Has the division become the formula for "New Palestine"?!

For nearly two decades, the Palestinian division has been treated as an urgent political crisis that, no matter how long it lasted, would eventually find its way to a solution through dialogue, reconciliation, or national understandings. However, what has been witnessed in recent years, and what has become clearer since the war of extermination in Gaza, now calls for an assessment of the accuracy of this assumption. It seems the question is no longer: when will the division end? Rather, are we still talking about a division, or about a new reality being entrenched as a framework through which the Palestinian cause and its political future are being reformulated? The danger of the current moment lies in the fact that the division is no longer merely the result of an internal crisis, but has gradually transformed into a favorable environment for reshaping the Palestinian geopolitical landscape itself. While the West Bank is subjected to a systematic dismantling process through settlement, annexation, and the isolation of cities and villages from each other, and not just the isolation of Jerusalem from its Palestinian surroundings, political, security, and economic arrangements are being proposed in Gaza that, in many aspects, go beyond the temporary nature that is supposed to accompany them. These paths may seem divergent on the surface, but they converge on one result: the entrenchment of separation between the components of the Palestinian people, and the closing of the door to any realistic possibility of an independent and unified Palestinian state, at a time when the dominant forces on the scene show no real action to prevent or even impede this path. Israel has largely succeeded in shifting the focus of international attention from the essence of the Palestinian cause as a cause of a people under occupation, to issues of administration, containment, and stability control. The discussion now revolves around the future of Gaza and its administration, and how to prevent collapse in the West Bank, more than it revolves around ending the occupation and embodying Palestinian national rights. Here lies one of the most dangerous transformations facing the Palestinian cause. National issues are not only defeated by military force, but can also erode when they are redefined and their position in international and regional consciousness is changed. More dangerously, many parties in the region and the world have begun to deal with the division as a stable reality, not a temporary crisis. While Palestinians continued to raise the slogan of ending the division without pursuing approaches that would dismantle it, many policies were built on a completely opposite premise, namely that this reality is here to stay, and that what is required is to adapt to and manage it, not to change it. From here, the essence of the crisis is no longer related to a committee here or a government and authority there, nor even to the absence of elections or the failure of reconciliation, despite the importance of all that. We are facing a crisis that affects the national project itself, and the ability of Palestinians to preserve the unity of their cause, its political representation, and its future vision. This question gains special importance in light of the ongoing arrangements within the Palestinian political system, whether related to the so-called "state constitution" or to the reshaping of national representative institutions and ambiguous "elections" for the Palestinian National Council. The issue here is not about the importance of reform or renewing legitimacies, as these are undisputed national requirements, but rather about the context in which these steps are taking place, the foundations on which they are based, and the outcomes they may lead to, such as entrenching exclusion and division. The rebuilding of national institutions is supposed to be the culmination of a national dialogue and consensus on the nature of the national project, its priorities, and its tools, not a substitute for it. However, when major foundational arrangements are implemented under the existing division, and without broad national consensus, the legitimate question becomes: are we in the process of rebuilding the Palestinian political system, or in the process of entrenching its adaptation to the new realities imposed by the division? The danger of this path increases if the situation shifts from the exclusion of specific political forces or oppositions to the exclusion of broad sectors of society from effective participation in shaping the national future. The crisis then is no longer merely a crisis of political representation, but becomes a crisis of the relationship between the political system and its society, and between national institutions and the idea for which they were established. Despite the catastrophes, defeats, and setbacks they have suffered, Palestinians have possessed a unifying national idea embodied in the project of national liberation and the establishment of an independent state. Today, however, the challenge is no longer limited to the question of the desired state, but extends to a more pressing question: how do we preserve the idea of the state itself from erosion, before the possibility of its embodiment on the ground is lost? States do not collapse only when they lose control over their territories, but when their founding elements disintegrate, especially the unity of geography, the unity of institutions, the unity of the political system, and the unity of the national vision. If current trends continue without radical review, the danger lies not only in the loss of additional parts of Palestinian land, but in entrenching a reality in which Gaza becomes a self-contained entity, and more dangerously, a distorted, expelling, and unsustainable entity, and the West Bank turns into mere isolated and besieged population clusters, while Jerusalem is pushed out of any real political equation. At that point, Palestinians will not be facing a deferred state project, but a reality in which the national cause is being replaced by livelihood, humanitarian, and administrative issues, no matter how important they may be. However, confronting this path does not begin with slogans, nor does it stop at repeated calls for reconciliation. It requires rebuilding the Palestinian national project itself, on the basis of political and democratic partnership, restoring the role of unifying institutions, renewing the legitimacy of the political system, and linking all of this to a national vision capable of uniting Palestinians in the homeland and diaspora around common goals. It also requires moving from managing daily crises to strategic thinking about the future; for peoples engaged in liberation battles, steadfastness is not enough, but they also need to have a clear vision of what they want to be in a decade or two. The battle raging today is not only over the land, despite its fateful importance, but over the political meaning of Palestine itself; will it remain the cause of a people striving for freedom, independence, and self-determination, or will it turn into separate entities and societies, each managed according to different conditions? Therefore, the biggest challenge facing Palestinians is not only to end the division, but to prevent its transformation into a permanent structure that redefines the Palestinian cause and its future. The opportunity to change the course is still available. However, time is no longer a neutral factor in the conflict, but has become one of its active elements. The issue is no longer just about ending a prolonged division, but about preserving the unity of the national cause itself from disintegration and erosion. And perhaps the question is no longer how to end the division, but how to prevent it from becoming the new formula for Palestine, and perhaps a prelude to an attempt to erase it.