Gaza without Sovereignty Today, Palestine without a State Tomorrow

Dr. Ibrahim Neirat

What is being prepared for the Gaza Strip today is not mismanagement, nor a failed international endeavor, nor even an “incomplete solution” imposed by circumstances. What is happening is a complete, integrated, and gradual political project, whose ultimate goal is not to end the war or alleviate suffering, but to redefine the Palestinian issue: from a national liberation cause to a long-term humanitarian file, and from a struggle for sovereignty to a matter of population management.

The danger here lies not in the declared intentions, but in the guaranteed outcomes. Every path begins with temporary administration and ends with a permanent arrangement. And all talk of “phased approaches,” “realism,” and “lack of alternatives” is merely linguistic cover for entrenching the model of Gaza without sovereignty as a starting point for re-engineering the entire Palestinian scene.

What makes matters worse is that this transformation does not occur through an explicit declaration, but through gradual arrangements framed in the language of “necessity,” “alleviation,” and “humanitarian urgency.”

What is called the “Trump Peace Council” (the council launched within the White House framework and promoting alternative arrangements that address the “cost” instead of the “occupation”) does not represent a fleeting deviation in American policy, but rather the culmination of a long process that considers the problem not to be the occupation, but the cost of the occupation. And when the goal becomes reducing the cost, not ending the cause, the natural result is to search for arrangements that maintain control and reduce responsibility. Gaza, besieged, exhausted, and divided, is presented today as the ideal testing ground for this model.

More dangerous than the project itself is the silent adaptation to it. History is not liquidated by force alone, but by gradualism, by implicit acceptance, and by surrender called rationality. When the Palestinian leadership does not openly reject, does not set clear limits, and does not take political initiative, it is not “buying time,” but letting time work against it.

The Palestinian leadership might say it lacks the ability to confront. This is true. But it undoubtedly possesses the ability to prevent, to obstruct, to raise the cost, and to refuse to be a false witness to the liquidation of its cause. The inability to impose a solution does not justify accepting the cancellation of a solution. And the difference between political realism and political suicide is a difference of will, not a difference of power.

The most dangerous thing that can happen now is the transformation of Gaza into an entity managed with a separate budget, special legal rules, independent security arrangements, and long-term reconstruction contracts that do not pass through the Palestinian authority (the Palestinian government, the executive authority, and accredited official bodies). This is not a “solution for Gaza,” but a final separation for it. And anyone who thinks that this separation will stop at Gaza is either deluded or complicit in deception. The West Bank is simultaneously left to settlement and creeping annexation, while the Palestinian Authority is emptied of its political content and reduced to an administrative function without sovereignty or horizon.

Acquiescence to what the United States is leading at this stage is not pragmatism, but an open mandate to liquidate the Palestinian issue with soft tools. Washington is not looking for a just solution, nor even a balanced solution, but for a stable arrangement at the lowest possible cost to itself and to Israel. The more Palestinians accept this logic, the more they become the cost that must be reduced.

What is needed is not angry statements, nor high-flown speeches, but decisive and clear political actions. Any talk of reconstruction must be immediately linked to a written legal definition of the status of the Gaza Strip. Any administration must be time-bound and have a clear termination mechanism. Any party that takes over the administration of the Strip outside the Palestinian framework must bear full legal and humanitarian responsibility, without Palestinian cover, and without a formal partnership that is later used to blame Palestinians for failure.

It must also be stated clearly: contracts concluded outside the Palestinian authority will not be binding in the future. Not out of revenge, but in defense of the idea of a state. For reconstruction built upon the denial of sovereignty does not restore life, but entrenches defeat.

Internally, the most dangerous thing that can be allowed is the emergence of alternative legitimacies managed in the name of “reality.” Any circumvention of the national authority opens the door to the collapse of what remains of the Palestinian political system. And division, however deep, does not grant anyone the right to redefine Palestinian representation or bypass it. Silence here is not neutrality, but participation in dismantling.

Time, which some are betting on to overcome this stage, is not neutral. Time is either managed, or it turns into a slow crushing tool. And every day that passes without legal and procedural control over what is being prepared for Gaza brings us one step closer to a reality where statements of regret or speeches of “if only we had known” will be of no use.

This is not an ordinary moment, nor one of the repeated failures. This is a moment of final redefinition. Gaza without sovereignty today means Palestine without a state tomorrow. And whoever thinks that history will exempt the silent has not read the history of this issue.

The question is no longer: Do we have the ability to win?

The real question is: Do we have the will to prevent defeat before it becomes a fait accompli?

From Diagnosis to Plan: Decisive Steps for the Palestinian Authority

If this reading is accurate, the Palestinian Authority does not have the luxury of “monitoring” or “waiting.” An immediate action plan is required to prevent the establishment of the Gaza without sovereignty model, as follows:

• Conditional Acceptance of Reconstruction and Stability
• The Authority does not reject reconstruction, but it rejects its transformation into an alternative to sovereignty.
  Acceptance is only under clear conditions:
  • A written legal definition of Gaza's status,
  • Identification of the administering body and responsibilities,
  • A timeframe for ending any temporary administration.
• Establishing Red Lines That Cannot Be Crossed

Without declaring a confrontation, the Authority must establish:• Non-acceptance of permanent or open-ended administration outside Palestinian sovereignty.• Rejection of independent budgets or financial systems.• Rejection of any reconstruction or investment contracts that do not pass through the Palestinian government.• Rejection of using the Authority as legal cover.

• Preventing Illegitimate Administrative and Financial Cooperation

• Stopping any official dealings with projects or entities operating outside the government.• Non-acceptance of funding that goes directly to Gaza without passing through accredited frameworks.

• Activating Legal Prevention

Sending legal memoranda to the United Nations and donors confirming that:• Any administration outside Palestinian sovereignty bears international legal responsibility.• Any contracts outside the Palestinian framework are not binding in the future.

• Preserving the Unity of the Palestinian System

Preventing structural separation through:• A single budget,• A unified civil registry,• A unified legal and financial system.

• Managing the Relationship with Washington with a Logic of Cost, Not Confrontation

The Authority is not an adversary, but a less costly option.A clear message must be sent: bypassing the Authority does not accelerate the solution, but makes Gaza a long-term American burden.

• Preventing the Emergence of Alternative Legitimacies within Gaza

Non-recognition of any transitional structures or “local administration” outside the national framework.Division is not a justification for bypassing the Palestinian authority.

• Managing Time as a Pressure Tool

The Authority does not rush into full engagement if the conditions for sovereignty are not met, and keeps the door open to raise the cost on the bypassing parties over time.

If these steps are not taken now, Gaza will become the model upon which “Palestine without a state” is built.And this is not a warning but a reality about to be imposed.

The question is not: Can we win?The question is: Do we have the will to prevent defeat before it turns into reality?