follows.

In this sense, the Oslo Accords can be viewed as the foundational act for the Fatah movement in the contemporary era, not because it was necessarily a "moral error," but because it restructured the entire Palestinian political sphere. Oslo was not merely a negotiating track, but the establishment of a new governance model: authority without sovereignty, an economy dependent on donors, functional security under occupation, and a transition from the logic of a liberation movement to the logic of daily administration of the population. This transformation produced a hybrid political structure: neither a viable state nor a liberation movement capable of open engagement. Over time, the crisis of this path was no longer its faltering, but that it itself became the only possible policy, the source of legitimacy, and the horizon of thought. Thus, the Oslo imprint became attached to the Fatah movement as the movement that ushered Palestinians into an open transitional authority phase without a sovereign horizon, and the accompanying representational fragmentation, erosion of the meaning of liberation, and structural dependence on external arrangements.

In contrast, Hamas has historically been associated with the pivotal act of October 7th, as a moment that broke the logic of containing and normalizing the conflict, and reintroduced the Palestinian issue to the heart of global politics, but at an unprecedented human and political cost. This act was not merely a military operation, but a pivotal event that escalated the conflict to an extreme: a comprehensive war on Gaza, a global test of law and ethics, and a re-raising of the question of the day after, implying who governs? Who represents what? And what form can the national project take after the destruction? In this sense, the name Hamas is no longer separate from "Al-Aqsa Flood" as a historical defining act, just as Fatah is no longer separate from Oslo. Here, the issue is not intentions, but the trajectory effect: a single act that reshapes the field and places the movement in a position from which it cannot disengage, whether in defense or in criticism.

Many experiences show that major movements are often historically defined by a single moment: the African National Congress by the liberation of South Africa, the Algerian National Liberation Front by the war of independence, Sinn Féin by the transition from arms to settlement, the British Conservatives by Brexit, the Israeli Labor Party by Oslo, and Likud by redefining Israel as an expansionist nation-state. In all these cases, the foundational act becomes a source of legitimacy, then over time transforms into a structural burden when historical conditions change and the movement remains captive to its initial mark. At this point, the question is no longer: who was right? But: is this movement still capable of producing a new horizon that transcends its foundational act?

Talking about "post-" in the Palestinian context seems much more difficult than in other contexts, including the Israeli one, because this question is not posed on politically or sovereignly stable ground, but on an open historical void. In most other contexts, "post-party" is discussed within an existing state with established institutions. When "post-Likud" or "post-Netanyahu" is said in Israel, the discussion takes place within the framework of a complete state: the army, economy, judiciary, and general political identity all remain, and the disagreement remains confined to the directions of governance, not the existence of the entity itself.

As for the Palestinian case, the discussion about "post-Fatah and Hamas" does not take place within an existing state, but within an incomplete national project and a political entity that has not yet formed. The parties here do not compete to manage a stable state, but effectively act in place of the absent state. Fatah bears the burden of external representation and the structure of authority under occupation, while Hamas does not merely represent an opposition party, but a governing structure in Gaza and a military bearer of resistance. Therefore, thinking about "post-them" is not received as a normal political transition, but as a possibility of a comprehensive void in the basic functions that the state is supposed to perform: political representation, governance, negotiation, defense, and the organization of people's daily lives. In such a context, "post-" does not seem like a transition within an existing system, but a leap into the unknown, affecting the entire structure of the national project itself, not just the balances of power within it.

The matter becomes more complex because the Palestinian field is governed by the condition of occupation. In the absence of sovereignty, politics becomes laden with existential functions: survival, protection, recognition, and representation. In such a context, groups tend to cling to what exists, no matter how problematic, because the alternative seems like an existential risk, not just a political adventure. In Israel, one party can be replaced by another without fear for the continuity of the state; in Palestine, it is feared that "post-" would be a collapse, not a transition.

Furthermore, the Palestinian experience is burdened by a memory of accumulated setbacks: settlement failures, collapse of unity, siege, wars, and erosion of representation. This memory makes the political imagination poor and burdened with caution. The question becomes not "what is the better alternative?" but "do we even have the luxury of experimentation?". In such a climate, thinking about "post-" becomes a symbolic gamble, because it opens up possibilities of chaos as much as it opens up possibilities of renewal.

Based on this, a thesis can be formulated that the Palestinian political system has entered a phase of "deadlock of the ruling duality": where Fatah and Hamas, despite their fundamental differences, have become prisoners of two historical junctures that they are no longer able to overcome or produce a new meaning for national action outside their shadow. Fatah is governed by the Oslo structure and its accumulated institutions, affiliations, and political economy, and Hamas is governed by the moment of Al-Aqsa Flood and the existential questions it opened regarding cost, capability, protection, and meaning. Both possess historical legitimacy, but this legitimacy has become more past-oriented than performative; it is based on what was, not on what can be achieved in post-disaster conditions.

Here, the question of "post-Fatah and Hamas" arises not as an exclusionary call, but as a structural question about the ability of the existing duality to produce a viable national strategy. The intention is not the end of the two movements, but the end of their monopoly over the horizon and meaning of Palestinian politics. "Post-" means opening up a new horizon for representation, thought, and organization, transcending the Oslo/Al-Aqsa Flood equation as the limits of what is possible.

The actual entry into this phase can be tested through concrete indicators, not slogans: the erosion of the two movements' ability to monopolize the definition of "national," and the search by broad sectors, especially young generations, for alternative forms of representation; the emergence of organizational or intellectual initiatives that transcend polarization and speak the language of the project, not the language of the axis; the shift of public debate from the question of "who is with us?" to the question of "what is a viable strategy?"; and the revival of the demand to rebuild national representation on comprehensive and democratic foundations as an existential condition for any new project.

If these indicators are realized, we will have effectively entered the "post-Fatah and Hamas" phase, not as a political vacuum, but as a horizon for re-establishing Palestinian politics outside the captivity of old junctures. Remaining within the duality, however, means recycling the same history: authority without sovereignty on the one hand, and resistance without a unifying political horizon on the other, while the societal cost continues to rise and the margin of meaning and hope shrinks. This dilemma becomes more dangerous in light of profound and alarming global transformations, not least the escalating trend towards the "privatization" of the international system, as reflected in Trump's policies, and the increasing indications of the formation of a multipolar world order, with its repercussions for the Global South, at the heart of which lies the Palestinian issue. In a world where the moral and legal framework that governed the post-Cold War era is disintegrating, and the value of the weak in power calculations is declining, the ability to rebuild the political self becomes a condition for survival, not an intellectual luxury. At such a moment, the question of "post-Fatah and Hamas" becomes not a mental exercise or a desire for rupture, but an existential necessity: a question of how Palestinians can regain their ability to imagine their future, formulate their project, and carry their cause beyond a duality that has exhausted its historical energy, in the face of a world that pushes them, time and again, to the brink of erasing meaning before erasing place.