Between Energy Security and Power Calculations: Why Does China Remain Silent on the War in Iran?

International political reports have revealed a cautious Chinese approach to the widespread military escalation launched by the United States and Israel against Iran since late February. Despite the strategic partnership between Beijing and Tehran, indicators confirm that the Chinese leadership is unwilling to engage militarily, preferring to protect the energy flows that are the lifeblood of its national economy.

Analytical sources indicate that Beijing is closely monitoring the repercussions of the airstrikes that targeted Iranian command centers and led to the martyrdom of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Despite timid diplomatic condemnations, the official Chinese position has focused on calling on all parties to exercise restraint, a clear indication of equating the aggressor with the victim to maintain regional balances.

Observers believe that China's energy security is organically linked to the stability of the Gulf, as Beijing imported more than 55% of its oil needs from the region in 2025. China fears that any violent military reaction on its part could lead to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which could cause a global energy crisis that its current reserves cannot sustain for long.

Chinese disappointment with Iranian military capabilities reflects a shift in Beijing's strategic vision, with Chinese experts believing that Tehran's regional power has been exaggerated through years of proxy wars. Recent attacks have revealed widespread security and intelligence vulnerabilities within the structure of the Iranian regime, weakening Beijing's confidence in its ally's ability to endure long-term.

Economically, the $400 billion agreement signed between the two countries has not translated into tangible projects on the ground due to sanctions and Iranian fears of Chinese influence. Beijing now finds itself facing a new reality, where Iran's GDP is less than Israel's despite the vast difference in area and population, making it a struggling economic partner.

Calculations with Washington play a pivotal role in shaping China's current stance, especially with the approaching summit between Presidents Xi Jinping and Donald Trump. Beijing seeks to avoid any confrontation with the US administration in the Middle East that could hinder opportunities to reach a comprehensive trade agreement that ends years of bitter rivalry between the two superpowers.

In light of the long-term war strategy announced by Tehran, China is awaiting the ability of the new Revolutionary Guard leadership, led by Ahmed Vahidi, to manage the conflict. If Iran succeeds in inflicting real damage on its adversaries, Beijing may be forced to reconsider its position and provide technical support and dual-use equipment similar to what it previously provided to Russia.

Reports indicate that political circles in Beijing are now accepting the idea of regime change in Tehran as a potential and non-catastrophic scenario, as long as the incoming leadership ensures the flow of oil. What is important for China is the stability of global markets, especially after oil prices rose by 6% due to the partial disruption of supplies in the early days of the confrontation.

Silent Chinese criticisms of mismanagement and corruption within Iranian state institutions also emerge as an additional factor in adopting a passive neutral stance. Chinese analysts believe that repeated Israeli infiltrations and the assassination of senior leaders and scientists reflect a state of internal distrust within the Iranian regime itself, making political investment in it high-risk.

For Israel, the continuation of the war incurs enormous economic losses amounting to 9.4 billion shekels per week, which Beijing monitors as a pressure factor that could end the conflict quickly. China hopes that these economic pressures on all parties will lead to a settlement that ensures shipping lanes remain open for its giant tankers heading east.

Estimates indicate that Beijing has oil reserves sufficient for about 30% of its annual imports, which gives it a short margin of maneuver before actual intervention. However, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz remains the 'red line' that could push the Chinese dragon to break its silence and act to protect its vital interests in the heart of the Middle East.

In the event of a rapid collapse of the Iranian regime, sources expect Beijing to quickly build bridges of communication with the new powers to ensure the continuity of oil agreements. China has proven in previous experiences its ability to adapt to sharp political changes as long as its commercial and geopolitical interests remain safe from direct targeting.

The disparity between Iran's revolutionary ideology and the urgent need for economic reform has put Tehran in a predicament that Beijing sees as a result of wrong decisions. Chinese analyses suggest that Tehran's insistence on confrontation without possessing sufficient economic power tools made it an easy target for superior American and Israeli military technology.

In conclusion, China's position remains subject to developments on the ground and Iran's ability to withstand the 'map-changing' campaign led by Washington. While military budgets in the region bleed billions of dollars daily, Beijing merely observes, awaiting the opportune moment to secure its share of the energy pie in the 'New Middle East'.

Beijing is not opposed to regime change in Iran per se; its top priority is to ensure that Tehran remains an effective economic partner that protects the flow of oil.