What remains of the "two-state solution"?

The "two-state solution" was, in essence, not just a political proposal, but rather the embodiment of an international philosophy based on the idea of balancing a minimum of "justice" for the Palestinians, ensuring the security of the occupation and legitimizing its existence. It was thus a temporary attempt to create a fragile balance between a colonial reality on the one hand, and aspirations for national liberation on the other. All of this was cloaked by the international system in the guise of "realistic peace" to avoid deeper explosions. Now, it has become more like a phrase repeated by diplomats, while all the foundations of life on the ground are eroding.

When the “two-state solution” was accepted in the 1990s, it was based on the assumption that a certain “historical settlement” could end the “conflict,” which was in reality an occupation, by establishing two states on the land of historic Palestine, unequal in anything, recognizing each other, and living side by side. This solution was an attempt to reproduce the post-World War II maps, but with a Middle Eastern flavor, adding a lot of political “realism,” and narrowing the scope of justice to a minimum. Throughout the past decades, it remained a mined project, full of historical and political contradictions, which made its collapse a matter of time, not a sudden event.

Perhaps one of the reasons for this is that the roots of the problem lie much deeper than mere rejection or political acceptance. This is because the philosophy of the “solution” itself carries a complex contradiction. It is based, in the end, on recognizing the historical “defeat” of the Palestinians. That is, on the one hand, it demands that the Palestinians give up their land and history, or at least most of it, in exchange for the promise of a “state” on a small part of their historical land, with diminished sovereignty, geographically fragmented, militarily besieged, economically dependent, and performing a functional role that is completely contrary to the reasons for which the Palestinian liberation movements were established, conditional upon the approval of the international community and its changing interests. In return, it grants the other party, the occupation, international recognition and the “right” to retain all the tools of security hegemony and control over the land, resources, borders, and virtually everything else.

Today, more than three decades after the Oslo Accords, things have become clearer, at least on the occupation side. It has come to view the repetition of the term “Palestinian state” in official discourse as a source of threat, and that any Palestinian entity, whatever its form, must lack the elements of sovereignty, especially security. This trend was clearly evident in Netanyahu’s statements the day before yesterday. He does not see this position as a deviation from the philosophy of the “two-state solution,” but rather as a natural extension of it, as none of the previously agreed-upon documents clearly stipulated granting the Palestinians full sovereignty or an actual right to self-determination without Israeli tutelage.

On the international level, the momentum of initiatives seeking to revive the "peace process" has declined, leaving the matter in the hands of the United States. Trends have emerged to manage the Palestinian issue, not resolve it, with priority given to new regional alliances and the world being occupied with wars and other issues. The Palestinian issue is no longer a priority or the world's primary concern. Mere talk of a Palestinian state seems more like a common political expression than a viable project, a tool to legitimize the continuation of the occupation, blackmail Palestinians into accepting the status quo, or perhaps a means to beautify the image of the international system and demonstrate its interest. Consequently, we find the occupation moving towards a unilateral decision that completely bypasses the "two-state solution" through settlements, annexation, and the establishment of irreversible facts.

In Palestine, the "two-state solution" has drained the legitimacy of the national project itself, eroding the Palestinian dream and, with it, the structure of the political, economic, and social systems. It has also opened the door to the future to other scenarios, including a return to square one under an internationally recognized apartheid regime, or perhaps another explosion that imposes new or unprecedented equations.

In conclusion, it can be said that the "two-state solution" remains only as a political memory, reminding us of an era of fragile settlements and a geography that changes daily at the expense of the Palestinians. In practice, however, it has irrevocably ended under the weight of fait accompli policies and disappointments.