A new era for Syria

The Assad regime did not fall only because of its internal mistakes and sins, whether in dealing with the Kurds or with the political and military opposition, or because of the extent of the shameful arbitrary arrests committed by the authoritarian apparatuses against the Syrians, which are positive reasons and strong motives for expanding the size of the popular, partisan, nationalist and religious opposition against his regime.

But the other additional fundamental reason lies in the Israeli-American hostility to the regime, against the backdrop of its firm positions against occupation and hegemony and its refusal to submit to their interests and plans, its adherence to the necessity of liberating the Golan from Israeli colonialism, its refusal to withdraw from its alliance with Russia and Iran, and its support for the Palestinian option.

The Assad regime has previously been subjected to pressures and temptations, with the aim of withdrawing from its national, political and security options, but it held firm and did not bow to the pressures, and did not respond to the temptations. It is like Abdel Nasser, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, Yasser Arafat, and all those who held on to their national dignity and Arab nationalism, and their alliances previously with the Soviets, and later with Russia, China and Iran.

The United States, which won the battles, clashes and events of the Cold War against the socialist camp, since after World War II, until the end of the Cold War in 1990, is working and keen to continue its military, political, security and economic hegemony over the world and international politics, except for what it offers to others, and its conflict now is with China, Russia and the rest of the less influential and powerful parties: Iran, South Africa, some Latin American countries, and others, so as not to cancel the results of its victory in the Cold War. Therefore, it works to support the regimes that follow its orbit, and works in coordination with it, or according to agreed upon common interests, and this explains the extent of its support for the Israeli colony to remain dominant and authoritarian, occupying the lands of three Arab countries, and imposing the normalization of its relations with the Arab world and adapting it to be a decisive tool in the Arab world, as Netanyahu says: a new Middle East, in conflict with the Arabs’ national interests and their aspirations for dignity and stability, and towards political and economic independence.

Bashar al-Assad lacked priorities and continued his narrow choices, relying on Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. Those who supported him were unable to continue their support for him, so he lost international cover and Hezbollah weakened against the backdrop of the painful strikes by the colony. He did not rely on his people and expand the social base of his regime, and the military and security services were unable to protect him, because the majority of his people were not with him and did not owe him loyalty, so the regime fell as happened with Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen.

Will the next regime cling to the Golan Heights as occupied Syrian territory? Or will it abandon it and not give it priority as a price for its acceptance by the Israelis and Americans, and their satisfaction with it?