Exchanging kidnapped and captives with prisoners: an immediate, humane, realistic, and painful plan

The state of uncertainty and suffering experienced by the families of kidnapped citizens and captured soldiers in Gaza, to a large extent, imposes restrictions on the hands of the Israeli army, and prevents Israel from doing what is required to fundamentally change the reality in the Gaza Strip. The issue disturbs us emotionally here in Israel, and it disturbs enlightened citizens and leaders around the world. At the same time, it is understood that there are dozens of Israeli children, women and elderly people, some of whom are citizens of other countries who have been kidnapped, stuck as if they were a thorn in the throat of the killers. As long as they are detained in Gaza, Hamas or Islamic Jihad will not be able to mobilize almost the only effective pressure that remains available to them: American public opinion in particular, and international opinion in general.

In addition to the above, Hamas or Islamic Jihad will not be able to use their prisoners and bodies to achieve the primary goal of the October 7 massacre, without making a settlement with Israel. This primary goal is to liberate Palestinian security prisoners and detainees from prisons in Israel. Here, it is clear that the two main parties in this war, namely Israel and Hamas, now have a great interest in ending the issue of the kidnapped and hostages, in a humane manner, and without shedding more blood. This common and horrific interest must be exploited, and can be exploited, through an exchange deal achieved through Qatari and Egyptian mediation, under pressure from the United States and its allies behind the scenes.

In general, the talk here is about an event in which Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other armed organizations and groups in Gaza release all the prisoners and hostages in their control, including the bodies. In return, and at the same time and place, Israel transfers a number to be determined, a very large number, unfortunately, of Palestinian prisoners. In return, Hamas will also receive broad humanitarian support, including food, water, medicine, health equipment, field hospitals, tents, clothing and personal equipment suitable for winter. The aid will come through Egypt, and the aid is likely to also include a limited amount of fuel, which will be supplied to hospitals in several batches.

Additional principles according to which an exchange transaction must be conducted:

It must be made clear to the mediators that this deal must be implemented before the IDF enters a major ground exercise in the Strip. It must be made clear to the mediators, and to both Hamas and Islamic Jihad, that the Israeli army will carry out the ground invasion in any case, and then Israel will greatly tighten the conditions for its approval of the deal, if it agrees to it at all.

The exchange should include the bodies of soldiers Hadar Goldin and Shaul Oren, who were killed in Operation Protective Edge in 2014.

Israel releases hundreds of security prisoners, according to a nominal list provided by Hamas. Israel will not compromise on the identity of the liberated prisoners, although it is clear that the list will include “killers” with a lot of blood on their hands. However, Israel will not give up its demand that every Palestinian prisoner freed in this deal be transferred to the Gaza Strip, and not be allowed to leave the Strip.

In order to implement the deal, a humanitarian ceasefire will be declared under the supervision of the United Nations, and will last between 12 and 24 hours.

In order to ensure transparency for both parties, and to prevent deception, fraud and interference by foreign parties, the exchange will be carried out in the open area located on the border between the Gaza Strip and Israel. Carrying out the exchange, via Egypt or another third country, may lead to delays and misunderstandings that could disrupt this sensitive procedure. The groups of liberators from both sides are accompanied by Red Cross personnel.

This plan can be implemented quickly, as it does not require long negotiations, protects the vital interests of the kidnapped and their families, does not constitute a handcuff to the Israeli army, and allows both Hamas and Islamic Jihad to claim that they did not kneel and did not feel insulted. It is not possible, and of course not desirable, to list all the reasons for supporting the exchange deal proposed here and those for rejecting it. But this balanced scheme creates strong incentives for both sides, so its success is possible.