How do we prevent Gaza's recovery from turning into an eight-decade project?

Next year will determine whether reconstruction will lead to breaking the cycle of violence in the region and the world 

How do we prevent Gaza's recovery from turning into an eight-decade project?

The American magazine "Foreign Policy" published an article by Shelly Culbertson addressing the challenges and mechanisms for rebuilding the Gaza Strip after the war, focusing on the fact that the issue is not just an engineering or material operation, but a comprehensive project that combines the human, social, and political dimensions with realistic planning, financing, and implementation.

When wars end, the focus should shift to what follows: the hard work of reconstruction. In the Gaza Strip, this effort will be on the scale of what Europe witnessed when its cities were destroyed during World War II, as well as what happened in Iraqi and Syrian cities that were razed during the war against the "ISIS" organization.

The fragile ceasefire in Gaza, and the 20-point peace framework, raise a degree of hope, but implementation requires strict realism. The destruction in Gaza is immense; about 70% of buildings are damaged or destroyed, 90% of the population has been displaced, basic infrastructure has been crushed, entire neighborhoods have been razed, hospitals and schools have been disrupted, and basic services have been almost completely cut off. The total cost of comprehensive reconstruction is estimated at more than $70 billion.

Reconstruction cannot begin, of course, until the political and security obstacles are overcome, as neither "Israel" nor "Hamas" has shown genuine commitment to rebuilding Gaza or enabling the governance arrangements necessary for such an effort. Nevertheless, even with these issues unresolved, it is time to think carefully about the measures required for real recovery. If the international community and regional actors approach Gaza's reconstruction without a shared vision, realistic timelines, and sufficient planning, the project is doomed to failure.

If planners, funders, and governments coordinate from the outset, the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip will be a vital element in creating the conditions for lasting stability. The way Gaza is rebuilt in the coming years will determine whether this moment will break the long cycle of violence in the region or be just another false dawn.

The war in Gaza has destroyed Palestinian heritage, and the natural environment has been damaged to the extent that many Palestinians may be unable to recognize their homes and fields. While recognizing the extent of the loss and acknowledging the impossibility of fully restoring what was is necessary, moving forward may require viewing this moment as an opportunity to start anew and replan the sector's entire infrastructure.

The RAND Corporation has developed a documented vision for Gaza and the West Bank, and this work shows that Gaza can be rebuilt, not just to restore what was lost, but to become a modern, sustainable area serving its population, contributing to the regional economy, and perhaps attracting tourists in the future. Gaza's cities could join other major economic cities in the Middle East, such as Amman, Dubai, Muscat, and "Tel Aviv". This vision ensures transforming Gaza from a symbol of destruction into a model of regional renewal.

Nevertheless, even with a clear vision, reconstruction efforts in Gaza will take longer than reconstruction in Iraq after ISIS, or recovery from Hurricane Katrina in the United States, much longer than many leaders and donors expect. Plans that envision fully rebuilding Gaza within five years do not account for this reality. Despite the importance of accelerating the pace of reconstruction in the short term, even prosperous countries have found that recovery from major disasters often takes a decade or more, and in unstable and conflict-prone contexts, it may extend to generations.

Germany, for example, after World War II, is a clear model; even after ten years, West Germany was hailed as an economic miracle, while reconstruction in East Germany remained incomplete. Without a precise approach, the timeline for Gaza's reconstruction could extend to decades. This should not be a cause for despair, but for preparation. A practical reconstruction plan addresses inevitable challenges before launch, centered on unclear property rights, debris, the need for immediate housing, restrictions on materials, weak management, and labor shortages. Each of these challenges is capable of obstructing Gaza's recovery path before it begins. However, the impacts of these obstacles can be mitigated through foresight and advance planning.

Property ownership is a fundamental issue in Gaza's reconstruction. Every piece of land is owned by someone, but ownership is often unclear. Even before the war, the ownership system was a complex mix of local, Israeli, Ottoman, British, and Egyptian laws, intertwined with claims to rights amid lost records, leading to ongoing disputes. It is essential to establish a clear framework for ownership, compensation, and dispute resolution before embarking on new urban development and community restoration.

Dealing with debris is the next challenge, as Gaza faces an estimated 68 million tons of debris, a figure far exceeding what cities like Mosul experienced, where debris ranged between 7 and 8 million metric tons after the war with the Islamic State. Under Gaza's debris lie human remains, in addition to about 7,500 metric tons of unexploded Israeli munitions. The United Nations estimated that debris removal alone could take 20 years. In Mosul, where debris was only about 15% of Gaza's level, the cleanup process remains incomplete eight years after the war's end.

It will be necessary to prioritize areas that can be cleared and rebuilt first, cordon off dangerous areas, provide sufficient equipment, remove unexploded ordnance, secure aggregation sites for processing removed debris, and handle victims' remains carefully. Debris removal requires effective international cooperation, and perhaps adopting new technologies, such as AI-based risk mapping, to accelerate the work.

Similarly, Gaza's debris can be turned into a valuable resource if recycled in building roads, ports, or even offshore islands, as part of innovative reconstruction projects. This huge amount of material can contribute to building future Gaza. In contrast, providing housing for all displaced Palestinians during reconstruction will be a major challenge. With most homes damaged or destroyed, Gaza residents currently live in temporary shelters on the beach, in semi-destroyed schools, and in tents near the ruins of their destroyed homes.

Up to 1.5 million Palestinians may need temporary shelter in safe, weather-resistant buildings, in addition to the need for water and electricity, while their permanent homes are rebuilt. The usual option in post-conflict areas is to establish camps intended to last for months, but which in reality turn into permanent cities. About a third of registered Palestinian refugees still live in camps in the Middle East established after 1948 and 1967, a reality that is repeating today with the outbreak of the war in October 2023.

The optimal approach is to develop temporary housing designed to avoid long-term camping. Given the number of affected people, camps become inevitable. Therefore, the RAND Corporation's plan suggests creating purpose-built camps, "future-oriented", that can later be developed into permanent residential neighborhoods. These camps will include tents and mobile homes within planning frameworks that allow for the construction of permanent homes later, with provision of transportation and basic services linked to neighboring cities. This also includes rehabilitating partially habitable neighborhoods to enable families to stay in them during the gradual reconstruction process. In areas where destruction is total, everything must be demolished and rebuilt completely, often through contracts with major international construction companies.

Reconstruction materials pose another challenge. For years, Gaza's economy has suffered from strict restrictions on dual-use materials, as Israel has prevented their entry, which today requires a serious review of this policy that destroyed Gaza's construction sector without preventing Hamas from building its tunnel network. Continuing to ban basic building materials will only deepen Gaza's poverty, and thus lead to a new round of violence in the future. In contrast, Israeli security concerns can be addressed through effective monitoring mechanisms and transparent supply chains. Bearing some calculated risks regarding materials necessary to enhance recovery may be the safest path forward.

No less important is the issue of financing and managing reconstruction. Billions of dollars from donors and private investments are expected to flow into Gaza in the near future. However, money alone does not guarantee success, as Gaza cannot afford funding inflows faster than management mechanisms can absorb. In previous experiences, inadequate administration has often hindered post-conflict recovery. A recent military report pointed to several factors behind the failure of the $145 billion American investment in Afghanistan, including oversight structures that failed to prevent corruption.

Hence, the need for governance and administrative structures capable of prioritizing projects, integrating local decision-making with international expertise, overseeing major capital projects, coordinating donor efforts, and ensuring transparency in financial flows. Gaza will also need proven technological systems, including unified platforms for coordinating donor efforts, similar to those developed by the European Union for Ukraine.

Finally, Gaza's reconstruction will require a skilled and extensive workforce, including engineers, builders, accountants, planners, and administrators. Gaza's labor capacity has been depleted by the war, with thousands of men of working age killed or injured, while women's participation in the labor market remains low. Other recovery experiences show the danger of underestimating this issue; reconstruction of the US Virgin Islands after hurricanes slowed for years due to shortages of skilled labor and insufficient housing for incoming workers. To avoid similar paralysis, Gaza will need vocational training programs to qualify Palestinians for reconstruction work, in addition to bringing in international labor managed through large-scale contracts, with provision of nearby accommodations, such as in Egypt across the border.

However, physical rebuilding is only one part of the recovery process; it must be accompanied by social and institutional rehabilitation. Reconstruction cannot advance without sustainable security and political stability. The ceasefire may collapse, donor appetite may wane, or regional tensions may resurface. Planners should not underestimate the human dimension, as widespread psychological trauma, physical disabilities from injuries, loss of social cohesion, and lack of trust among Palestinians after years of war all constitute serious obstacles to recovery.

Nevertheless, history shows that countries and cities destroyed by wars, from Berlin to Ho Chi Minh City to Beirut, are capable of rebuilding and even thriving if given time and the right approach. Next year will determine whether Gaza's recovery begins on realistic foundations or remains stuck in a quagmire of waiting. The difference lies in the details, from workforce plans to institutional coordination mechanisms. These details may seem technical, but they are in fact the foundation of peace and prosperity. Ignoring them can abort even the most generous international efforts, while mastering them can give Palestinians what they have lacked for decades: not just temporary relief, but a real opportunity to rebuild and stay in their homeland.