Ending the Israeli aggression on Gaza: the moral imperative and the high political price

The cloud of Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip has loomed over the besieged city for a long time. It is a cloud laden with blood, genocide, starvation, and forced displacement, the likes of which the modern era has never seen in terms of brutality and scope, and which has been witnessed and heard by the entire world. This dark cloud has exposed the fragility of the international system and its inability to stop the massacres or implement international humanitarian law, as tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians have been killed under the weight of a military machine that makes no distinction between children and resistance fighters, nor between homes and shelters.

In the face of this brutal violence, the Israeli government, headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, has demonstrated blatant political and military bankruptcy. It has failed to achieve any of its declared goals, whether eliminating the resistance, restoring what it calls "deterrence," or releasing its prisoners. Rather, Tel Aviv appears mired in an unprecedented internal crisis, manifested in sharp divisions, popular protests, and the erosion of trust in the political and military establishment. Faced with the steadfastness of the Gazans, the Israeli occupation has emerged as a barbaric force more afraid of breaking out of the impasse than eager to achieve a false victory.

Although the clouds are destined to dissipate, when the cloud of this aggression clears, it will leave behind heavy political and strategic costs, not only for the Palestinians, but for the entire region.

What the war on Gaza has revealed, particularly over its months, is that Israel, despite its weapons of mass destruction and power, suffers from a structural inability to address the core of the Palestinian issue. Weapons do not address the moral dilemma resulting from the continued occupation, nor do they guarantee legitimacy in a world that has begun to change, particularly in global public opinion, which has begun to view what is happening in Gaza as an ongoing crime against humanity.

The Israeli discourse of "self-defense" has lost its effectiveness in the face of images of corpses and children under the rubble, especially in the digital space, where traditional media is no longer the only one telling the story.

One of the most significant costs the region may have to pay, and which may be part of a post-war deal, is the push to expand Arab normalization with Israel, under the pretext of reconstruction or preventing a security collapse. But the most dangerous, however, is what is being quietly circulated in some circles: a project to annex large parts of the West Bank, particularly Area C, with direct or indirect American support.

These plans are not new. Their outlines emerged since the introduction of the "Deal of the Century" under President Donald Trump, when there was talk of the de facto annexation of Palestinian lands in the West Bank. Today, with the return of Republican influence in the United States and the near-total absence of the idea of a "two-state solution" from official American discourse, annexation appears to be making a comeback, albeit in a more normalized international environment and a region more preoccupied with itself.

The most dangerous aspect of the annexation project is not only the change in geography, but also the reshaping of the Palestinian political entity to align with the logic of control and containment. Implementing annexation must be accompanied by a comprehensive restructuring of Palestinian national institutions, chief among them the PLO and the Palestinian Authority. This would strip them of their liberationist character and transform them into administrative and security agencies that do not represent a national project, but are instead functionally managed within regional and international arrangements. As some data indicates, the Palestinian Authority will then be reshaped, in terms of its role and structure, transforming it from a transitional entity toward statehood into a permanent entity managing the affairs of the population, without any sovereign horizon. Tasks will be redistributed between those managing security and those providing services, while Palestinian representation will be reduced to formal titles and advisory forums that possess neither decision-making power nor a legitimate project. In this context, the call for partial elections for the Palestinian National Council may be used as a cosmetic tool to consolidate the status quo, rather than change it. Fragmented elections, without comprehensive national consensus, and amidst existing divisions and the hegemony of the occupation, do not establish new legitimacy. Rather, they reproduce the crisis and give it a false democratic appearance.

But halting the aggression alone is not enough unless it is accompanied by a political resistance project that rebuilds the Palestinian political system, puts an end to security coordination, and restores the PLO as the legitimate and unified representative of Palestinians at home and in the diaspora, according to a liberation vision based on rights, not accommodation with the occupation. Experience has proven that the absence of a comprehensive national project has weakened the Palestinian position, opened the way for displacement and dismantling projects, and transformed the issue into a mere "relief" or "security" issue. What is required today is not merely to defend the victim, but rather to rebuild the Palestinian national project from its roots: genuine partnership, inclusive representation, political and popular resistance, and liberating Palestinian decision-making from the shackles of guardianship and coordination, before a new reality is imposed in which Palestine becomes a name without substance.

The battle of Gaza, with all the pain and sacrifices it entailed, may be a foundational moment for repositioning the Palestinian cause, not only in the Arab conscience, but also in regional and international equations. But this will not happen automatically. It is not enough for the cloud of blood to dissipate; the foundations beneath it must be rebuilt, so that the scene is not repeated, the genocide is not repeated, and the memory is not erased.

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